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Abstract
This thesis analyses the use of law in the emergence and functioning of public enterprises 
in Bangladesh, which are viewed as a politico-economic and legal institution devised to 
implement public policy. According to a meeting o f experts at Tangier (Morocco) from 
the 15-19 December 1980 on the "Concept, definition and clssification o f public 
enterprises", a public enterprise is an organisation which is:
-owned by public authorities including central, state or local authorities, to the extent 
of fifty percent or more,
-is under the top managerial control of the owning public authorities, such public 
control including, inter alia, the right to appoint management and to formulate critical 
policy decisions,
-is established for the achievement of a defined set o f public purposes, which may be 
multidimensional in character
-and is consequently placed under a system of public accountability
-is engaged in activities of a business character
-involves the basic idea of investment and returns
-and which markets its outputs in the shape of goods and services.1
Thus, public enterprises would include any commercial, financial, industrial, agricultural 
or promotional undertaking owned by a public authority, either wholly or through majority 
share holding which is engaged in the production and sale of goods and services and 
whose affairs are capable of being recorded in the balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts.
In spite of the fact that many of the problems of public enterprises are a direct concern of 
lawyers, this thesis is the first attempt by a lawyer to study legal aspects of public 
enterprises in the context of Bangladesh. It aims to make an original contribution to the 
growing body of scholarship establishing links between public law and politics. It was 
undertaken at a time when the idea of privatisation is sweeping all over the world, 
necessitating a fresh discussion on the role of public enterprises and the practicality of 
significant privatisation in a poor country like Bangladesh.
By its very nature, the thesis can only be both analytical as well as descriptive. The 
scheme of analysis involves reference to historical, political, social and economic factors 
that have contributed to the emergence of public enterprises in Bangladesh and the later 
privatisation o f some of them.
The thesis is influenced by the recognition o f the importance of contextual non-legal 
factors that have influenced the development process in Bangladesh. Like in many other 
developing countries, in Bangladesh the role of law in achieving developmental objectives 
has been over-emphasised. Of course problems of development have clearly influenced 
the perception of the predominant role of legislation. But law is only one factor 
interwoven with other factors in a wider social and economic fabric. This is not to de- 
emphasise the importance of formal legal provisions, but they should be seen as symbols 
of attempts to implement the law's underlying tasks, and, in the course of this, as 
providing political resources which individuals and groups can utilise to gain their ends. It 
is, therefore, important not to confuse the instruments of implementation with the 
underlying purposes themselves. Thus this thesis, instead of focusing only on the different 
kinds of legal rules, looks at the underlying power relationships in Bangladesh and the 
interests for which state power is being used which, in turn, influence the actual 
functioning of the public enterprises. The roles of the state and the bureaucracy in the 
functioning of public enterprises are included in this discussion. It explains the behaviour,
'Report of the Expert Group Meeting at Tanner*, in P. Fernandes and P.Sichert (ed). Seeking the Personality of Public 
Enterprise: An Enquiry into the Concept, Definition and Classification o f Public Enterprises, 1981, p.24.
performance and development of public enterprises in Bangladesh. It also, examines the 
political and socio-economic context in which public enteiprises are embedded. The 
central hypothesis of the thesis is that the creation and operation of public enterprises are 
mostly determined by the character of the political coalition in power, and that political 
changes are reflected in intra-organisational dimensions. It recognizes that even though 
public enterprises are powerful socio-economic and legal entities, to understand their 
functioning it is necessary to analyse their external environment.
Indeed, an adequate approach to public law should be to investigate public policy, and ask 
what demands government makes of the constitutional and legal systems in seeking to 
achieve its objectives, how those systems respond to those expectations, and the problems 
created by those responses for the government. Thus public law is a tool used to achieve 
public ends. The use of public law may occur directly either through the moulding of 
social processes by regulatory rules or through the establishment and definition of 
institutions. Thus the version of public law adopted in the thesis has for its main focus of 
interest the design of institutions through which public policy is implemented along with 
the relationship between those institutions and other parts o f  the constitutional structure.
Therefore, a particular concern of this thesis will be institutional design for the operation 
of public enterprises in Bangladesh. Operational aspects include both organisation and 
management. Organisation is viewed as the structure o f  hierarchy in the functioning of 
public enterprises and management can be defined as the processes by which the work is 
accomplished including planning, financing, staffing, controlling various activities and 
ensuring accountability.
The thesis concludes that, the legal forms and the law including measures of privatisation 
have not achieved what they had intended to. The benefit of the legal form can be 
achieved only when there is a full understanding and acceptance by the concerned parties 
viz., government, management and workers of what a legal form entails. Until public 
enterprise culture becomes more business-like, the changes in the legal form will be of 
little relevance. In order to improve the performance of public enterprises it is necessary to 
ensure true accountability of the government to the people. Without establishing real 
democracy in Bangladesh, which was mostly governed by martial law, framing rules and 
regulations to improve performance of public enterprises will largely be an exercise that 
will not ensure practical benefits to the country.
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Introduction
i. T h eo re tica l Sett inns
In Bangladesh, the public sector came into being through the following legal processes:- 
First, public enterprises functioning in Bangladesh before independence became 
the property of the Republic of Bangladesh through the mechanism of state succession. In 
the field o f industries, Bangladesh Industrial Development Corporation was established 
for the purpose of taking over the enterprises and other assets of East Pakistan industrial 
Corporation.1 Second, the state took over the control and management of enterprises of 
non-Bengalis who either left the country or were not available to control and manage the 
enterprises.2 Third, the government also took over management and control of some 
enterprises whose former owners or directors could not be allowed to control or manage 
them "in the public interest".3 In other words, the state confiscated4 certain properties. 
Fourth, the government nationalised jute, textiles and sugar industries through P.O.27.
There are 50 public corporations, of which 13 deal with industrial enterprises, 11 
belong to the financial and insurance sector, 9 work for transport and tourism, 7 for 
agriculture and water resources, 4 dealing with the energy sector, 4 for area development 
and spatial planning and 2 for trading.5 Thus, it is noticed that these corporations vary in 
their nature and purpose. Some are natural monopolies e.g., the energy sector, public 
utilities (area development and spatial planning), while others are commercial in nature.
1. See article 4 of The Bangladesh Industrial Development Corporation Order, 1972, P.O. 39 o f 1972.
2 See article 2. The Bangladesh (Taking Over o f Control and Management o f Industrial and Commercial Concerns) Order, being
A. P.O. I  o f1972.
3 Ibid; il although did not make it clear what constituted public interest but in fact the stale took over properties of those who 
collaborated with the Pakistan army in the genocide.
The Bangladesh (Taking Over of Control and Management of Industrial and Commercial Concerns) Order 1972 (A.P.O. 1 of 
1972) empowered the government to lake over their 'control and management, or appoint a Management Board or Administrator, 
or direct any autonomous or semi-autonomous body or any other authority, to take over control and management'  Article 2< 1) 
of the Acting President s Order No. I  o f1972.
4 Here confiscation is used in the sense of an administrative punitive measure. Through it ownership is transferred to the state by a
unilateral act of the latter without compensation.
The list of public sector corporations in Bangladesh is provided in appendix 2.
Apart from the above mentioned public corporations, some public enterprises are 
organised as departmental undertakings e.g. public health and hospitals, railways, posts, 
telephone and telegraph etc.
The thesis will mainly study the public corporations under the Ministry of 
Industry.6 One reason for choosing this group is that it alone has raised much debate in the 
country because many of the enterprises came into the public sector through 
nationalisation, which was equated by the government as a step towards socialism.
It will be an error to take nationalisation by itself as a socialist policy without 
analysing who nationalised and for what ends. Nationalisation had also created much 
confusion; the Dhaka Chamber of Commerce always blamed nationalisation for 
dampening the environment of investment, though, as will be seen later, there is 
practically no evidence to support its assertion. Since only manufacturing industries, banks 
and insurance companies were nationalised - i.e taken over by the state from the private 
sector with compensation, there is a better prospect for them to attract private capital in 
case of privatisation because these were once in private hands. Furthermore, other public 
enterprises, irrespective of the ideological bias of the government, are likely to remain in 
the public sector for a long time to come because they are either too capital intensive, or 
strategic or service oriented or the private sector is not interested in them. Indeed, those 
enterprises were under the public sector even when Bangladesh was still a part of 
Pakistan.
Many of the problems connected with the functioning of public enterprises are 
legal in character, e.g. institutional structures, the relationships between institutions, the 
balance between autonomy and control. The subject of public enterprises and their role 
and management has taken on a much heightened significance in public policy discussions
The jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry is limited to
is passing through an intense uncertainty at 
resulting in the resignation of General Er 
property worth 5.6 billion U.S S. (The Bangladesh Turn
in late 1990's because since then the country 
ill recovering from the recent political upheavals 
ing about half a million people and destroying 
i elected government has sworn in April 1991.
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around the world because of the electoral victories of supporters of market economy in 
Britain, USA, Canada and Germany during the 1980s. The recent changes in Eastern 
European countries, resulting in the shift of the policy towards privatisation of public 
enterprises, have also contributed to a fresh discussion on the subject.
In spite of their great importance in the economy of Bangladesh, there has been 
very little research on public enterprises. In the past, what little research was made was 
done by economists, management and financial experts who studied public enterprises 
from their respective points of view. But surprisingly, in spite of being a legal category, 
not a single study has been done by lawyers. This thesis is the first attempt by a lawyer to 
study public enterprises in Bangladesh. It is not only public enterprises but indeed, 
research in law in general has been very little compared to other social science disciplines 
in Bangladesh. Whatever little legal research was done in Bangladesh, has been positivist 
in nature. These studies recognise the instrumental functions of the lawyers only. Such 
studies only examine the world of legal rules, trying merely to harmonise and elucidate 
them so that in the words of Seidman, "they [can] form a gapless web."7 But is it not 
becoming more and more clear that law has a social engineering function which cut-across 
the boundary of conflict amelioration to become a means through which social policies 
become social actions?
Public enterprises are embarked upon to perform various functions. The diversity 
of functioas has the consequences of a mixed character, reflected in the existing 
legislation. They function in an environment of coastitutional, administrative, civil and 
company laws whose interpretation and conciliation are not always obvious. They are 
public agencies and yet often operate through private law.8 They work in a very complex 
institutional environment and transcend traditional legal categories. Their insertion in a 
hierarchical system (the economic organisation of the state or the system of direction of
7 R.B Seidman. The Suit, Law and Development, 1978, p.45.
*. Many academia have thown Ike high degree of compenctralion between public and private lawa and tllualraled the complcxiliaa 
of diarovering the dividing line between public and private law. See for example. O Poggi. Tht Development o f the Modern 
Stale, (especially chapter vi). 1978 ^
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the economy) influences the efficiency of the decision-making and thus the performance 
of the enterprises. The public enterprises have to deal with demand not only related to the 
quantity or quality of its products but also to the demands of the public administration, 
government and citizens in terms of the execution of policies. This means they are partly 
commercial organisations and partly a component of the bureaucracy.
As will be seen, public enterprises are a device capable of different uses, and its 
uses are determined by various factors. The key factors include the mode and the relations 
of production, the nature and alliances of the ruling groups, and the access to and control 
over the state apparatus. Ultimately the functions of the public enterprises must depend on 
the nature of the state. Indeed, public enterprises are an emanation and extension of the 
state, and their dynamics can scarcely be understood without some appreciation o f the role 
of the state and social groups who control its apparatus. Thus, research on them needs to 
be undertaken in a broad framework that goes beyond law if a genuine understanding of 
their dynamics are to be understood.
Public enterprises are an emanation and extension of the state. A small class, 
however has control of the state apparatus. At the time of independence the local 
bourgeoisie was very weak because of the colonial past and the discriminatory policy of 
the Pakistani government. But within the framework of Pakistan a group of petty- 
bourgeoisie developed. This group gave leadership during the war of independence. In the 
absence of a strong group of local bourgeoisie the government had no alternative but to 
take control of management of the enterprises. Thus nationalisation in Bangladesh was 
more a reflexive attitude of the government necessitated by the objective need of the time 
to cope with the vacuum created by the independence of Bangladesh rather than a long­
term economic policy.
Thus, the law on nationalisation responded to the problems arising from the 
economic situation prevailing in the country. There was an objective need for 
nationalisation to which the law was a response, more in an attempt to discourage the
4
economic destabilization than to allow an offensive against private enterprises. The law 
was thus a variable determined by the external and internal factors. Public enterprises 
were set up as instruments of national economic policy and economic levers with which 
planning objectives are to be realised. The compulsion for creating public enterprises 
seems to have come primarily from the realisation that state should gain control over 
economic resources and also that the state should rescue operation of the private sector.
The task perceived by the government, which was led by the petty-bourgeoisie was 
to allow the latter to develop itself into the national bourgeoisie that would eventually take 
responsibility of the enterprises from the government. Thus when the class of petty- 
bourgeoisie obtained access to state power it started appropriating the surpluses hitherto 
consumed by the Pakistani colonial and Bengali comprador bourgeoisie both in urban and 
rural areas. The government machinery and the public enterprises were used to nurture 
this class. But the leadership was under pressure from more radicals within the party. 
Thus, although the party in power incorporated socialism as one of the state policies in the 
Constitution of the country, in practice, as will be seen, it was not serious about it. This 
was time-buying rhetoric, giving sufficient time and opportunity to the petty-bourgeoisie 
to strengthen itself. This is evident from the policies and practice of the Awami League 
government. First the ceiling on private investment was fixed at Taka 2.5 million9,
The exchange rale of Hriliah £ in liangladeah Taka aince independence ia ahown in the following ublc:-
5
thereupon raised to 30 million and 100 million in 1975. This general increase was done to 
accommodate the increasing capability of the trading bourgeoisie. The government did not 
bring any change in the private property oriented economy and agricultural reforms were 
not introduced in order to elevate the conditions of the masses.
The thesis (Chapter 1) will examine the interaction of law with political and 
societal factors in order to help towards a better understanding of the social role of law. 
Such study is necessary because a close textual analysis of law does not clarify a great 
deal the effectiveness of the law or its ability to solve pressing social and economic 
problems. The traditional legal study, which deals mainly with forms and structures, 
would be insufficient to illuminate how the enterprises in Bangladesh function in reality.
The thesis will show that public enterprises are not neutral institutions through 
which the government can achieve development disinterestedly. They exist in a neo­
colonial political economy and serve definite class interests.10 In Bangladesh, the material 
weakness of the bourgeoisie and the heterogeneity of the dominant class enables the 
bureaucracy to occupy a dominating position. But the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie
Table!
Exchange rale of Taka per Pound Sterling
Official Wage Hamer's Rale
67.13
'= Nil. (Source: Bangladesh Bank).
10 Mere, slate representing 'class ¡Merest' is not used i 
exercise of domination over the rest of society.
I groups in the
6
have an identity of interests emanating from their common social base. The economic base 
of the bourgeoisie, engaged mostly in trading, is weak, primarily non-entrepreneurial, 
largely parasitic and thus dependent upon the bureaucracy for its own development and 
yet enjoys state power.11 The access and proximity to power allows it to control the 
economy including the public enterprises. Both bureaucracy and bourgeoisie thus depend 
on the public sector- and particularly on its system of patronage12 like distribution of 
import-export licences, quotas, public works orders, granting of bank loans for even non- 
feasible/fictitous enterprises which were never established.13 Capital formation was 
encouraged with abundant government finance involving mostly public enterprises, low 
interest rates and over-valued exchange rate resulting in the increase of corruption.
It is thus evident that public enterprises have been extensively used as a form of 
patronage, a device to channel resources to the ruling political party. This patrimonial use 
of public enterprises is bound to affect the efficiency, competitions and profitability of 
enterprises.
Analyses of the class character of the Bangladeshi state have focused on ways in 
which the ruling groups have attempted to control the economy through the political 
means at its disposal by the creation and extension of state ownership, through providing 
capital as well as satisfying the political and ideological conditions of their own authority 
and legitimacy. This situation lends itself to an analysis of the causes of contradiction 
within the state while describing such apparently resulting malfunctions of state policy as 
corruption, bureaucratic control, lack of commitment amongst political leaders.
11 M.M.Iluq. Toward« Undemanding Relationship between the Government and Public I nlerprises in Bangladesh: with emphasis 
on Public Corporations', unpublished paper presented at a seminar on Public Enterprises in Bangladesh, organised by BPATC, 
16-17 March 1986. p.6.
12. R.Sobhan and M. Ahmad. 1‘ubltc Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime . A Study in the Political Economy o f Bangladesh. 1980, 
also N.lslam. Development Planning in Bangladesh. A Study in Political Economy. 1977.
This point has been underscored by several authors studying public enterprises in the developing countries, see Y.P. Ghai. 
'Control and Management of the Economy: Research Perspective on Public Enteiprise' in Ghai (ed). Law in the Political 
Economy o f Public Enterprise, 1977.1.G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, 1976. C. Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The 
Political Economy o f Neocolonialism, 1975.
13. 1-earni from interviews and news paper reportings from time to time.
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Nationalisation of industries took place by an ordinance of the President known as 
the Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) Order, 1972. Public enterprises in 
the industrial sector are controlled and managed in accordance with this Order and this 
Order brought many private industrial enterprises under public ownership.
The thesis will, thus, examine this Order in the light of the socio-economic realities 
of Bangladesh in organising public industrial enterprises. It aims to show that the 
government that nationalised some industries, including banking and insurance, in the 
name of establishing socialism was in fact guided by pragmatism rather than by any 
ideology, and that socialism was used only as a convenient rhetoric. The thesis will also 
discuss the Constitutional provisions relating to public enterprises, the nature of 
Bangladeshi state and the legal system of Bangladesh.
The presence o f a large number of public enterprises also required an effective co­
ordination amongst themselves as well as the clarification of their relationship with 
governmental institutions. Most of these issues are ultimately related to the organisation 
and structure of public enterprises. The role of the public lawyer here will be to ‘map the 
state’ by investigating the mutual relations of institutions and their interactions with the 
private sphere. A particular concern in this thesis thus, will be the institutional form 
adopted in Bangladesh. The thesis will concentrate (chapter 3) on this issue by considering 
how successfully the institution of public ownership of industry was designed and how 
implementation took place.
But the institutions cannot be analysed in isolation from each other and from other 
elements of social structure because they form a system. This produces a further legal 
concern - the constitutional dimensions in which the limits and interrelationships of 
institutions are examined. The thesis, therefore, will analyse the complex pattern of 
influence and regulations between government and the enterprises, and the relations with 
Parliament.
In preference to departmental form, the public corporation form of legal 
organisation in the industrial sector has been adopted in Bangladesh. One of the crucial 
problems of this form is to find a balance between autonomy granted to the enterprises and 
the ensuring of accountability. This balancing between autonomy and control constitutes 
the very essence of the relationship between the government and public corporations.
Chapter-4 therefore, will critically analyse contradictory pressures for, on the one 
hand, autonomy for the enterprises and on the other, political control. The thesis will show 
that this balancing is not possible in Bangladesh because the group that shapes the nature 
of state administration and the role played by public enterprises in the development of the 
new rich class do not normally allow such a balance. On the contrary, the tendency is 
always to create an imbalance in favour of the executive government because of the 
absence/ineffectiveness of democratic institutions like the Parliament or a free press. True 
accountability becomes antithetical to the interests of both bureaucracy and bourgeoisie. 
Therefore, although the Nationalisation Order of 1972, other government instructions and 
policy declarations stress the need to allow more autonomy to the public enterprises but in 
reality they are not properly implemented. In this thesis, I am going to show that legal 
forms in themselves have relatively little significance. It is the way they are employed and 
manipulated that really matters.
Referring to the situation in the developing countries, Ghai writes:
.... in the economic and political context of most developing countries
the relevance of the legal and organisational forms of public 
enterprises for the conduct and performance of these enterprises has 
long been in dispute, specially since it was not to be expected that the 
governments of these countries would restrict themselves to their 
legally assigned roles. For a variety of reasons, many of which are 
connected with the maintenance of the existing power structure, the 
public sector is subject to improper political pressures. Many of the 
existing legal forms of public enterprises, whether they be statutory 
corporations or registered companies, are designed to ensure 
commercial and operational autonomy for the enterprise. Yet these 
forms have not secured this autonomy.14
Y.P. Gh»i and A. Bohm. Editorial Introduction'. Public Enterprise, vol. 10. No.l. 1990, p.10.
The situation in Bangladesh is not different from Ghai's remark on the limitations 
of the legal forms in the situation of developing countries. In spite of the absence of 
required autonomy, as inherent in the constitutional theory of public corporation form, 
with the careful designing of institutions and allocations of responsibilities between 
different tiers of the managerial hierarchy the legal form can be more successful.15
After only three and half years of independence, however the government was 
overthrown through a military coup. There has since been a reversal of the policy. The 
period since 1982, especially, has witnessed total denationalisation i.e., the transfer of 
nationalised units to private sector. Apart from denationalisation there have been 
divestment of many public enterprises.16 Chapter 5 deals with the extent and process of 
privatisation17, its impact on the economy, procedures followed for privatisation and the 
introduction of holding companies in Bangladesh.
In principle, privatisation may be a highly desirable objective18, and indeed, it has 
been increasingly pressed by international financial institutions, like the World Bank and 
IMF, on all debt ridden countries. However desirable it might seem to be in developed 
industrialised countries, as will be seen, in most developing countries including 
Bangladesh, given economic and political realities, extensive privatisation is unlikely to 
take place.19 Because of the size of the public sector and because of the political and 
economic difficulties associated with privatisation, it is likely that a large number of
15. Prof. Ghai also thinks that the form can become import».------------------------------------------------------------------
ihe enterprise management Ibid. In another article Ghai writes, "the form is not merely an empty shell: it is a device for i 
aggregation of resources: creation of bureaucracies: the pursuit of goals and a vehicle for entering into relationships with other 
groups.' Y.P. Ghai. 'Control and Management of Economy: Research Perspectives on Public Enterprises' in Ghai (edX op. til..
In fact both dénationalisa
17 Privatisation generally speaking denotes changing public ownership into private ownership. The concept of privatisation is. in
fact, much wider It is to be understood, not merely in the structural sense of who owns an enterprise, but in the substantive sense 
of how far the operations of an enterprises are brought within the discipline of market forces. An elaborate discussion of 
privatisation can be found in Chapter S.
18. The rationale for privatisation is discussed in chapter 5.
19. It may be mentioned here that in the developed countries there exist strong private sectors and financial markets capable of 
mobilising resources to take advantage of divestiture programmes. Although in the developing countries, loo. the winds of 
political rhetoric are gusting strongly against public enterprises as instruments of economic activity and even as forms of 
governmental structure, the situation in these countries are altogether different. In the absence of a developed market and of
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public enterprises will continue to operate in Bangladesh. Moreover, in Bangladesh, 
private sector exists on the fringe and often on the strength of costly government support 
programmes.20 The private sector is actively encouraged to set up industrial units through 
provision of substantial credit by public enterprise such as the Shilpa Bank (BSB) and 
Shilpa Rin Shangstha (BSRS).
Despite the current emphasis on private sector development and the privatisation, 
in its structural sense, of many current public functions, it will be evident that public 
enterprises in one form or another will be around for a long time. Indeed, in spite of the 
commitment of the government of Bangladesh for a market oriented economy, the Third 
Five Year Plan (TFYP) 1985-90 realised the absurdity of total privatisation. Even after 
substantive denationalisation and divestment of many public enterprises during the Second 
Five Year Plan 1980-85, the TFYP 1985-90 mentioned that public sector corporations and 
their enterprises still "occupy a critical place in the economy as they control the 
commanding heights of the economy from public utilities to some of the major 
industries."21 Even the World Bank, a prescriber of privatisation, acknowledged that 
"greater reliance on private investment and market forces in determining industrial 
efficiency alone will not be sufficient to transform the industrial sector in Bangladesh."22 
Thus a degree of public enterprise is imperative, irrespective of the ideological bias of the 
present government.
In Bangladesh, privatisation has not yet achieved the intended results like greater 
efficiency. At the same time, most public enterprises are, also, inefficient. But the issues 
surrounding the role of public enterprises were never discussed without any ideological 
bias. This resulted in the hasty adoption of privatisation without considering proper
adequate capital in private hands public enterprises will continue to play a significant role in the economy of developing
20 A.H.M.N. Chowdhury. Small and Medium Industries in Asian Developing Countries'. Asian Development Review, vol.8, no.2,
1990. p.28.
21. Government of Bangladesh. The Third Five Year Plan 198S-90. 1985. p.26. (emphasis added).
22 IBRD. Industrial Sector in Bangladesh. 1989. p.59.
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implications, resulting in the failure of privatisation policy.23 It should be mentioned here 
that public enterprise or privatisation are means to an end, the end being national well 
being; they are not ends by themselves. The achievement of end is more important than 
the means and hence, means should be suitably revised in the interest of accomplishing the 
end.
Since total privatisation is impossible, over-enthusiasm for privatisation must not 
direct the attention of policy makers from the more important task of instituting necessary 
structural, policy, and management reforms so that public enterprises in Bangladesh can 
operate with efficiency, productivity and financial gain.
The thesis is intended to show that privatisation should not denote mere transfer of 
ownership from the state to private sector but the introduction of greater reliance on 
market mechanisms, like allowing the management o f  the public enterprises to borrow 
from the financial market and not the injection from the treasury, to fix prices of its 
products, to give more autonomy to the enterprise management to be guided by provisions 
of the company law and its own memorandum of articles, etc. The thesis raises doubts 
about the efficacy and efficiency likely to be accrued by simply transferring the ownership 
to the private sector depending on state patronage and without introducing institutions and 
means to control the growth of monopoly, standard and quality of services provided to the 
consumers, which are at the moment absent. The social and economic cost of such 
privatisation is too enormous to be borne by a country with more than 80% population 
living below the subsistence level. Moreover, since massive privatisation is impossible, is 
it not the time to give public enterprises an opportunity to operate without interference 
from the government in their day to day functioning and allow them to be guided, as far as 
possible, by the market forces rather than the present, detailed albeit informal, guidance
23. The general remark of Windell G. Schaeffer. President of Ihe Bruise Is based IASIA (Inlcrnalional Association of Schools and 
Institutes of Administration) referring to the situation in the developing countries fully fill in the Bangladesh situation. He remarked. 
■Unfortunately. Ihe issues surrounding the role of public enterprises often are not being discussed or analysed in an impartial or 
scientific manner. We live in a political world, and ideology and politics take centre stage whenever matters of such importance are 
being debated. Ihe result is that international hanking, lending and assistance institutions, as well as the political leadership in many 
countries, are all too ready to urge willy-nilly upon decision makers their current panaceas for economic ills, often to the detriment of 
particular institutions and even of the economy as a whole.' W.O.Schaeffer. 'Foreword' to K.Wcltcnhall. and C.O.Naullain ((eds.)). 
Getting Together in Public Enterprise. 1987. p.v.
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from the treasury or the parent ministry? Therefore the problem of devising more 
satisfactory means for public ownership needs urgent attention by public lawyers. This 
should be based partly on a democratic concern with the design of the instruments to 
achieve legitimacy through participation and proper accountability. Unfortunately, in the 
expectation that one day public enterprises will be privatised, far less attention than 
necessary has been paid to devising appropriate institutional design or the genuine 
implementation of reforms. Indeed, privatisation cannot avoid the central problem of 
relations between government and industry. Therefore the need for effective public law 
institution building in regulation and on the relations between government and industry 
remains as pressing as ever.
ii. The Background
Bangladesh became a sovereign independent state on the 16th of December 1971 as a 
result o f a successful war of independence. Before 1947, Bangladesh was a part of British 
India. In August 1947, when British India was partitioned into two states, namely India 
and Pakistan, the area now comprising Bangladesh (at that time East Bengal, a part of the 
province of Bengal) fell to the share of Pakistan. After 1947 till independence in 1971, it 
was a province of Pakistan and was known as East Pakistan.
Eighty percent of the population of East Bengal (now Bangladesh) were Muslims 
but during British rule, the Bengali Hindu community held control of land, business, 
commerce, industries, money lending, civil service, education, legal and other professions. 
After partition in 1947 the Hindu community, especially industrialists, businessmen, 
landed aristocracy, professionals, gradually migrated to India. Moreover, during British 
rule, almost all industrial development in this region took place in and around Calcutta, 
which was the capital of British India until 1911. As a result, industries, capital, wealth 
and entrepreneurship tended to be concentrated in Calcutta which, at independence
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became part of India.24 Thus since independence in 1947 the state had to take direct 
responsibility for indastrialisation by creating public enterprises.
As it transpired later by experience, within the framework of Pakistan, East 
Pakistan found itself in the situation o f colony of West Pakistan (now Pakistan). The East 
Pakistanis had to fight the West Pakistanis who wanted to rule by force. In reply to East 
Pakistan's demand for provincial autonomy, its fair share of economic development and 
the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people the West Pakistani army 
started genocide on the 25th of March 1971. Under the circumstances East Pakistan 
declared its independence as the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh on the 26th March 1971 
resulting in a bloody civil war25. The war ended with the unconditional surrender of all 
Pakistani forces on the 16th of December 1971. After the war Bangladesh once again had 
to start afresh.
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world, surviving on foreign aid. It 
has a population of 120 million with a comparatively small area of 55,598 sq. miles. It is 
the most densely populated country in the world, with a density of 1350 persons per sq. 
mile, and the number is on the rise. The dynamics of population growth, with inadequate 
compensatory growth in non-agricultural sectors, have led to massive landlessness, 
illiteracy and poverty. 80% of the population depend on agriculture. The balance of 
payment is dangerously in deficit. The export earning can cover only 30% of the import 
bill. Economic development was thus impossible without direct participation of the state 
because of the lack of capital and entrepreneurial ability of the moneyed section of 
society. Even when there was capital, private entrepreneurs were uninterested in investing 
where risks were high and chances of profit small. Thus, the state had to take the main
24 During British rule the urea now compriaing Bangladesh was relegated lo a position of a hinterland via-a -via certain other parts 
of British India As a result no major industries were set up in Bangladesh during the British period although it had natural 
advantages in jute. lea. tobacco, paper and leather Bangladesh had a monopoly in the production of jute in the world but none of 
the 106 jute mills in British India was situated in present Bangladesh All the jute fibre grown in the region used to feed the iute 
mills of West Bengal (now a province of India) or exported. IN. Ahmed. An Economic Orography of East Pakistan. 1968, p. 222.) 
11« industrial backwardness of the region can he understood from the fact that there were 1500 industrial enterprises (with 20 or 
more workers in each factory) in West Bengal against 83 in last Bengal (present Bangladesh) in 1947 |F.H Yusuf. 
Nationalisation o f Industries In Bangladesh. 1985. p.47.|
25. There exist a vast literature on the independence of Bangladesh, the breakup of Pakistan and description of the genocide 
committed by Pakistan army. Some of them are mentioned in chapter I.
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responsibility for industrialisation by directly establishing and operating industries. The 
state was seen as a crucial stimulant and organiser of socio-economic progress. The 
government had conceived public enterprises as an instrument of development strategy 
and resorted to it whenever private investments were likely to be inadequate. Thus the 
ideology of 'developmentalisnr and the idea of the interventionist state some what 
overlap.26
The bulk of the development budget of Bangladesh27 come from developed 
countries and its public enterprises mostly utilise those funds. As such public enterprises 
of Bangladesh are part and parcel of the wider international capital. As a result even the 
form of organisation of public enterprises of the developed countries are replicated 
without taking into consideration the politico-economic situation of the country. This is 
also evident from the fact that now the developed countries are privatising many public 
enterprises so is Bangladesh.
Before independence in 1971, the industrial sector was dominated by West 
Pakistani entrepreneurs, although there were many manufacturing public enterprises, too. 
Moreover, West Pakistan was the principal market for many of the industries. At 
independence both these factors changed. During the war, the Pakistani entrepreneurs left 
the country leaving their enterprises, and immediately after the war the Pakistani market 
was closed. The abandoned industries of the departing Pakistani industrialists were taken 
over by the state. Apart from it, the state nationalized jute, textiles and sugar industries. 
About 85% of the assets of medium and large scale industries comprised the public 
enterprises. Thus the government undertook the task of not only controlling but operating 
the industrial sector which has been drained of its managers and deprived of its principal 
markets. The new government also changed the structure of ownership.
26 Pie l in e  view is expressed hv While. G. While. 'The Developmental Stale' in Y.P.Ghai. R.Luckham and F.Snyder (ed). The 
Political Economy o f Low, A Third World Reader. 1987. p 433
27 80% of the development budget of Bangladesh cornea from foreign aid or loans. See the budget speech of Finance Minister Saifur 
Rahman in the Jatiyo Sangshad (name of the Parliament) on 3.6.91. reported in all Bangladeshi dailies on 4.6.91.
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Thus, in Bangladesh, the existence of a number of public enterprises had become 
not merely important, but indispensable. A sizeable public sector existed at the time of her 
emergence as an independent state on December 16, 1971. Within three months of 
independence, a decision was taken to nationalise28 banking, insurance companies and 
some industries. This was explained in part as a fulfilment of the election promises of the 
ruling party to establish a socialist economic system.29 Socialism was declared as one of 
the four pillars30 of the new State and was incorporated in the Constitution of the country. 
State ownership through the creation of a "nationalised public sector embracing the key 
sectors of the economy"; "planned economic growth" were also envisaged in the 
Constitution.31
In Bangladesh today the government directly owns and manages public utilities 
and many enterprises in the field of manufacture, finance and agricultural developments 
that affect the nation's economic well-being as a whole. In spite of its commitment 
towards introducing market mechanisms in the economy, it plans and helps 
industrialisation through the development of important industries under private ownership. 
The practice of planning economic development contradicts the piolicy of leaving the 
course of events to be determined by the price mechanism as it operates under the 
influence of market forces. The government has at various times served as custodian of 
private enterprises, founder of new enterprises, supplier of raw materials and buyer of 
finished goods. To this end various public enterprises have been created. The government 
has conceived public enterprises as an instrument of development strategy and has 
resorted to it whenever private investments would not likely to adequately help in 
accomplishing that strategy. The multiple objectives of development plans have also
28. The concept of nationalisation and the actual process of nationalisation in Bangladesh is discussed in Chapter 2.
°f  PUbllC enterpn“ S ,n d,fferenl COUnlne*' we ^ntinadham. The Economics of
30. The other three pillars were democracy, secularism and nationalism. However, in 1978, the military government through 
promulgation of Martial law  Ordinance amended many provisions oí the Constitution. Secularism has been amended by faith in 
Islam and socialism, though retained, but was given a new meaning. Chapter I discusses these amendmendmcnts elaborately.
J1. See Articles 8(ii). 13(a)and 15 of the Constitution o f the People's Republic o f Bangladesh.
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applied to public enterprises. These, beside political considerations , have complicated 
their purpose. Although, public enterprise is one of the paths to greater control over the 
economy but has not been hostile towards private enterprise.
Public enterprises in Bangladesh transcend a single sector. In some sectors public 
enterprises enjoy absolute monopoly. The public enterprises in Bangladesh accounts for a 
high proportion of capital formation, foreign exchange earnings, and employment. The 
First Five Year Plan (FFYP) 1973-78 sought to expand the relative role of public 
enterprise by locating 80% of the plan expenditure in the public sector.32
Indeed, the existence and operations of public enterprises as public institutions are 
matters of great consequence to the economy33 accounting for nearly 90% of the aggregate 
fixed assets in the major industrial groups in 1973. Because of the taking over of the 
ownership of industries through nationalisation there has been a shift of focus of a large 
number of economic decisions from private entrepreneurs to government administrators. 
In view of the great importance of public enterprises the country is searching for better 
policies and their implementation in the public economic sector.
32 Government of Bangladesh. Minis'» of Finance. The Fin! Five Year Phut 1973-78. 1973, p.96. The FFYP also considered (he 
public enterprise as "a potent tool for generating surplus and mobilisation of expansion of investment for development*. The
same plan. also, viewed public enterprises "an effective additional tool in the hands of the government.* See Ibid.
Government of Bangladesh. Bangladesh Statistical Year Book. 1979. p.260. Aggregate annual expenditure of the nationalised 
industries was estimated at about 64% of the total expenditure incurred by all public sector institutions in the country. 
(Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of Finance. Budget Statement o f Autonomous Bodies 7975-76. 1975. p.7] and their annual 
average budget expenditure was equivalent to nearly 78% of the average aggregate amount of government revenue and capital 
expenditure during the First Five Year Plan (FFYP) period. (Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of Finance. FFYP. 1973. 
P-216.1 They accounted for 80% of total FFYP allocations for the industrial sector. Ilbid.l Nearly 43% of Financial re 
provided by the commercial banks went to the manufacturing sector. (IBRD. Bangladesh Current Econ ~
l 1 ________  ________ ________
l  t
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of the products of the publi
The Industrial sector in general contributes only 10% of the GDP 
a half. (Government of Bangladesh. Bangladesh Statistical Year 
about 37% of the total industrial labour force|/fc.d) Though the 
sector performs a very significant supportive role in the oevelo 
This modest industrial base accounts for about 70% of the 
Public and Private sector in a Developing Country'. Jt
___ ________ _______________ ___________________ ic Trends, vol.l. 1978.
P58.| Exports of the products of the nationalised industries (etched 59% of the total foreign exchange earning. /Ibid.| The value
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Hi. Research Methodology.
The main sources of this study comprises of:
i) use of primary materials. This involved a study of statutes, official documents 
such as development plans, industrial policy statements, annual reports of the public 
corporations and their enterprises, reports of the official investigation and inquiries, 
parliamentary debates and proceedings, reports of the UN, World Bank (IBRD), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Asian Development Bank (ADB);
ii) research in secondary sources such as published books, articles in journals, 
unpublished dissertations, monographs.
iii) The field study gave access to some internal management documents and 
original data from the ministries, corporations and enterprises. Personal observations, 
interviews and discussions with the relevant Ministers, officials of the Ministry, 
Corporation and enterprises under them, member of the Public Accounts Committee, 
politicians, trade union leaders, journalists and representatives of the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries gave some insight into the problems and issues concerning the 
study. Many of these observations and interviews are critically analysed while others are 
not reflected in the body of the thesis but their assistance in helping me to understand the 
subject and the workings of the public enterprises in Bangladesh is invaluable.
Chapters 3 and 4 are based mostly on empirical research in Bangladesh; field 
work was under taken for this purpose. During field work a questionnaire was considered, 
but the writer soon realised that handing over the questionnaires to the relevant persons 
would not serve any purpose. The response was poor, many did not bother to answer them 
and even if someone did take the trouble in going through them, the answers were too 
formal and precise. Thus the writer was forced to discuss the issues informally instead.
Amongst the difficulties faced during research were the dearth of published 
materials. Empirical research was bound to be hampered due to paucity of statistical data. 
It was not only the problem of nonavailability of sufficient data but also their frequent
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unreliability, contradictions and even inconsistencies that created problems. Indeed, at 
times they appeared irreconcilable. Published figures varied not only between different 
agencies but also by the same organisations at different points of time.
CHAPTER 1
State, Law and the Emergence of 
Public Enterprises in Bangladesh
1.1. Introduction.
The state has always, in one way or another, intervened in the economy in order to control 
and regulate it with a view to guiding its course through carefully designed sets of control. 
The intervention is sometimes direct and sometimes indirect. By direct intervention is 
meant a situation where the state owns an enterprise or a group of it; by indirect 
intervention is meant that the state employs regulatory controls. In case of direct 
intervention the state actually enters into production and involves itself in both control and 
management, i.e. the use of public enterprises. The need for direct control or operational 
controls* arise mainly from the desire to control the development of the economy, or from 
the general weakness o f the market mechanism or even the absence of market mechanism, 
scarcity o f raw materials, foreign exchange, etc.
The indirect model of controls obtains where the state does not itself own any 
sector of the economy, but tries to influence the conduct of the economic actors, who are 
private parties, through a variety of regulatory and other mechanisms administered by the 
government or its agencies. They include various licensing procedures, imposition of 
taxes, tariff regulations, foreign exchange regulations and other prohibitory public laws. It
Ghai use* different terminology, lie mentions two types of control, 
public enterprises and the regulatory model meaning indirect control 
Research Perspective on Public Enterprise' in Y.P.Ghai (ed). Iaw in i
c operational model meaning direct control i.e the use of 
iee Y.P.Ghai, ‘Control and Management of the Economy: 
Political Economy o f Public Enterprises, 1977, pp. 17-22.
is more a characteristic of market economies, although this model can also be used in 
socialist countries.2
It is to be noted that whether the model of control is direct or indirect, in each case, 
the aim is not to allow things to take their own course, but to influence or control the 
process of economic development. From a legal point of view, the difference between 
direct and indirect control is that the second model is a method of control without 
ownership, and the first of management through ownership.
Generally a state uses both the forms of intervention but with a bias towards one of 
them. The forms of intervention and control differs from country to country and even from 
time to time in a given country. But from the late 18th century until a century ago the 
prevalent doctrine was the non-interference of the state directly in industrial management 
except insofar as it was necessary to break up private monopoly.
1.2. The Rise und Fall o f Public Enterprises
Before the rise of capitalism, starting the 16th century, government's main motivation and 
rationalisation for its policies of subordination of economic affairs to the will of the state 
was for promoting merchant profits.3 From the middle o f the seventeenth century, "almost 
all mercantilist writers condemned state granted monopolies and other forms of protection 
and favoritism in the internal economy as opposed to international commerce."4 But 
earlier in the seventeenth century, the belief that restrictions on production and trade 
within a nation were harmful to the interests of every one concerned was increasingly 
widespread5. These writers believed that all men were motivated primarily by self interest
2. ibid.
3. For more deliil» of McrcanUlist period and Ihe periods preceding it. see B.K.Ilunt. History o f Economic Thought: A Critical 
Perspective. 1979. pp.1-30.
4 Ibid., p.27.
5. -Numerous statements of ibis view can be found in Ihe work» of such writers as Malynes. Petty. North. Law and Child.- Ibid.
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and should be left alone to compete in a free market if the public welfare was to be 
maximized. The Physiocrats6 regarded this theory as objectively scientific7. Their 
intellectual leader, Francois Quesnay, developed a model of how a society should be 
structured in order to reflect natural law. On the basis of this model the Physiocrats 
advocated political reform, namely, the abolition of guilds and the removal of all tariffs, 
taxes, subsidies, restrictions and regulations prevalent at that time in France. All these 
doctrines were summed up in the slogan, "Laissez faire et laissez passer, le monde va cle 
lui-mAeme" .8
Physiocratic influence was short lived and was primarily intellectual, not political.9 10
But the Physiocrats are notable for their invention of the term and policy of laissez faire, w 
which has lingered as a subject of economic discussion ever since and characterizes the 
doctrine of the classical economists11 who followed.12
The classical economists took up the theme from Adam Smith, who in his famous 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations, (generally referred to as 
the Wealth o f Nations) in 1776, propounded the view that welfare could be maximised by 
the introduction of a laissez faire policy by the government, i.e., allowing the forces of 
competition and the free interplay of supply and demand to regulate the economy, which 
would be almost entirely unhindered by government restrictions or interventions.13
6 The Physiocrats were a group of French social reformcis who were intellectual disciples of Francois Quesnay (1694-1774). Most 
of their ideas came directly or indirectly from Quesnay's Tableau Economique, printed first privately in Versailles in 1758; See 
Hunt, op cil.. p.30.
7 Ibid., p.33.
*. It means "Don't interfere, the world will take care of itself” see G.Soule, Ideas o f Great Economists. 1955, p.36.
9 E.Hunt. op. cil.. p.31.
10. The term laissez faire. is commonly attributed to Goumay (1712-1759). who was a Physiocrat. Translated literally, it means 'let 
to do', i.e. leave alone, signifying that the government should leave individuals alone in their economic activities. See 
EWhittaker, A History of Economic Ideas. 1947. p.41.
11. The classical period of economics ranges from Adam Smith's Wealth o f Nations: 1776 to J.S. Mill's Principles o f Political 
Economy, 1848. See Whittaker, op. cit.. p.60.
12 G Soule, op.cit., p.34.
13 E.K Hunt. op.cU., p.51.
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The classical economists believed that the function of the government should be 
limited to certain policy functions, mainly in the field of defence, foreign affairs, police 
and justice; and the business of the industry was to produce goods as cheaply as possible. 
Therefore, interference by industry in politics was fatal to good government, and 
interference by the state in industry was fatal to efficient production. The wisest course for 
a government was to abstain from a blundering intervention and leave industry to its own 
devices.14
As a result of the acceptance of the doctrine of "laissez-faire", a great liberalisation 
of economic activity took place especially in developed European countries and in the 
United States, although at the same time in the next one hundred forty years, the state 
continued to intervene in order to protect individuals, encourage some collective action 
and even provide services itself.15
The two world wars changed all this. The period from 1914 to 1945 was a period 
of continuous war or preparation for war.16 During this period all productive activities 
were mobilised for defence. Every industry gave up production for peacetime and 
concentrated on war materials. Foreign trade was confined to essential commodities. In 
this situation the state undertook the tasks previously left in the hands of private 
individuals. Production and distribution became one of the functions of the state. 
Politicians and economists, who favoured an extension of the economic function of the 
state, continuously grew in number.
In 1919, A.C. Pigou, in his Economics o f Welfare, put forward arguments in favour 
of state intervention in industries of a monopolistic character. He discussed at length the
m Smith the slate ought to be given only three duties: "first, the duty of protecting the society from violence and 
invasion of other independent societies: secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the 
injustice or oppression of every other member of it. or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice: and. thirdly, the 
duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any
:~t.uca...t . ~ . n -----K..r „ f  individuals, to erect and maintain: because the profit would never repay the expense to any
ty frequently do much more than repay it to a great society." A. Smith, op.
individual, c
idividual or small number 
ir. p.651; quoted from llun !.. p.55.
R.K.Sinha. Eci lies of Public Enterprises. 1983, p.16.
inherent disadvantages of traditional political institutions (i.e. municipal and national 
representative assemblies) as instruments for the control or the operation of monopolistic 
business enterprises, and indicated that these bodies were primarily created for purposes 
other than that of intervention in industry. Pigou concluded that modern developments in 
the structure and methods of governmental agencies have fitted these agencies for a degree 
of beneficial intervention in industry which would not have been justified in earlier 
times.17
In Russia, the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917 with Marxist ideology. Common 
ownership of the means of production was a cardinal aim of the new government which 
insisted on the evils of capitalist ownership over the means of production and replacing 
capitalist ownership by public ownership through a series of nationalization programmes. 
Socialism was taken to be a rival system to capitalism for the organization of economic 
affairs.
Marxism saw the private ownership of the means of production - capital- as a 
means by which one class in the economy exploited another. Taking capital into public 
ownership was seen as a means by which this exploitation could be ended and an 
egalitarian society developed. Politically it meant more than the substitution of common 
ownership for private ownership. The form of ownership has been associated with the 
general emancipation of the working class and emphasized the need for greater equality in 
economic and social matters. Taking over private ownership by the state, i.e. 
nationalization, had, therefore, been an important element in the programmes of the 
socialist and other social-democratic parties. Indeed, in some countries, particularly in the 
U.K and France, the major acts of nationalisation were carried out by these parties.18 
However, to assume that public enterprises have been only created by the socialist 
governments would be an inaccurate reflection of history.
17 A.C.Pigou. Economics of Welfare. 1919. p.299.
18 R Rees. Public Enterprise Economics. 1984. p.S.
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In 1926, J.M. Keynes supported government interference in those services which 
were social in nature, particularly for the control of savings and investment, the business 
cycle, and the development of a national population policy.19 In recent times, Galbraith 
expressed the opinion that certain industries are of peculiar importance not only for 
comfort, well-being, tranquillity and happiness but also for continued existence. They 
provide shelter, health services and local transportation of people. Housing, particularly in 
a cold climate, medical attention and the means of reaching ones's place of employment 
are not frivolous needs. He maintained that these industries could not function in the 
market system. The only solution he found for these industries was organisation under 
public ownership. He also pointed out that with the rise of the market and the planning 
systems, and the consequent inequality in development, the case for public ownership 
becomes much more general.20
There is considerable substance in the argument that, left to itself, the private 
sector is unlikely to invest in the development of public utilities as the government would. 
Thus, development of these utilities has to be initiated by the government. Even in a 
country like the United States of America, the seat of market economy, during the 
depression of the 1930's, Roosevelt era of the "New Deal", created a massive body of 
social welfare legislation both at Federal and state level providing for minimum welfare to 
the citizens. The need for an active role of the state in guiding and regulating the 
employment and business was acknowledged.21
In fact, no state has ever allowed the economy to go on its own way by remaining a 
silent spectator. Far from being a passive22 observer of the economic process, the state
19 J.M.Keynes, The End of Laissez-faire, 1926, p.46.
20 J.ICGalbrailh, Economics and the Public Purposes. 1974, pp.279-81.
21. W.Friedmann, The Stale and the Rule of Law in a Mixed Economy. 1971. p.13.
22 Even in Smith’s description of the state functions |i 
'the principle of laissez faire from the very beginn 
capitalism,* and that 'there is a fundamental cot 
Keynes, the amount of state intervention considered n
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today has emerged as an active participant, taking upon itself the "role of protector, 
controller and guardian of the citizen and of entrepreneur at the same time."23 Practically 
there is hardly any sphere o f human activity which is not, in some way or other, controlled 
and regulated by the all powerful, all embracing machine, which is the modern state. It is 
evident that increasing state intervention in the economic life of the people has become a 
characteristic feature of the twentieth century.
But with the political ascendancy of conservative governments in the United States 
and Great Britain, as well as Canada and Germany in the 1980s there has been a reversal 
of economic ideas and policy. The rise of conservatism brought with it a neo-classical, 
free market counter revolution in economic theory and policy. It seems the ideas of laissez 
faire are increasingly gaining ground again. The central theme of this counter revolution is 
that too much state intervention in the economy effectively slows down the pace of 
economic growth. It believes that both economic efficiency and growth will be stimulated 
by permitting free markets to flourish, privatising public enterprises, promoting free trade 
and eliminating the plethora of government regulations and price distortions. Now more 
and more public enterprises are being privatised not only in these countries but else where 
in the world. The dramatic changes in the Eastern European countries in recent years 
following largely from the policies of "perestroika" and "glasnost” in the Soviet Union, 
have seen a shift of policy towards allowing more role to the private sector. This economic 
ideology has been augmented and formidably thrust upon the developing countries by 
World Bank and the IMF. Thus we observe a full circle in the evolution of economic 
thought.
Be these as they may, it remains a fact that until now public enterprises are being 
used by all countries, in varying degrees and numbers, whether developed or 
underdeveloped. Of course public enterprises have acquired greater importance in the 
developing countries.
In spite of their universality, the growth of public enterprises and the degree of 
government control in the economic and industrial management differ from nation to 
nation and from government to government, e.g. in countries such as China and Cuba, the 
government owns and controls almost all productive resources. This was of course, true in 
the former USSR. Even in the industrialised countries such as the UK, Sweden, France, 
Germany, Japan and Italy, both public and private enterprises coexist not as rivals but as 
complementing each other, although in the US and Switzerland public enterprises are 
relatively less in use.
Although the ownership of public enterprises in theory lies with the state, in 
practice the real control lies with one or more groups working through a political party, a 
bureaucracy and a technocracy. The contention of competing social forces not only 
manifests themselves in the ownership control-operation nexus, but also extends into 
strategy, management and result.24 Thus, what are ultimately important are the interactive 
systems relating to social forces, political power and economic policy.
Thus, it is necessary to study public enterprises in the wider context of the state, 
because the state is seldom neutral or impartial, and its policies affect the structure of 
society. It is also important to understand the relationship between dominant groups and 
the administrative process, including the way public enterprises actually function.25 To 
analyze the public enterprises separated from the politico-economic context where they 
are embedded would give an oversimplified and distorted view of their character and 
would make it almost impossible to understand their unique qualities.
24. R.Sobhan. The Political Economy o f Public Enterprises in Asia. (mimeo), 1978.
25. I. A-Allendc. 'Towards a Theory of Stale Enterprises in Less Developed Countries' in Public Enterprise.  vol. 8. No. 2. 1988. 
P-147-
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1.3. Public Enterprises before the Independence of Bangladesh and the Role of the 
State.
Public enterprises in British India had largely been confined to providing social goods in 
the form of communications, broadcasting, posts, telegraph and telephone, roads and 
railways, transportation, and limited banking facilities and certain defence 
establishments.26
Pakistan's involvement in public enterprises started with a framework and outlook 
inherited from colonial times. Thus in the early years, public enterprises covered the 
communications network, power, irrigation, social service facilities in education, health, 
housing and defence.27 After independence in 1947 the role and function of the 
government changed. The Industrial Policy announced in 1948 limited public ownership 
to the manufacture of arms and ammunition, the manufacture and operation of railways, 
telephones, telegraph and wireless and the generation of hydroelectric power.28 This 
policy of limiting public enterprises contributed to the industrial backwardness of East 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) because East Pakistan lacked an indigenous entrepreneurial 
class 29 and massive state interference was required for the industrial development of the 
province.
A few years later, The Economic Appraisal Committee emphasised the role of the 
government as "regulator", "general administrator" "promoter" and "facilitator"30. In spite 
of this, the committee noted the need for expanded state involvement in agriculture.
26. For a discussion on public enterprises during British rule. see. R.Dutt. Economic History o f India. 2 volumes. 1950 also 
D.R.Gadgil, The Industrial Evolution of India in Recent Times 1860-1939. 1971 (5th edition).
27. For deuils sec R J. Andrus and A.F.Mohammcd. The Economy o f Pakistan. 1958.
28. Government of PakisUn. Statement on Industrial Policy, 1948.
29 For the reasons for the absence of entrepreneurial class in East Pakistan see F.H.Yusuf. Nationalisation of Industries in 
Bangladesh. 1985, pp.53-60.
30. Government of PakisUn. Report o f the Economic Appraisal Committee, 1952.
finance, transport and social sectors.31 The efforts of the public sector were to supplement 
the private sector and to actively promote the growth of individual entrepreneurship.
In spite of the above policy recommendations, the following table illustrates the 
dominant role of the public sector in the industrial development of East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh).
Table-2
DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE IN E.PAKISTAN (NOW BANGLADESH) 
IN MILLION RUPEES.32
PERIOD PUBLIC
0 )
PRIVATE
(2)
TOTAL
(3)
% OF PUBLIC
(1 as % of 3)
1954-55 700 300 1000 70
1959-60 1970 730 2700 73
1964-65 6700 3000 9700 69
1969-70 11060 5500 16560 67
[Source: Government of Pakistan, Report of the Panel of 
Economists on the Fourth Five Year PLan, 1970.]
In pursuance of the policy of promoting private entrepreneurs rather than direct 
state participation in industrial management as far as possible, many public agencies, 
which were promotional in nature, like the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation 
PIDC (later bifurcated as West Pakistan [WPIDC] and the East Pakistan Industrial 
Development Corporation [EPIDC]), Water and Power Development Authority 
(WAPDA), Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), Pakistan Shipping Corporation (PSC), 
Chittagong Port Trust (CPT), Dhaka Improvement Trust (DIT) etc. were created. Similar 
organisations were created in financial, trading, service and promotional sectors, viz, the
3». nu
32 Rupee is the name of the Pakistani currency whose exchange value in 1969 was 11~ Rs. 10.30.
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central bank of the country (the State Bank of Pakistan), Industrial Finance Corporation 
(IFCP), National Bank o f Pakistan, Agricultural Development Bank (ADBP), Small 
Industries Corporation (PSIC), Pakistan Industrial Development Bank (IDBP), Pakistan 
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC), House Building Finance 
Corporation (HBFC), Trading Corporation of Pakistan (TCP) etc.
The PIDC/EPIDC, PSIC and other financial institutions were instrumental in 
promoting many manufacturing units, through their joint ventures, initiative, planning, 
provision of resources, risk taking etc. The public enterprise institutions, which were 
confined to high risk, low profile areas, came to play a significant role in creating the 
institutional infrastructure for helping private enterprise to utilize public resources. Many 
industrial enterprises were established with the aim of transferring them later to the private 
sector. Thus it is clear that the government created certain public enterprises to promote 
private industrial sector and EPIDC established many industrial enterprises which were 
run by it.
The policy of industrialisation through government support was pursued through a 
set of positive and negative controls manifested in tariff protection, tax concessions, 
exchange rate manipulation as well as direct and indirect subsidies.33 PIDC/EPIDC and 
the financial institutions played a pivotal role in the process of industrialisation in both the 
private and public sectors.34 It is doubtful whether without planned government measures 
in the shape of providing capital from the national exchequer, and the fiscal and 
infrastructural facilities made available by public corporations, the present heavy 
industries, like diesel plant, machine tools, ship-building, fertilizer, chemicals, heavy 
engineering, steel mills, sugar mills etc. would have come into existence.
From its inception in 1952 up to the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 
PIDC/EPIDC set up 74 different manufacturing units in various fields either by itself or in
33. For ■ detailed study of the public enterprises in Pakistan, see R.Sobhan and M.Ahmad. Public Enterprise in an Intermediate 
Regime: A Study in the Political Economy o f Bangladesh, 1980, pp.33-77.
34. For a detail growth of EPIDC and its role in promoting industrialisation, see T.Hexner. EPIDC■ A Conglomerate in Pakistan. 
1969.
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collaboration with private sector.35 The industrial policies of the government of Pakistan 
and the charter of PIDC/EPIDC committed it to set up industries, run them for some time 
and then transfer them to enterprising private industrialists, when these had grown up, as 
on-going and profit earning concerns.36
The non-Bengali (i.e. Pakistani) entrepreneurs gained much from this policy.37 The 
central capital,38 the principal sea and air ports and the centre of import and export trade 
were also situated in the capital city. This great geographical incongruity was by itself a 
sufficient disincentive for an aspiring Bengali investor to come all the way to the central 
capital to complete the necessary legal and administrative formalities to establish a new 
enterprise or to extend an existing one. It may be mentioned here that under the 
Government o f India Act 1935 i.e. the Constitution of British India, industrial development 
was a provincial subject but by enacting the Development o f Industries Federal Control 
Act 1949, the government of Pakistan transferred industries to federal control. The West 
Pakistani entrepreneurs gained much because their proximity to the capital city enabled 
them to cultivate personal contacts with the bureaucracy. The device of import licensing 
regulated the import trade and only a limited number of licenses were issued so that 
license holders were assured of an economic volume of business. The renewal of licenses 
among importers were decided in reference to their performance in trade and their 
financial position. Established import houses continued to grow in size, leaving almost no 
room for newcomers. The Pakistani ruling elite employed direct and indirect devices to 
transfer resources from Bangladesh to (West) Pakistan to the amount of US$ 6 billion.39 
The objectives of the successive industrial policies followed by the government of 
Pakistan were to facilitate the growth of the West Pakistani industrialists and men in
3S. BIDC. Public Relations Department. BJ.D.C in Figures. 1972. (soon after independence EPIDC came to be known as 
Bangladesh Industrial Development Corporation BIDC).
36 See Government of Pakistan. The Charter o f EPIDC. 1962.
37. Sec H.Papanek, Entrepreneurs m East Pakistan, 1969.
38. At partition Karachi became the capital of Pakistan and later Islamabad became the capital. Both these cities are situated in West 
Pakistan (now Pakistan) and are more than 1000 miles away from Bangladesh. Indian territory being in between.
39 J.Faaland and J.R.Parkinson. Bangladesh the Test Case for Development. 1976, p.18; the authors used the expression •subtle' 
and 'powerful* devices.
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commerce to exploit the resources of Bangladesh, keep it perpetually dependent on 
Pakistani manufacturers and to create a viable market for their products.40
During the Third Five Year Plan (1965-70 period), the dominant political theme 
was not to challenge the growth of the Pakistani bourgeois class but to support the growth 
of a group of East Pakistani (now Bangladeshi), to be later transformed into local 
bourgeois class,41 in an attempt to bring some sort of economic parity.
The ruling elite was also eager to find a sympathetic counter group in East 
Pakistan. East Pakistan started experiencing the growth of Bengali industrialists through a 
system of sponsored capitalism,42 supported by political patronage, on the one hand, and 
reinforced, on the other hand, by the political opposition's demand for parity in 
developmental allocation between the two parts of Pakistan.43 The Bengali (East 
Pakistani) bourgeoisie demonstrated their dependent character by continually looking to 
government to undertake modernizing activities with them and for the benefit of their 
class. The result was the creation of a class of Bengali bourgeoisie providing support to a 
regime, similar to the previous British colonial one. This developed to such an extent that 
even the draft Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75 itself recognized that the policy of 
encouraging private enterprise through direct and indirect concessions created "inequality, 
inequity and consequent social tension."44
40 S.Islam. Public Corporations in Bangladesh. I97S. p.28.
41. Moneyed class denotes the people having surplus inveslible funds and bourgeoisie are those who owns manufacturing industries. 
Thus Moneyed class is wider in its meaning and includes traders, bourgeoisie, farmers with surplus. In Bangladesh, there exists 
no farm as it is understood in developed countries, farmers with surplus means those land owners who have surplus after 
maintaining his family from the income derived from land.
42. For an analysis of the growth of Bengali bourgeoisie, see K. Ahmed. The Socio-political History o f Bengal, 1975; 11.Broomfield. 
Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Bengal in the Twentieth Century. 1968 also T.Hexner, op. at.
43. There is a wide range of literature on disparity between the two wings of Pakistan and its wider implications. Hie literature 
includes government publications such as the Report of the Panel o f Economists on the Fourth Five Year Plan, op. cit„ 
A.Rahman. East and West Pakistan, A Problem in the Political Economy o f Regional Planning. 1968; RJahan. Pakistan: Failure 
in National Integration. 1972; KU.Ahmed, Breakup o f Pakistan: Background and Prospects o f Bangladesh. 1972; A3 .Gupta,
Regional Disparity and Economic Development in Pakistan' in V.K.R.V. Rao (ed). Bangladesh Economy: Problems and 
Prospects, 1974; R.Nations. ‘The Economic Structure of Pakistan and Bangladesh' in R.BIacfcbum (ed). Explosions in the 
Subcontinent. 1975.
44 Government of Pakistan. Draft Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-73, 1970. p.12.
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EPIDC was a major instrument of government policy to create a class of 
bourgeoisie from amongst the Bengali traders.45 But the task was a difficult one because 
of the very limited number of members of Bengali traders with sufficient business 
experience or capital. As a result, EPIDC had to act in conjunction with other public 
enterprises in the field of finance. Thus the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 
(IDBP) and the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) had to give 
financial and other technical support in building up a Bengali capitalist class. EPIDC 
provided the plans and design, helped in selecting the right machinery and assisted in the 
construction and commissioning of the enterprise. Material help was given by providing a 
capital structure with a minimum debt-equity ratio of 70:30. The financial institutions 
covered the debt by a foreign exchange loan to the project from the financial institutions to 
finance the cost of imported machinery. The EPIDC was committed to provide 50% of the 
equity, but in most cases it went up because o f the escalation of construction costs.46
Sobhan and Ahmad carried out an interesting study47 which shows that in some 
cases the equity share of the private party was below 7.5% of the total investment. Even 
this component did not always require any immediate cash outlay. The owner usually 
over-invoiced the machinery purchased by 10-20% and kept this amount of foreign 
currency in his own account.48 The owner could then convert 50% of the foreign exchange 
earned at black market rates at a time when the rupee was over-valued to the extent of 80- 
100% and this provided his working capital. Sobhan and Ahmad49 illustrate the whole 
transaction numerically on the basis of specific information about equity structure of 10
45. T.llcxner. op. cU
46 Ibid.
47 R.Sobhan and M.Ahmad. open.
48. For full detail of thin transaction, see Sobhan and Ahmad, op. cil., p.41.
49 Ibid.
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jute mills but only added the financial implications of the black market in foreign currency
in the following way:50
1. Cost of project
2. Financial institution's loan 
at 75% of project cost
3. EPIDC investment at 50% equity
4. Bengali owner's equity shares
5. Black marketing value o f converting 
7.5% of over invoicing of machinery 
cost at 100% premium on official rate
Rs.20mill. 
Rs.15 mill.
Rs.2.5 mill. 
Rs.2.5 mill.
Rs.2.05 mill.
Thus by over-valuing by just 7.5%, the owner was able to meet most of his share 
of his equity and acquired substantial control of the project of Rs. 20 million, paying only 
a negligible amount. In fact many did much better by a higher rate of invoicing and built 
their own foreign exchange reserve abroad while bringing back some amount to meet the 
running cost of the mill.51
EPIDCs selection of the chosen few (mostly of Bengali origin) was in most cases 
not related to past business experience, or even high liquidity. The main entrepreneurial 
skill required was measured in terms of the candidate's access to the political power 
structure or his capability to influence the top management of EPIDC and financial 
institutions and the decision makers in the government.52
The policy of patronizing the Bengali entrepreneurs worked well enough until the 
demand for partnership in the political power of the state received momentum in the last 
years of the 1960s. Naturally the people of Bangladesh began to protest against the 
government policy. By 1970, a nucleus had formed of aspirant Bengali industrialists who 
thought that the departure of non-Bengalis would automatically widen their scope for the 
extraction of surplus.
n.vol.l.No.l. 1969.
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Public enterprises accelerated the growth of capitalism in East Pakistan and had a 
disruptive effect on the prevailing Asiatic mode of production.53 With the extension of 
state activities promoting capitalism the number and role of bureaucracy increased. The 
growth of capitalism resulted in the growth of a group of industrialists, traders and 
workers. The social system showed the configuration of interest groups which interact 
with each other in order to gain or retain control of productive resources. While the 
economic system had the function of actualisation of goals through the production of 
gcxxls and services.54 The group, namely the bureaucracy (both civil and military), had the 
privilege of making decisions by virtue of its control over productive resources through 
control of political system.55
1.4. The Liberation W ar and its Impact on Public Enterprises.
In 1970, for the first time in the history of Pakistan a genuine free election based on 
universal adult suffrage was held. But after the election56, the military junta, backed by the 
(West) Pakistani bourgeoisie, refused to hand over power to the newly elected people's 
representatives or to convene the National Assembly. Instead the Pakistan army started 
committing genocide in East Pakistan to force the Bengalis to give up their right to self 
government.57 The Bengalis had no alternative but to fight the army with all that they 
could gather. In response to the brutal genocide of the army beginning from the night of 
25th March 1971, the leaders of the the Awami League, obtaining a majority in the
53. For a discussion of the Asiatic mode of production, sec chapter 2.
54 M.Ahmad. Stale and Development. Essays on Public Enterprise. 1987. p.3.
Amongst a large number of books and articles written on the implications of the 1970 election results and the sequence of events
leading to the declaration of independence of Bangladesh, see RJackson. South Asian Crisis. 1973 also H.Feldman. The End of 
the Beginning, Pakistan 1900-71. 1975.
57 For descriptions of the army a  
Bangladesh Document. 1971;
. amongst many writings special mention may be made of Government of India. 
op. ci/.. A-Mascarenhas. The Rape of Bangladesh. 1974 and D.Loshak. Pakistan Crisis.
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general election58, were compelled to declare the independence of East Pakistan as the 
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh on the 26th of March 1971.59 The war of independence 
lasted for 9 months. With the unconditional surrender of Pakistani forces on the 16th of 
December 1971, independent Bangladesh became a reality.
The Awami League60 gave leadership during the liberation war against Pakistan. 
This party was a splinter group of the Muslim League which fought for the division of 
India and creation of Pakistan on the basis of religion. As a reaction against the non­
secular communal bias of the Muslim League, it adopted secularism as one of the planks 
of its platform. The Awami League was basically a middle class petty-bourgeois party in 
terms of the composition of the economic interest groups which provided its main support 
in the country.61 They were the farmers with surplus, the trading and marketing 
intermediaries (mercantile class) engaged in domestic and foreign trade, and small scale 
entrepreneurs who were aspiring to develop into medium and large-scale industrialists. 
The number of traders and industrialists in the former East Pakistan was small and they 
suffered from comparative disadvantages from their counterparts of West Pakistani 
origin.62 These groups of petty-bourgeoisie played a pre-eminent role in the economic life 
of the country but could not influence the political process in Pakistan as it was in the 
hands of the West Pakistanis. These were the main economic groups from which were also 
drawn the members o f  the public service (the bureaucracy), the army, the professionals 
and the intelligentsia. The party fought for a larger share of the benefits of economic 
progress and a larger share o f  resources for the development of East Pakistan. It also 
wanted greater participation o f  the province in the process of political and economic 
decision making. By the mid 1960's its main platform was the demand for autonomy in the
58 The Awami league won 160 or 300 National Aaaembly acata and 288 of 300 East Pakistan Provincial Aaacmbly acata.
59 For the text or the declaration of independence, aee Bangladesh Document, op. cil.. pp.315-17.
60 For a diacuaaion on the Awami league. ace M Raahidu/yaman. Thc Awami league in the Political Development of Paltiatan' in 
Altan Survey, vol.10. 1970. pp.574-87.
61. T.AIi,' Pakistan and Bangladesh: Resulta and Prospects’ in R.BIackhurn. op. cit., pp.293-301 also N.lslam. Development 
Planning in Bangladesh: A Study in Political Economy. 1977. pp.21-24.
62. N.lslam, op.cit.. p. 15.
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management of the financial and foreign exchange resources of East Pakistan on the basis 
of what came to be popularly known as the "six-point programme" of autonomy.63 In other 
words, the party was primarily promoting Bengali nationalism within the framework of 
Pakistan.
The Awami League increasingly gained support in the upper echelons of the urban 
elite, the intellectuals and professionals. They became the strongest spokesmen in the fight 
within Pakistan for greater participation in economic opportunities. These were the groups 
disadvantaged by the state but who had the aspiration of controlling state power to 
maximize their economic interest.
In the urban areas, the party drew considerable support from the labour unions in 
the large-scale industries. These industries were predominantly owned by (West) 
Pakistanis. Therefore, the organization of the workers in such industries against the 
Pakistani owners was a part of the nationalist struggle. By supporting and organising 
workers in their fight for higher wages and better working conditions, the Awami League 
obtained a powerful ally which was very useful in organising mass meetings and in 
mobilising popular support. The workers though numbering only 350,0000, were an 
influential pressure group in view of their concentration in large towns and their ability to 
organize industrial action to dislocate the economic and administrative machineries in 
urban areas.64 Moreover, the workers had profound influence in shaping the public opinion 
and political consciousness of the rural masses. They could do so because the rate of 
literacy was very low combined with lack of communication and ineffectiveness of the 
formal mass media instruments, like news papers and radio, which resulted in the 
dependence and reliance of the population on the first hand information supplied by the 
workers returning to their villages for various reasons. In other words, the workers were 
the main liaison between the urban and rural population. Because of economic instability,
63 Sheikh Mujibur RahmM. Charier for Survival: Six Point Programme. 1966; reprinted in Bangladesh Document, as Six Points 
Formula - Our Right to live', op. cit.. pp.23-33.
64 For the role of the workers in the movement against Pakistan, see T.Maniruzzaman. Radical Politics and the Emergence of 
Bangladesh' in P.R.Brass and M.Franda (ed). Radical Politics in South Asia. 1973.
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intense competition for jobs, seasonal variations in the supply of job and the continuing 
reliance of workers on agriculture, the workers periodically returns to his village.
During the period between 1958-70, when Pakistan was directly or indirectly ruled 
by the military in coalition with the bureaucracy, political parties were either banned from 
time to time or occasionally revived for short intervals. The top leadership of the Awami 
League was in prison for most of the time with the result that the movement for autonomy 
and restoration of democracy was largely carried forward by student activists. It was 
during the same period that the radical elements gained influence in both the student and 
labour wings of the Awami League. By 1968-69 unity was forged between the Awami 
League student organization (Student League) and the left wing student organization 
(Student Union), linked with various Marxist and left oriented political parties, to carry 
forward the movement for autonomy and democracy on the basis of "Eleven Points 
Programme"6S, which absorbed the six point autonomy demand and included such 
measures as a) nationalisation of banks, insurance companies and large industrial units, b) 
reduction of taxes on agriculturists, c) payment of proper wages to the labourers etc.66
The war of independence during 1971 was the last important factor in increasing 
the strength of radical elements in Bangladesh politics. The liberation fighters were drawn 
from young men of all political affiliations as well as from the Bengali personnel of the 
Pakistan armed forces, including the police. Young peasants and students, both rural and 
urban, were a very important component of the force. There was a large contingent of 
radical elements among the freedom fighters, especially among the students. During and 
after the war, the leftist parties gained much strength with the acquisition of arms during 
the war.67
65. For details of 'Eleven Points Demands' of the East Pakistan Student's All Party Committee of Action, see Sobhan and Ahmad, op. 
a!., p.96.
66 Ibid.
67. The discussions of the above three paragraphs are mainly based on the information of various studies of the mentioned period, 
see for example. N.lslam. op. cil. Sobhan and Ahmad, op cil.
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It is with this background that Bangladesh became independent. At the time of 
independence, public enterprises in Bangladesh functioned in respect of central banking, 
commercial banking, industrial financing, house building loans, agricultural credit, 
insurance, railway, road transport, airlines, inland and marine shipping, post, telephone 
and telegraph, radio and television broadcasting, health, jute marketing, foreign trade etc. 
There were public enterprises in such diverse fields as agricultural development and 
extension services, fisheries development, regulation of inland water transport, aviation, 
water and sewerage services in major cities, power generation, flood control and 
irrigation, city improvement, regulation of tea plantation and processing, promotion of 
tourism to film industry development. Public enterprises also covered fields like atomic 
energy research, rural development, industrial and scientific research etc. The universities 
were totally dependent on government grants and were effectively public sector 
organisations.
At the time of independence, 47% of the fixed assets of the modern industrial 
sector,68 were controlled by non-Bengali entrepreneurs. Many of these were themselves 
part of large business houses with their headquarters in Pakistan, so the policy making and 
records were located in Pakistan. An estimated 41% of the total fixed assets in the modem 
industrial sector in Bangladesh were controlled by these big business conglomerates. 
Among the non-conglomerate enterprises many were one unit ventures where the assets, 
management and policy making were all located in Bangladesh even though the 
proprietors were Pakistani. 70% of the bank deposits were in banks owned and based in 
Pakistan. In the same way, trade (both foreign and domestic), had been dominated by non- 
Bengalis. The bulk of inter-wing trade, which accounted for 48% of Bangladesh's foreign 
trade in 1969-70, was in non-Bengali hands.
As the war of independence went on and the emergence of Bangladesh became 
more and more imminent, thousands of villages and market places were burnt and 
devastated. Railways, roads and waterways were damaged and crippled. About a thousand
68. The figures quoted here ire cited from F.H.Yusuf. Nationalisation of Industries in Bangladesh. 1985.
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bridges were blown up. Industrial plants were shifted to (West) Pakistan and a few were 
damaged. The economy was devastated, communications disrupted and supply lines were 
cut off. Above all 3 million people were killed.69
During the war, non-Bengali businessmen began pulling out o f Bangladesh for fear 
of possible massacre. As a result, only a handful of entrepreneurs were left in Bangladesh 
after the war and they too, kept away from their factories and offices.70 In this exodus, top 
management were joined by middle managers, foremen and even skilled workmen. As a 
result, a major segment of the private sector in Bangladesh came to a standstill at 
liberation, most notably industrial enterprises owned by non-Bengalis. The impact of non- 
Bengali emigration was more critically felt in finance and commerce. In the field of trade 
only physical assets and bank liabilities remained. The bulk of capital tied up in the 
knowledge and experience of the entrepreneurs disappeared. This was accompanied by the 
physical break with Pakistan, where much of the trading expertise was connected. For 
example 100% of imported cotton and textiles came from Pakistan. Apart from trade 
knowledge, completely new sources of supply had to be found to make up for traditional 
imports from Pakistan such as cotton and textiles, oil seeds, fine rice and cement. Above 
all, this demanded not only a knowledge of trading procedures, but also of international 
markets. It demanded financial resources and skilled manpower. Bangladesh lacked 
both.71 Moreover, many countries did not recognise the new state soon after independence. 
The ports were inoperative due to the laying of mines by the Pakistan navy during the war 
and it took quite some time to make them operative.
Apart from the non-Bengali enterprises, most of the Bengali owned private 
enterprises were closed because their owners had collaborated with the Pakistan 
government either directly or by way of keeping their enterprises open in defiance of the
69 For ■ full description of damage due to the war. ace different repons of the UN. for example Report on the Reconstruction of the 
Bangladesh Economy. 1972 and also AMascarenhas. op. at., and D.Lomhak. op. at.
70 For the impact of non- Bengali emigration, see World Bank report, Reconstructing the Economy o f Bangladesh, vol.2,1972. also 
UN Report on the Reconstruction o f the Bangladesh Economy. 1972.
71. Sobhan and Ahmad, op. cd.. p.92.
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call by the Bangladesh government in exile. Many workers of these enterprises had joined 
the guerilla force and many deliberately abstained from their work. This was partly due to 
their fear of insecurity in the urban areas where repression was high and partly in response 
to the call of the government in exile asking not to contribute to the war economy of the 
Pakistanis. All absentee workers lost their jobs during the war. Thus after the war, the 
Bengali entrepreneurs incurred the wrath of the employees who were armed and were not 
only asking for reinstatement but also their full back wages. The Bengali entrepreneurs, in 
fear of retaliation and danger against their lives by the militant workers or because of 
inability to pay the claims of the workers, also abandoned their enterprises.72
1.5. Public Enterprises after Independence.
In view of the above circumstances and the deteriorating condition o f  the economy, the 
immediate task in the industrial sector was to resume production, provide employment and 
income to the workers, supply goods and services to the consumers and find access to 
foreign exchange to meet the import bills through exports of accumulated stock at the 
enterprises. The general index of industrial production (manufacturing) fell to 80.87 in 
1972-73 as against 100 in the base year 1969-70. The foreign exchange reserves were nil 
up to January 1972.73 The preamble of the Industrial Investment Policy for 1972-73 aptly 
describes the situation. It says:
Among the most formidable challenges which the Government was 
confronted with upon liberation was that presented by the situation in 
the industrial sector. Being a product of a colonial capitalist system,.... it 
manifested large areas which had been totally neglected and deprived of 
the resources necessary for development,.... as an immediate and direct 
result of the liberation war, the predatory Pakistani industrialists had 
abandoned their industries in Bangladesh but only after taking with them 
every thing they could, including in some cases, the provident fund 
money of the employees. They left behind only such plant and
72 EssasnsS'*“
machinery which they could not remove and also left behind huge 
liabilities.
In this situation the government was faced with the immediate task of 
restoring the existing industries. This meant the assumption by the 
government of the enormous responsibility of replacing the 
entrepreneurs and managers for efficient and effective management..,74
Amongst the Bengali bourgeoisie there were few prospective buyers to buy the 
large "abandoned" industrial units. In the event of transfer to private sector, these 
individuals would have needed large-scale financial and other assistance from the state. 
Furthermore, the abandoned industrial units suffered from severe depletion of assets, 
working capital and inventories in the aftermath o f war, not to speak of financial liabilities 
left by the Pakistanis. Private investors would only have been persuaded to purchase them 
if the government was ready to compensate them for losses and to contribute to their 
rehabilitation. Given the need for massive help from and intervention by the government 
to put them in working condition, this help would have raised serious questions in the 
minds of the people as these were precisely the kinds of policies pursued during the 
Pakistani rule. In many of the abandoned enterprises, militant workers took over control 
and management; in a few cases they firmly resisted transfer to private investors.75 
Moreover, after liberation, the idea of transfer or sale of abandoned enterprises to the 
prospective Bengali buyers was resented and vehemently opposed by trade union leaders, 
students and all political parties participating in the liberation war.76
There was also a general sense of insecurity among the moneyed class caused by 
widespread possession of arms, which dampened the investment climate and created 
uncertainty in the minds of the potential investors about the security o f private capital. The 
lack of interest in taking over the large industrial units is subsequently confirmed by the
74. Bangladesh Gazelle Extraordinary. Industrial Investment Policy for 1972-73. (Emphasis added).
75 Sobhan and Ahmad, op. cit. p.45.
76. The General Secretary of pro-government trade union ’Sramik League’ (Workers League) declared. "A section of Bengali 
capitalist class is conspiring to buy the factories left by their original owners at nominal prices .... We do not believe in private 
property and we are determined to uproot any budding capitalist at the birth.' Extract from the speech of Mr.A.Mannan. General 
Secretary. Jatiyo Sramik League on 1.1.72, The Bangladesh Observer. 2.1.72.
Another labour leader declared that sacrifice in blood during the Liberation War was made not to create another Bengali capitalist 
da.« but for the establishment of exploitation-free society. See the Daily Ittefaque (Bengali ). 20.3.72.
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lack of interest for taking over disinvested industrial units with less than Tk. 1.5 million in 
assets. The pace of disinvestment of such small enterprises was slow in spite of the fact 
that the intending purchasers could pay in instalments, and in some cases by bank 
borrowing.77
Above all, people with surplus funds, legally or illegally earned, did not have 
entrepreneurial ability or interests; they were interested in quick turnover and prospect of 
high profits and, therefore, remained mainly in trading and speculation ventures. 
Immediately after independence, the private vested interests and the nascent industrialists 
were few in number, ill organised and mostly on the defensive, given their negative (or at 
best passive) role in the Liberation War.78
Last but not least, the party was duty bound to embark on the policy of 
nationalisation of jute (both trade and industries), bank and insurance companies as an 
election promise.79
The demand for nationalisation was so overwhelming that the leaders of the party 
had to repeatedly assure the people as to their intentions of establishing a socialist 
society.80 *
77 N.Islam. op.cil.. p.21.
78 The description in Ihis paragraph is mainly based on Ihe sludy of N.lslam, op. cil.. nnd M.M.Akash, op. cil.
79. See Ihe Election Man,fata of the A worn, League (in Bengali). 1970 also Six Point Programme oftheAwami League. 1966.
Il is noteworthy to mention that before the general election of 1970 almost all political parties of Pakistan emphasised the 
nationalisation of banks, insurance business, stale trading of major exports. Looking at the election manifestoes of various 
political parties one can easily notice that the economic programme of the Awami Ixague was no more radical than that of 
rightist Pakistan Convention Muslim League. For the text of the Pakistan Convention Muslim League Manifesto for the general 
election 1970, see T.AIi, Pakistan Military Rule or People's Power. 1970. pp.255-259. It envisaged the same pattern ofpublic 
sector without using the word socialism.
A political party which wanted to retain its mass appeal and support among the students and workers could not easily disregard 
the prevailing political mood and break its pre-election pledge immediately after coming to power on an issue which even its 
political opponents pledged.
80 See the speeches of the leaders of the party trying to assure the people of their intentions to establish a social 
example, a senior minister, who later became the President after Muiih was killed (although known to all for his
declared: "It shall not he permitted to help grow a capitalist class in Bangladesh....The Awami Ixague govemmen
as pledged to establish socialism in the country * Reported in the Bangladesh Observer. 16.3.72; The Vice-PrcsiC 
republic announced: 'The government shall very soon nationalise the major industrial enterprises and commercial 
own by the foreigners in order to achieve the goals of socialism.' Reported in the Bangladesh Observer. 19.1.72.
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In order to control and manage the abandoned properties, the government 
promulgated on the 3rd January 1972 (i.e. after only 17 days of independence) The 
Bangladesh (Taking over o f Control and Management o f  Industrial and Commercial 
Concerns) Order 1972, Acting President's Order No.l o f  I972gl. Clauses 2(1) and 2(2) of 
the above order say:
2(1). Where the owners, directors or managers or majority of the 
owners, directors or managers, of any industrial or commercial concern 
have left Bangladesh or are not available to control and manage the 
concern, or where in the opinion of the government of Bangladesh, the 
owners or director of any industrial or commercial concern cannot be 
allowed, in the public interest, to control and manage the concern, the 
Government of Bangladesh may ... take over its control and 
management, or appoint a management Board or Administrator or direct 
any autonomous or semi-autonomous body or any other authority, to 
take over its control and management.
2(2). Where the government of Bangladesh takes over the control or 
management of any industrial or commercial concern under clause (1) 
all the powers and duties of the owners, directors. Board of Directors, 
and managers of the concern, including the power to operate bank 
accounts, shall vest in the government of Bangladesh.82
By the President's Order No.l of 1972, 786 industrial enterprises, and 2187 
commercial enterprises, a large number of residential and commercial establishments, 
private and commercial vehicles and other business ventures were vested in the 
government. In addition there were 12 non-Bengali commercial banks with 1175 branches 
with a large number of non-Bengali managerial staff.83 In accordance with clause 2(2) of 
the above order, the government passed executive orders vesting the management of each 
abandoned enterprise in a board drawn from the Ministry of Industry, the workers, the 
available previous management cadres of the enterprise and outsiders designated by the 
government ostensibly for their managerial experience. This formation of management 
boards with officers of the Ministry of Industry practically over-strained the meagre
le Acting President/P resident in pursuance of the Proclamation o f Independence o f Bangladesh 1971.
83. The figures are cited from Government of Bangladesh. Resume of the Activities o f the Financial Institutions in Bangladesh, 
1976, p.8 also Government of Bangladesh. Statistical Pocket Book of Bangladesh, 1987. pp.127 and 325.
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administrative resources of the Ministry of Industry. As a result, these boards were soon 
replaced by administrators especially appointed to manage these enterprises. Moreover, in 
a least developing country like Bangladesh, it was natural that genuine small industrialists 
suffered from shortage of credit facilities. Thus it became necessary to set in motion the 
institutions that were previously extending credit facilities. With this in view, the 
Bangladesh (Administration o f Financial Institutions) Order 1972 was promulgated. 
Under the provisions of this Order, administrators were appointed for the management of 
the branches of the Pakistan Refugee Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, the House 
Building Finance Corporation (the Bangladesh House Building Finance Corporation was 
later established under President's Order No.7 o f 1973), the Investment Corporation of 
Pakistan, and the Equity Participation Fund. The administrators were authorised to do all 
the functions that had previously been entrusted to the Boards of Directors of these 
corporations.
These ad hoc measures could not solve the problem of management. The industrial 
sector needed long term solutions and a proper structure of management with a firm 
politico-economic philosophy. The youths and the workers were militant, as the memories 
of political subjugation, economic exploitation and disparity in economic and industrial 
development under a free enterprise policy leading to the concentration of wealth in the 
hands of 22 Pakistani families were still very vivid to them.84 Even the Draft Fourth Five 
Year Plan 1970-75 recognized the need to control the concentration of private industrial 
income.85 The plan avoided the use of the word "nationalisation" but concluded that big 
industries with sizeable and sophisticated technology, could not be left to the private 
sector. In the sphere of banks and insurance, excessive concentration of resource
84 These 22 non-Bengali business houses controlled as much as 40.8% of all private manufacturing assets in lias! Pakistan. i.e. 
Bangladesh, and 72% of fixed assets in the modern private manufacturing sector. There was a general feeling that industrial 
enterprises had been set up at the expense and through exploitation of the people of Bangladesh and henceforth they should 
belong to the people.
For a deuil study on the concentration of wealth in Pakisun. see I.J. While. Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in 
Pakistan. 1974.
85 See Draft Fourth Five Year Plan I970-7Î. op.cil.
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utilization in a few hands was pointed out and government control through nationalisation, 
majority share holding or stricter regulation o f  credit policies were identified as 
alternatives.86
The decision to nationalise the banks, insurance and major industries was 
announced on the first independence day i.e. 26th March 1972.87 8As the constitution of the 
country had not yet been framed and the parliament was not in session, the decision to 
nationalise was announced by the Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. On the advice 
of the Prime Minister the President promulgated an ordinance. President's Order No.27, 
The Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) order 1 9 7 2 Along with the 
indastries, the government, also on the same day, nationalised twelve commercial banks 
and set up six banking organizations with the entire assets and liabilities of each bank 
vested in the government.89
Apart from this, certain institutional readjustments were made in respect of the 
specialised financial institutions. New corporations were established or converted from old 
ones as inherited in the public sector. The Bangladesh House Building Finance 
Corporation was set up in place of the Pakistan House Building Finance Corporation 
operating in Bangladesh, but the entire authorised capital was subscribed by the 
government.90 The IDBP and the Equity Participation Fund (EPF) were merged to create 
the "Bangladesh Shilpa Bank", with the entire authorised capital subscribed by the 
government.91 Likewise, the PICIC, ICP, and the NIT were merged to set up "Bangladesh
86 Ibid.
87 On Ike night of 25Ih March 1971 ibe Pakistani army tlarled genocide in lias' Pakistan Immediately after the midnight i.e. 26th 
March 1971 the independence of Bangladesh was proclaimed That is why this day is officially celebrated as Independence Day 
Up to 16lh December 1971. Bangladesh remained under military occupation of Pakistani forces. On this day the Pakistani armed 
forces surrendered marking the end of the liberation war. Thus 16th December is commemorated as Victory Day.
88 Prior to this, in December 1971. the shares held by the public in the State Bank of Pakistan, as well as other assets of the bank in 
Bangladesh were taken over by the government and Bangladesh Bank was established to function as the central hank of the
country. See Bangladesh Gazette l-xlraordinary. The Bangladesh Hank (Temporary Order) 1971. Acting President's Order No. 2 
of 1971.
89 Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary. The Bangladesh Bank (Nationalisation) Order 1972. President s Order No.26 of ¡972.
90 Bangladesh Gazette I ix Inordinary. The Bangladesh House Building Finance Corporation Order 1972. The term subscribed is 
used in the legislation itself.
9*. Bangladesh Gazette lixtraordinary. The Bangladesh (Administration Financial Institutions) Order 1972.
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Shilpa Rin Sangstha" 92 In the field of insurance, two controlling public corporations were 
set up, one for life insurance and the other for general insurance business out of all the 
existing insurance companies.* 93 Here too, the government subscribed the entire authorised 
capital.
Other public corporations such as the Bangladesh Agricultural Development 
Corporation (BADC), Agricultural Development Bank (Krishi Bank), Jute Board, Tea 
Board, port trusts, different city development trusts, Water and Sewerage Authority 
(WASA) in different metropolitan areas, Inland Water and Transport Authority (BIWTA), 
Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation (BRTC), Bangladesh Railway etc. continued 
their functions as before. WAPDA was bifurcated to establish the Water Development 
Board and Power Development Board with no authorised capital. Other than the existing 
public corporations a few public enterprises were set up in the agricultural sector such as 
the Colton Board, Tobacco Board and Horticulture Board. The Trading Corporation o f 
Bangladesh (TCB) was established to carry on the business of foreign trade. The 
Consumer Supplies Corporation (COSCOR) was set up mainly as a price stabilisation 
measure for essential commodities. The jute export trade was nationalised and the 
Bangladesh Jute Export Corporation was established. The Bangladesh Shipping 
Corporation was established for operation and development of marine transport services. 
Biman - Bangladesh Airlines - was created.
In the industrial sector, the government dismantled the EPIDC and instead created 
ten sector corporations94 to operate the abandoned enterprises with fixed assets of more 
than Tk.2.5 million, the existing enterprises of the EPIDC and the nationalised industrial 
enterprises owned by Bangladeshi owners. Some abandoned enterprises were placed under
« .  Ibid.
93 Bangladesh Gazelle Extraordinary. The Bangladesh Insurance (Nationalisation) Order 1972.
9>l. See article 10(1) of P .0 .27 o f 1972.
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two newly created public corporations. Freedom Fighters Welfare Trust (Mukti Jodha 
Kalyan Trust) and Armed Forces Welfare Trust (Sena Kalyan Sangstha).
In the course of a year after liberation, 38 new public corporations were 
established in addition to 20 others which had been established during Pakistani rule.95 
Thus within a year, public enterprises grew in number and covered a wide range of 
activities. This widening of public enterprises took place in the name of building a 
socialist society in Bangladesh. While announcing nationalisation, the Prime Minister 
declared:
My government believes in internal social revolution. There must be a
change in old social systems....  My government and party are pledged
to introduce a scientific socialist economy. First step, namely 
nationalisation has been taken as the beginning of a planned programme 
towards socialisation of resources.96
In the same tone the Finance minister claimed that:
The nationalisation was a bold step towards establishment o f  complete 
socialism in the country. This would enable the people to enjoy the 
profits of the industrial enterprises which were previously appropriated 
by a few capitalists.97
The minister of industries claimed, that the nationalisation would bring
revolutionary change in the industrial field. Explaining the decision, he stated:
During the period of Pakistani administration a monopoly capitalism of 
twenty two families was established in the name of development. These 
twenty two families controlled the economy. They also used to control 
policies with a view to safeguard their monopoly capitalism. In this their 
major share holdings in banks, insurance business and foreign trade
helped....The principal objective o f the bloody war of liberation was to
attain economic freedom.... and freedom from all sorts of political and 
economic servitude.98
Although there was no opposition to nationalisation per se when it was announced, 
there were signs of awareness that nationalisation would not, by itself, automatically give
95. M.M.Zaman, ' Accountability of Public Enterprises in Bangladesh' in Management and Development, voi. 10, No.3. p.115.
96. The speech of the Prime Minister was reported in all national dailies of 27.3.72.
97. See, the Ittefaque. 3.4.72.
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rise to the establishment of a socialist society. A member of the Jatiyo Sangshad 
(Parliament) said, "this nationalisation is not socialism and it cannot be said that this is the 
first step of socialism. This has set up state capitalism, which is not conducive to 
socialism."99 A major criticism against the nationalisation carried out by the government 
as a step towards socialism was that the government kept the marketing and distribution of 
the products of the nationalised sector insulated from public sector control and 
management. While a major segment of production was owned and controlled by the state 
the marketing and distribution were left to the private sector agents (who in most cases 
were greedy and dishonest). The government had no control over the market. A 
commentator in a national Daily wrote that this would frustrate the move towards 
socialism.100
Whatever was the ideological motive behind nationalisation, the fact was that 
through it the government became directly responsible for productive activity, in contrast 
to the old regulatory and promotional responsibilities. Public ownership on a large scale 
and diverse industrial activities gave rise to a monopoly situation, whether formal or real, 
instead of real competition. This tended to make almost the entire industrial sector in to a 
single unit merging the problems of the firm with the problems of the economy.
The Nationalisation Order was followed by the government's declaration of 
investment policy.101 The policy imposed limits or ceilings on private investment. New 
private investment was to be allowed in units with assets of no more than Tk. 2.5 million, 
which could grow up to Tk. 3.5 million through reinvestment of profits.102
99 See Jatiyo Sangshader Bilarka (Debates in theJaliyo Sangshad) (in Bengali), vol.l. No.3. 12.4.73. p.89.
100 R.Islam. On Nationalisation'. The lltefaque ( in Bengali). 19.5.72.
,01. . Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of Industries. Investment Policy 1973.
102 It is important to note that while there was a limit on the size of an individual enterprise, there was no limit on the number of 
units a particular individual or group of individuals could own. (See Ibid.) Such investment opportunities as existed within the 
limit of Tk. 2.5 million, combined with the investments in the smaller abandoned units which were available for purchase by the 
private investors, were large enough to absorb all private savin« seeking such investment milieu. (N. Islam, op. cit.. p.31.) 
Moreover, during 1973-74 and 1974-75 the government licensed 172 enterprises with fixed assets per unit up to Tk. 2.5 millions: 
about half of total investment was sanctioned in limits of assets below Tk. 1 million. Similarly, whether private investment was 
discouraged by the ceiling was unclear. During 1973-74. as many as 700 applications for loans were received by the financial 
institutions for investment within the ceiling. (Ibid.)
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1.6. T he C hange o f G overnm ent Policies: T he Beginning o f the R ise o f  Private Sector.
After the Nationalisation Order 1972 the next important step in the legal field was the 
framing of the Constitution in November 1972. The Constitution reflected the economic 
objectives, and political reality, as they were conceived by the Awami League ruling 
circle. Article 8(1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh spells out the fundamental principles 
of the state as democracy, nationalism, socialism, and secularism. The intentions of the 
leadership were manifested in various articles and in subsequent amendments to the 
Constitution. When framed in 1972 the Constitution provided for the separation of the 
judiciary from the executive, thus attempting to ensure the independence of judiciary. But 
soon it was realised by the ruling party that fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
constitution, independence of judiciary and the responsibility of the executive to the 
legislature were hampering the growth o f  the local bourgeoisie and political opponents 
were reaping the fruits of the democratic constitution.103 In a deliberate move to 
concentrate power in the hands of the executive and to curb the increasing rise of the 
opposition the Constitution (Second Amendment) Act was passed on 22 September 1973.
The second amendment, for the first time, enacted provisions recognising and 
regulating preventive detention by adding clauses 4 and 5 to article 33 of the Constitution 
(the article which contained safeguards to arrest and detention). These clauses did not 
contain any express provision as to when a law providing for preventive detention could 
be passed or specifying the maximum period for which a person could be held in 
preventive custody. Where the Constitution did not originally contain any provision for 
the declaration of an emergency, the second amendment also conferred on the President 
the power to declare emergency with the consent of the Prime Minister. In the event of 
emergency being proclaimed, the fundamental rights guarantied in articles 36-43 could be 
suspended so as to remove the restrictions imposed on the power of the legislature to make
103 Derived from discussion with Badaruddin Omar, a prominent political analyst of the country.
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any law nr the executive to take any action contrary to the mentioned articles. Similarly, 
during the operation of an emergency, the President could issue an order suspending the 
enforcement of any fundamental rights.
Starting from 1973/74 there was increasing pressure for an upward revision of the 
ceiling on private investment and for allowing a larger role for foreign investment, 
especially its collaboration with domestic private enterprise.104 By 1974 there were a 
number of factors which had contributed to an accumulation of surplus funds in private 
hands. This accumulation of surplus funds was possible through high profits earned in 
domestic and import trading activities, including illegal trade, such as trade in contraband 
goods and smuggling of jute and other exportables across the border. Since these 
transactions were illegal, the risks were high and hence profits once realised were high. 
Import licences, quotas, bank loans and official business permits were mainly disbursed to 
facilitate easy income for the ruling party cadre, and these were sold and resold several 
times before reaching the genuine traders and importers. In addition, many residential 
buildings and trading or commercial enterprises abandoned by Pakistanis were illegally 
occupied by private persons, in some cases under the cover of political protection. The 
"caretakers" of such commercial enterprises, hastily appointed by the government in 1972 
immediately after independence, made large fortunes through the undeclared sale of 
assets. Moreover, there were gains to be obtained from rental or sales proceeds of 
abandoned houses which were illegally occupied by private persons.105
In this context, whether existing opportunities for private investment in the 
industrial sector were adequate or not to absorb available investible funds, was not a major 
issue. What was crucial was that government reverted, gradually if not immediately, to the 
pre-liberation policy of "sponsored capitalism" where the state would provide 
concessional financial and fiscal facilities to allow private investors to invest, to reap large
104 M.M.Akwh. op Cl/., p.17,
>« ;m .
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gains, to gain initial experience, if necessary with government subsidies, and then to grow
in size and power.106
There was pressure not only for raising the ceiling on investment but also for
declaring a moratorium on any action against ill-gotten or "black-money", i.e. money
earned in illegal transactions such as smuggling and black marketing, bureaucratic or
political corruption and avoidance of taxation. All hidden wealth was to be exempted from
civil and criminal liabilities for past violation of foreign exchange and tax laws. One
member of the Mujib107 planning commission writes.
When the 1974-75 budget and Annual Development Plan came up for 
discussion at the end of May/June 1974, a rather unstructured 
discussion on the ceiling took place amongst the policy makers in the 
context of legitimizing black money.108
The pressure for raising the ceiling on private investment exerted by the new rich 
within Bangladesh was strongly and consistently supported by donor countries and 
foreign-aid agencies. The World Bank recommended raising the ceiling to Tk.10 million 
or removing it altogether.109
The move to raise the ceiling on private investment succeeded. The new 
investment policy110 raised the ceiling of private investment substantially from Tk.2.5 
million to Tk.30 million. Private foreign investors were allowed to enter into partnership 
with domestic private investors, mainly but not exclusively in projects where 
"technological and managerial gap existed."111 Finally, the moratorium on nationalisation
106 N.Islam, op. at., p.245.
107 Sheikh Muiibur Rahman ia considered to be Ihe founder of Bangladesh and he headed Ihe Awami League govemmenl (1972 - 
August 1975).
108 R Sobhan and M. Ahmad, op. at., p.244. ( Professor R Sobhan was the member of the Planning Commission in charge of
109 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (frequently termed as the World Bank). Bangladesh: 
Development in Rural Economy, vol.l, 1974. p.312.
110 Govemmenl of Bangladesh. Ministry of Industries. Revised Investment Policy, 1974.
II1. Ibid., p.3.
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was extended from ten to fifteen years and fair and equitable compensation was guarantied 
in the event of subsequent nationalisation.112
Within a few months after independence, one section of students and workers 
within the party was demanding more radical steps towards socialism while another group 
was denouncing socialism as an alien ideology not suitable for Bangladesh. The latter 
group along with the major group of the leadership was advocating "Mujibism"m  as 
opposed to socialism. Both groups claimed the support of Mujib himself. But when the 
real test came for Mujib to ch<x>se one of them, he and the party blessed the latter 
group.114 The former group later formed their own political party; the National Socialist 
Party (JSD). With the departure of the radical faction the petty-bourgeois leadership of the 
party started consolidating their position, this time without having any serious challenge 
from within.
The prevailing economic stagnation, accentuated by rapid inflation and marked by 
a severe famine in the third quarter of 1974, decreased the popularity of the party in 
power. The army and bureaucracy were unhappy, because of their subordinate role to the 
politicians, which was contrary to the long experience of the Pakistani era. In the face of 
decreasing public support, the government became more and more autocratic. The labour 
movements, and opposition political views were crashed through the Special Powers Act, 
1974 and the declaration o f  emergency.115 As time passed, the emerging bourgeoisie, 
which was initially weak immediately after independence gained some strength and the 
civil and military bureaucracy were gradually consolidating. In order to consolidate 
political power and to satisfy different pressure groups, the government again amended the
«'2 IkU
115 Mujihism was referred u  the philosophy of Sheikh Muiihur Rahman the Prime Minister. The characteristics of Mujihism has 
never been explained either by Mujih himself or by his party Hut judging from his speeches and other government policy 
declarations it is quite evident that essentially it meant "mixed-economy".
114 Personal knowledge, also, see the Bangladeshi news papers of February June. 1973.
115 Por details of the provisions of the Spatial Power, Ail 1974. see Bangladesh tia/elle I extraordinary. 1974.
For detailed analysis of the declaration of emergency, see li.Bari, Martial l  aw m HaaglaJeah I97S-79: A l.egal Anatyiu. (a 
PhD. thesis submitted at the School of Orientals«! African Studies) 1985, Chapter I.
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Constitution. Thus the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act was passed on the 25th 
January 1975 without any debate.
The Act changed the fundamental character of the Constitution. It replaced 
parliamentary democracy with a presidential one, curbed the independence of the 
judiciary, abolished judicial power to enforce fundamental rights, conferred the President 
with the power of vetoing a Bill passed by the parliament and gave the President the 
power of declaring Bangladesh an "one-party" state.
It is to be mentioned here that the Supreme Court in 1981 in the case of Hamidul
Huq Chowdhury v. Bangladesh observed that by incorporation of a provision relating to a
proclamation of Emergency in the Constitution and by introduction of Fourth Amendment
in the Constitution by Act II of 1975 the basic and essential features of the Constitution
were altered and destroyed. The Court further noted:
These alterations and amendments of the Constitution reduced the 
Constitution out of recognition. It was in our opinion, beyond the 
powers of Parliament as the donee of prescribed powers under a 
controlled Constitution to alter the essential features and basic 
structure o f the Constitution.116
However, having observed the above, the court concluded that:
After a lapse of nearly six years interposed by extra-constitutional 
process which has not been resisted by the people, and having been 
recognised by several judicial authorities, these questions, namely, the 
unconstitutionality of the impugned enactment on ground of loss of 
competency o f the Parliament in 1975 on account of the Fourth 
Amendment and creation of immunity of laws during proclamation of 
Emergency, though these were violative of Fundamental Rights, 
cannot be entertained.117
The President exercised his powers in accordance with the Constitution's Fourth 
Amendment to establish a one party state from February 1975, in which the party cadres
116 llamidul Huq Chouwdhury v. Bangladesh. 33 DLR (1081) 394.
117. Ibid. The Supreme Court in 1989 using Ihc same "basic structure" theory in the case of Anwar llossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh 
11989 Bl.I) (Spl) 1| held that the Jatiyo Sangshad had no prerogative to change the basic principles of the constitution and ruled 
against the 8th Amendment of the Constitution. It may be mentioned here that the Bangladesh Supreme Court is not the only 
court which asserted the power of judicial review over amendments to the Constitution. See the Indian case of Minerva Mills Ltd. 
v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789 also Sierra Leone case of Akar v. Attorney General (1966-67) A.L.R.S.I.. 283 quoted from 
J.Cottrell. Indian Judicial Activism, the Company and the Worker: A note on National Textile WorkcrsUnion v Ramakrishnan' 
in the International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol.39, 1990, 0-438.
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and bureaucracy, including the army, were to be integrated under one unified leadership 
and control. The Communist Party of Bangladesh and the National Awami Party (M) 
joined the newly formed only legal political party but others did not. Between these two 
contending clear interest groups in the party, the President was the balancing force. In the 
meantime, all but three newspapers were banned. Thousands of political opponents were 
detained without any charge under the Special Powers Act.
Although leadership remained in the hands of the same petty bourgeois elements, 
with the joining of the communist party and National Awami Party (M), its leadership was 
not beyond question. Moreover, some of the programmes of the newly formed lone 
political party, "BAKSAL", (Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League - Bangladesh 
Peasants and Workers National League) were viewed by the emerging bourgeoisie as 
being against their further development and potentially "socialist". The bourgeoisie, 
whose growth was mainly due to patronage by the state, the military and civil bureaucracy 
did not like the programmes considered to be socialist. Thus the right wingers of the 
Awami League, supported by international capital, conspired with a small section of army 
to eliminate President Mujib, because he was considered to be slow in bringing about the 
cherished reforms as conceived by it. Analysing the political developments in Bangladesh, 
Hamza Alavi in 1973 wrote:
[T]he Bengali bureaucracy exists, and the Awami League regime has 
identified itself with it and with the privileged groups [professionals, 
farmers with surplus, traders and bourgeoisie] in the country, but the 
latter are not backed by substantial military forces.... It may yet be that a 
new bureaucratic-military oligarchy with outside aid will in due course 
consolidate its position and power in Bangladesh.118
On the 15th August 1975, President Mujib was killed in a military coup organised 
by a small section of the army.
118 II Alavi. -The Stale in Poet Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh' in K. Gough and M.P.Shamta (ed). Impenaliim ami 
Revolution in South Alia, 1973. p.172 (emphasis added).
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1.7. Declaration of M artial Law: The Acceleration of Bureaucratic Predominance 
and the Decline of Public Enterprises.
The military installed a new President, who was the Minister of Commerce in the Mujib 
cabinet and a vice-president of BAKSAL. Khondker Mustaque Ahmed, the new President, 
who was known to all as a man with bias towards a free market economy, preferred to 
keep the entire cabinet of Mujib. The entire cabinet which gave leadership during the war 
of independence in absence of Mujib was not only dropped from the cabinet but taken to 
custody. These four leaders, on the night of the 3rd November 1975, was brutally killed at 
the order o f Mushtaque inside Dhaka Central Jail.
In subsequent months there were two more military coups. Khondker Mustaque 
Ahmed was removed from the office of the President. The country was placed under 
martial law and the Constitution was first suspended and later amended by martial law 
regulations.119 The military government which was established after the coup on 7th 
November 1975, under the leadership of Gen. Ziaur Rahman, opted for a much greater 
role for the private sector. This coup sharply changed the political scenario.120
The industrial policy was again revised in order to increase the boundaries of 
private investment while cutting the size of the public enterprises.121 Industries previously 
reserved for the public sector were now thrown open to joint participation of public and 
private enterprises.122 Various policies, for example providing upto 70% of the total cost 
of establishing an enterprise by state owned financial institutions, to promote private 
capitalism were vigorously pursued. In order to legalise "black-money", the policy
119 The Constitution of Bangladesh docs not contain any provision for the declaration of martial law or the suspension of 
Constitution as a whole. Thus the suspension and the amendments of the Constitution by the martial law authonly through 
promulgation of martial law orders violates the provisions of the Constitution.
The attitudes of Bangladesh judiciary on this is dearly expressed in Ham,dullluq Chowdhury v. Bangladesh (33 DLR (1981] 
394 and Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh 11989 BLD (spl)| 1. For the attitudes of courts of other countries see 
Y.P.Ghai. Coups and Constitutional Doctrines: The Role of Courts'. The Political Quarterly, vol.58. No.3. 1987. pp.308-311.
120 S.Oren. * After the Bangladesh Coups' in the World Today, vol.32. 1976. pp. 18-24.
121. It was possible because by 1975 slate patronage already created a group of people who acquired sufficient wealth to establish 
enterprises previously reserved for exclusive state participation.
122 Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary. Revised Industrial Policy I97S.
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declared, "......those who would disclose such funds would be allowed to retain the same
without any questioning by the government...."123 An amount o f Tk.1.3 billion black- 
money was declared by different individuals to the taxation authorities.124 *
The revised industrial policy also drastically changed the investment policy. The 
policy raised the ceiling of private investment further to Tk.100 million. Both local and 
foreign investors were allowed to participate with the public sector in setting up industries 
falling within the reserved list. Although a major share was to be retained by the public 
corporations, management contracts could be given to private investors on considerations 
of "economy, technology and management".123 Tax holidays and other incentives 
introduced by the earlier government were not only re-emphasised but extended. The 
stock exchange was reactivated. Finally, the government decided to disinvest some 
industrial units which were placed under public corporations.
The decision to make payment of compensation for the nationalised enterprises to 
their previous share holders was also vigorously implemented. The revised industrial 
policy o f 1975 also contrasted with the policy of the previous government in not 
containing any reference to socialism.126 The Industrial Policy announced in May 1977,
123 Ibid.
124 II.Khasru. Public Scclor. Black Money and Pricca'. The Holiday. 28.8 77.
Commentators believe that the amount declared as a result of the Revised Industrial Policy was far short of all realistic 
assumptions regarding the undeclared volume of money in private hands through illegal patronage by the stale. (Ibid.) The 
President of the Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industries opined that by the end of 1972 at least an amount of Tk.10 billion 
black money was concentrated in the hands of a very limited few in a country whose average annual GDP since liberation has 
been or the order of IV.55 billion. A.AIam.' Ferreting out the Black Money'. The Holiday. 9.9.77.
legalisation of black money effectively meant according some sort of legitimacy to the violation of existing laws and regulations. 
It also encouraged others to undertake such activities in the future. By way of legalising the ' Hack-money', government rewarded 
those who made fortunes by a violation of laws in the context of a general stale of deprivation in the economy. This was also 
against the expectation of the society. Moreover, it not only shows the failure of the government to enforce laws made by it but 
also its participation in their violation for private gains. Since the state was an active participant in the formation of Hack money 
it was natural on its part to legalise it.
123 Revised Industrial Policy. op.cit.
126 The New Investment Policy o f 1974. although kept the provision for an expanded private sector still continued its formal rhetoric 
of socialism stating. "...in pursuance of the government commitment to the establishment of a socialist economy, the key sectors
including the bulk of the industries arc already in the public sector.....It is. however, considered conducive to the goal of rapid
industrialisation and mobilisation of investment funds to afford scope to the private entrepreneurs to play an expanded role within 
the framework of a planned economy."
The Revised Industrial Policy o f 1975 abandoned the reference to socialism and justified the change in policy in the following 
terms: "The government is of the view that while industries of baric and strategic importance or in the nature of public utility 
service, should remain in the puMic sector, for reaching the goal of mobilisation of investment funds and rapid industrialisation.
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limited the participation of the public sector to eight categories of industries and 
announced a concurrent list of nine categories which were open to both public and private 
sector. This marked the end of the policy of nationalisation and the expansion of private 
sector. A careful review of the policy reveals that, however desirous the government was 
to reduce the frontiers of public enterprises, it cannot undermine the importance of public 
enterprises in Bangladesh.
Generous financial assistance was provided by the government not only in the 
form of loans but also in the form of equity. Liberal credit facilities from the public sector 
financial institutions were provided for industrial financing of the private sector. By 1976- 
77 the private sector was getting an edge over the public sector. The Bangladesh Shilpa 
Bank (BSB) sanctioned 90% of its loans to the private sector in 1976-77 compared to 17% 
in 1974-75 and 20% in 1973-74.127 Increased tax holidays, rebate on payment of custom 
duties for import of capital equipment and raw materials, writing off the payment of 
interests accumulated over the principal borrowed, expert counsel provided by the 
government as well as lending agencies (all were in public sector), policies protecting the 
domestic market against foreign competition were some of the facilities granted to the 
local business community. There was a reduction of up to 75% in rates of various fees 
charged by the financial institutions for the private sector investors. The Investment 
Corporation of Bangladesh (ICB) was set up in 1976 to provide institutional support to the 
stock market. The liberalisation and incentive packages of the import and export policies 
increasingly favoured the private sector in terms of allocations as well as infrastructural 
facilities.128 The Presidential Adviser in charge of the Ministry of Commerce emphatically
Ihc private entrepreneurs should he afforded adequate scope and facilities for setting up industrial enterprises within the broad 
framework of a planned economy...."
127 Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of Finance. Resume o f the Financial Institutions 1Q77-7H. pp.71-72.
128 The Presidential Adviser in charge of the Minislty of Commerce described the import policy of the government as "the most 
liberal import policy for many years- even more liberal than the policies of the last days of Pakistan." quoted from ' Bias Towards 
Private Seclo/, The Holiday. 10.7.77.
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declared that the government aimed at "a reduction of the public sector and expansion of 
the private sector."129
During martial law (1975-79), a number of leftist politicians were arrested and 
even sentenced to long term imprisonment including the President, General Secretary and 
a number of national and regional executive members of the National Socialist Party 
(JSD),130 Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) and others. A leader of the JSD Colonel 
Abu Taher was tried in camera and sentenced to death.131
Once the military government o f Zia felt consolidated, it became anxious for its 
legitimacy for both internal and external reasons. Moreover during this period the army 
tried to revolt on a number of occasions.132 So the need for legitimacy became a policy 
objective o f the government and accordingly a country-wide referendum was organised.
The military government of Zia, after consolidation and crushing of opposition 
amended the constitution by a Martial Law Ordinance introducing a multi-party 
presidential system with the office o f  the President vested with sweeping powers.133 
Bureaucrats filled the vacuum in the major decision making bodies e.g. the Cabinet, the 
Planning Commission, National Economic Council etc.
During the rule of Zia the bureaucracy, military bureaucracy in particular, in the 
ruling coalition started gaining the upper hand by directly controlling state power which 
was utilised to strengthen its economic power through various legal and illegal means of 
state patronage and judicious use of the spoils system. In the tradition of the past, the
129 Ibid
130. For ihc ideological line of ISD aee T.Maniruzzaman. * Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution?' in Asian Studies. 1 VIS.
,31. For details of the trial of Colonel Taher. see E-Bnri. op. at., pJ7.
It is to be mentioned here that already during the Mujib regime thousands of workers of the JSD and other under ground 
"communist parties* were killed, including the leader of an underground pro-Peking "communist party".
132 F.H. Yusuf, op. c,t.. p.90.
133 E.Bari, op. cit„ p.42.
It may be recalled that the Awami league government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman earlier switched over to one party presidential 
rule from the original multi-party Westminster system of government.
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proximity to the ruling power structure and the ruling party brought opportunities at the 
levels o f the political and bureaucratic hierarchy to earn lucrative premia from the process 
of distribution of the substantial international aid/grants, issue of permits, licences, quotas 
and from bribery. It became politically expedient for Zia's government to further its group 
interests through various means of patronage and use of spoils system of which a further 
decimation of the public enterprises was a convenient means. Thus expansion of public 
enterprises was considered to be hindering the interest of the ruling elite. It was in the 
group interest of the ruling class even to allow the public enterprises to remain at their 
previous size.134
Since the imposition of martial law in 1975, the continued and unabated 
predominance of the bureaucracy and especially the military, in politics and 
administration even under an elected government became obvious. Although Zia was very 
popular,135 he was under constant pressure from his army colleagues,136 which left no 
doubt where the locus of power and authority remained in spite of the facade of 
democracy. Army officers wanted more participation in the administration, though they 
were already sharing with their civilian counterparts. Indeed, even the post election 
cabinet of Zia contained six retired army officers.137
Dissatisfaction within the army as well as bourgeoisie continued. The number of 
attempted coups during the rule of Zia is indicative of restive ambitions and certain lust 
for power of a few generals.138 In May 1981, Zia was killed by a rival group in the army.
134 M.M.AIcash, op. cil. p.19.
135. Zia secured 98.88% of the tolal ratted confidence vote in April 1977 referendum and 76.3% in the presidential election of June 
1978.
136 M. Rashiduzzaman. Bangladesh in 1977: Dilemmas of the Military Rulers' in Asian Survey, vol.18.1978. p.131.
137 lhlJ
138 For more details of the roup attempts during that time, see H.Bari, op. etl., p.57.
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1.8. General Ershad's Regime: Further Consolidation of Bureaucratic Predominance 
and Decrease in Public Enterprises.
After Zia was killed, his civilian Vice-President, Justice Abdus Satter was elected 
President with a big margin. But right after the election the army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. 
H.M.Ershad, started to give provocative political statements regarding the need for 
participation by the armed forces in the political process. He then directly interfered in the 
functioning of the President, his cabinet and other functionaries of the government.139 A 
sizeable section of the ruling party backed the army. The subsequent crisis between the 
President and the military bureaucracy culminated in the forced resignation of President 
Satter and yet another imposition o f Martial Law on the 24th o f March 1982 throughout 
the country. Through the promulgation of Martial Law Proclamation Order 1982.140 Gen. 
Ershad became the Chief Martial Law Administrator with the legislative, executive and 
judicial powers vested in him. He had also the power to nominate a President for the 
republic.141 The constitution was suspended and Parliament was dissolved. Strict 
censorship of newspapers was instituted.
The new regime led by Gen. Ershad reviewed the industrial policy. The new 
industrial policy as announced in June 1982 aimed, among other things, to i) expand the 
manufacturing sector with the increased participation of private sector; ii) limit the role of 
public sector to the establishment of basic, heavy and strategic industry.142 According to 
the new policy, public sector investment was limited only to six sectors and the areas 
where both public and private sector could set up new industries were expanded. The
139 This section is based on my personal knowledge and also on the information of (he national dailies and weeklies between 
December 1981-March 1982.
14®. See Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, Proclamation of Martial !aiw 1982. 24.3.1982
*41. Clause (b) of the Proclamation o f Martial Law says. "I may nominate any person as President of the country at any time and 
shall enter upon the office of the President after taking oath before the Chief Justice of Bangladesh or any judge of the Supt 
Court designated by me. I may rescind or cancel such nomination from lime to time and nominate another person as the Ptesi 
of Bangladesh. The Prrsidenl so nominated by me shall be the head of the slate and act on and in accordance with my advit 
Chief Martial I .aw Administrator and perform such functions as assigned to him by me.’ Sec the Proclamation of Martial 
1982. op.cit. The CMLA first nominated a judge of the supreme court Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Choudhurv. The post ol 
President was subordinate to the CMLA. Within a year the appointed President was relieved of his post and the offices ol 
CMLA and the President was combined together.
142. Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of Industry. New Industrial Policy 1982.
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existing size of the sector corporations was to lie reduced by disinvesting the industrial 
units abandoned by non-Bengali owners in a phased manner. Provisions were also made to 
disinvest those units which were established with a corporation's own resources or 
government developmental funds. Shares of public sector enterprises were to be made 
available for public subscription retaining the majority share with the corporation. 
Provision was also made to appoint management contractors to run some of the bigger 
industrial enterprises in the public sector. Finally, it was decided to return the jute and 
textile mills to their former Bangladeshi owners.143
By 1982 state patronisation had resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of 
millionaires in the society.144 The New industrial Policy o f 1982 (NIP) was a response to 
this fact, i.e., the growth of a group who could take advantage of privatisation. Thus, it 
announced concrete steps for the growth of the private sector, which among others 
included increase of monetary incentives, such as reduced personal and company taxes, 
increased tax exemption and simplification of procedures to establish an enterprise, 
concessionary interest rates on loans for industries in less developed areas etc. Since 1982, 
several measures were taken to develop the institutional framework to facilitate the growth 
of private enterprises.145 The Second Five Year Plan 1980-85 was revised in May 1983 
with an emphasis to "allow private sector to have a more pronounced role in the 
economy".146 Encouragement of private investment had become one of the main economic 
objectives of the government.147
M M Akash, op. cil.
They are a) hank.» and insurance companies were allowed in private sector, b) Industrial Promotion Development Company 
(IDPC) with 30% government shares was set up for promoting private industries, c) leasing companies were allowed for 
procurement and leasing of equipment to potential investors, d) a scheme was devised for protecting foreign currency loan from 
the adverse effects of the exchange rate fluctuation which was named as Exchange Fluctuation Burden Absorption Scheme 
(EFAS) in 1983. e) bonded warehouse facilities were allowed to export oriented industrirs. f) a high powered monitoring
143 lb>i
up to review the bottle-necks arising i I of tariff anomalies and suggest remedial
147 New Industrial Policy 1982, op. cil.
The thesis covers the period up to 1990 and hence does i political changes.
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In the same manner as Zia, Ershad promulgated a martial law order exonerating 
the holders of illegal money from any civil or criminal liabilities on their declaration of the 
amount.148 The government denationalised a number of banks and industrial units. By 
June 1983, 185 nationalised industrial units were disinvested resulting in the decrease of 
public enterpi ises. Nationalisation in Bangladesh thus virtually came to an end before the 
end of 1983.149 Like the previous regime, decimation of the nationalised industries was 
used as a means, like distribution of diplomatic assignments, secondment of army 
personnel to civilian posts, re-employment of retired army personnel to civilian jobs or 
fostering business enterprise operated by some ex-defence personnel150 to pacify the 
armed forces. The government had also permitted the establishment of new private banks 
and insurance companies apart from denationalising two of the six nationalised 
commercial banks. A number of army officers were appointed as chairmen of various 
public corporations.
The government further liberalised its industrial policy and in 1986 announced a 
Revised Industrial Policy (RIP). Amongst many objectives the policy aims at effecting 
growth of industries with increased emphasis on private sector participation151 and 
limiting the role of the public sector to the establishment of strategic and heavy 
industries.152 However, the industrial policy 1986 pointed out that in areas and/or sectors 
where investment is considered desirable, but private investment may not be forthcoming, 
public sector may set up industries either by themselves or jointly with the private sector, 
which may in due course, be transferred to private entrepreneurs. The RIP emphasised for 
the conversion of the individual enterprises into public limited companies and
148 See. Bangladesh Gaulle Extraordinary. Martial Law Regulation No. V, 1982.
149 F.H.Yusuf, op. cit.. p.215.
150 Ibid., p.108.
151. Effects of the policy of industrialisation through privatisation will he discussed in chapter 5.
152 The scope of the operation of public enterprises was limited to a) arms, ammunition and sensitive defence equipment, b) 
generation (excluding standhy/captive generation), transmission and distribution of electricity, c) forest plantation and 
mechanised extraction within the bounds of reserved forests, d) telecommunications (two way light/ HE/ VHF/ UHF 
transmission), e) air transport (excluding cargo) and railways, f) atomic energy and g) security printing (currency note) and 
minting. See. Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of Industry, Revued Industrial Policy 1986.
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corporations into holding companies in appropriate cases. It also emphasised the off 
loading of 49% shares.153
The RIP continued its emphasis on the predominant role of the private sector and 
concrete steps in boosting the private sector were declared. Except in the cases of the 
reserved list of seven areas, private sector investment has been kept practically open 
without any ceiling and with the least formalities for registration/ sanction. There is also 
provision for private investment outside the reserved list in joint collaboration with the 
public sector corporations.
Various incentives have also been provided to boost private sector investment. The 
RIP among others, undertook the strategy of assisting and promoting local industries with 
comparative advantage through tariff rationalisation and appropriate fiscal measures. 
Above all private investors are allowed to invest their own resources without government 
permission.154
The government, to accelerate increased private investment in industry, shifted its 
role from regulatory to promotional and assistance and to this end established a Board of 
Investment in January in 1989 to deal with all matters relating to the establishment and 
operation of industrial units. The Board is headed by the President himself. Providing all 
kinds of capital and creation of infrastructural facilities for industries are among the major 
functions of the Board.
In terms of legitimizing his personal rule Ershad followed similar political steps as 
did late General Zia. He held referendum by asking whether people wanted him or not. He 
then formed his own political party, the Jatiyo Party (JP) with members drawn mostly 
from the BNP, right wingers of the Awami League, a few politicians of other smaller 
parties, retired military and civil bureaucrats.
153 Thin will hr diacuucd elaborately in Chapter S.
154 Ibid.
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Once organised his political platform, Ershad in 1986 hold parliamentary election 
and obtained 193 out of total 300 seats by rigging the election.155 The election proved 
conclusively the hollowness of his pronounced intention to establish democracy in the 
country. After the election martial law was officially withdrawn. He, then, hold 
Presidential election and got elected,156 but the major opposition parties boycotted the 
election.
Once martial law was withdrawn and a facade of democracy established, the 
opposition to Ershad's rule grew. During October-November 1987, the opposition parties 
called for nationwide strikes for days together and repeated it resulting in chaos and 
paralyse of normal economic life of the country. Initially Ershad tried to suppress the 
movement through political means but failed. He, thus, opted for using force and quickly 
dissolved the parliament, and declared a state of emergency, which meant restricting all 
political activities and the suspension of certain fundamental rights. Some political 
leaders, including the leader of the Awami League and the BNP were arrested, others were 
haunted by the police. Under the coverage of the Emergency, parliamentary election was 
held in early 1988157, which all major opposition parties boycotted. After the session of 
the Parliament convened emergency was first relaxed and then withdrawn.
The 1987 mass movement for the restoration of democracy failed because the two 
major opposition parties, namely the Awami League and the BNP, could not unite. In 
1988 the country witnessed the most devastating flood, even major part of the capital 
Dhaka was under water. Due to flood, the opposition parties remained silent and could not 
go ahead with their programmes. The anti-Ershad movement lost momentum for the time 
being. But in 1990 the students belonging to all political parties unexpectedly united and
155 The BNP boycotted the election on the ground that under Irshad free and fair election will never take place and accordingly 
demanded his resignation before the election. The Awami league. although demanded the similar thing hut participated in the 
election to prove its assertion about lirshad.
156 In Bangladesh, the President was elected directly by the people before Bangladesh switched over to parliamrtary system in July 
1991.
157 The Constitution of Bangladesh clearly says that the state of emergency cannot continue beyond 120 days and can only be 
extended for a further 120 days by the parliament and each extension requires the approval of the parliament. The Constitution 
also says that once the Parliament is dissolved by the President a new Parliamentary election must be held within 120 days or the 
President will have to re-convene the old Parliament.
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vowed to fight for the restoration o f democracy. The political parties had to follow suit 
because they feared losing control over the masses. In October-November, opposition 
parties unitedly organised rallies, frequently called for prolonged strikes, paralysed the 
economy. Ershad in vein tried all means including the use of force. The army realising the 
mood of the population decided not to side with Ershad. He had to resign and handed over 
power to the Chief Justice of the country, who would head an interim non-party 
government to hold free and fair parliamentary election, as demanded by the opposition.158
Since, the interim government's main function was to hold free and fair election it 
continued the policies adopted by Ershad. In February parliamentary election was held in 
which although the BNP, headed by the widow of the late Gen. Zia - Khaleda Zia, 
emerged as the single majority party but was short of 12 seats to form the government. 
The fundamentalist Jamat-e-Islami, banned during Awami League regime but revived by 
BNP, obtaining 18 seats supported the BNP. Thus, Khaleda Zia became the Prime 
Minister of the country.
It may be recalled that constitutionally Bangladesh had a presidential system of 
government where the president is both the head of the state and of the government. 
However, the BNP government, in spite of its election manifesto to retain present hybrid 
system, in the Budget session of Parliament introduced a bill to change over to the 
Westminster type and the bill was duly passed. On the 15th of September 1991,
158. The opposition panics demanded resignation of Ershad and transfer of power to the Chief Justice of the Country because they 
realised that under Ershad there cannot he any free and fair election. But. there is no constitutional provision of transferring 
power to the Chief Justice. However, in case of the resignation of the President, the vice president, who can be appointed and 
dismissed by the President, automatically becomes the President and can continue up to the remaining tenure of office. (The 
Parliament modified this rule and the vice president was required to be the running male of the President during the Presidential 
election as in the U S A. and should remain in office during the full tenure of office of the President, which means the President 
lost the power of dismissal of the Vice-President) If both President and vice President resigns or are unable to function then the 
Speaker of the Jatiyo Sangshad functions as President.
In order to pave the way to hand over power to the chief justice without breaking the provisions of th 
opposition parties demanded the resignation of the vice-Piesideol fust and the immediate appointment of the Chief Ju 
Vice President. After this new appointment Ershad as President should resign paving the way for the Chief Justice to 
President. But political and economic situation deteriorated so much that President. vice-Presiden! and entire a  
resigned handing over power to the Chief Justice, once more in violation of the Constitutional provisions.
The very resignation process is now treated as a revolution. Under the Constitution any person holding any offu 
held the office of the President. The Chief Justice was all along opposing the idea and he accepted the post on the 
after holding free and fair election he should be allowed to resume his former post. As in 1978 and 1$86 martial 
validated retrospectively by the parliament, the appointment of the chief justice and his return to his former post wi 
retrospective validation. Ilow competent is the parliament in validating something retrospectively which ab initio >
c - " - . . . 1—’ ------ -------I“ f—  — -----■* -n Bangladesh. For a detail of the changes see the news (----- —1
lion of Bangladesh as amended up to 1990.
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referendum159 was held and 84.42% of the votes casted was in favour o f  the change of 
governmental system from presidential to parliamentary one.
The shift of BNP stand seems to be dictated by a) popular demand, b) to avoid 
costly presidential election, especially after the recent devastating cyclone and c) above all 
the risk of not winning the election by the government because if the president is elected 
from any other party the parliamentary victory of the BNP will be almost meaningless. In 
that case the country is likely to face Constitutional crisis between the President who will 
be both head o f the state and government and the prime minister who is the leader of the 
majority party in the parliament without real power. The constitutional crisis between the 
president and the prime minister will invariably worsen the present bad economic 
situation. In that case there might be a possibility of direct military take over which the 
government is trying to avoid.
In term of economic philosophy and the composition of the party, BNP and 
Ershad's JP do not differ in any manner. Therefore, one cannot expect any change in 
government's economic policies.
From the Awami League in the 1972-75, through military rules o f  Zia and Ershad 
(1975-1990), the bureaucracy, especially the army, gained hold over other groups of the 
ruling coalition. Since then the country is practically run by the bureaucrats in coalition 
with the army. Many army officers voluntarily retired and entered business, trade or 
manufacturing. In a country where unemployment among the educated is high, officers of 
the army leave their jobs early and start their own business venture indicating how easy it 
is for them to be in business because of their proximity to power structure. The civil 
bureaucrats also do not find any difficulty either in engaging themselves in business or in 
being absorbed by big business or by the non-governmental organisations (both local and 
foreign) on retirement.
159 According lo the cc ■I of 1978. the change of governmental ayalem requires the holding of a referendum.
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The process of nationalisation under the Awami League followed by rampant 
privatisation of nationalised enterprises, the rapid establishment of private banks and 
insurance companies, the lavish invitation to foreign investment, the clear-cut domination 
of donor countries and aid agencies; the mushrooming of non-governmental organisations 
and the geometric growth of multi-millionaire trading bourgeoisie of whom a 
conspicuously increasing proportion had military and civil bureaucratic background and 
the increasing militarisation of the public administration and public enterprises 
administration are the logical culmination o f the policies of the previous governments.
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CHAPTER 2
Legal Foundations of Public 
Enterprises in Bangladesh
2.1. Introduction.
Bangladesh with its long history of colonial domination is not an exception to the pattern 
of development that generally took place in other colonial countries, both before and after 
independence.1 During the British rule, capitalist relations of production were penetrating 
the economy of Bangladesh. Such penetration created and shaped the social formation of 
Bangladesh, however, at the same time, the pre-capitalist relations o f  production which 
were in vogue were preserved largely because they served to subsidise capitalist 
production.
Legality as a legal ideology was, often, presented by the colonialists as justifying 
part of their civilizing mission.2 As part of introducing capitalist relations of production 
and part of fulfilling the civilizing mission, an array of prototype laws with minimal 
modification was introduced into India, as in other colonies. But with the weak penetration 
of capitalism,3 given what had to be done to structure the colonial economy and to 
maintain it, universalism, freedom and equality of any significant kind, associated with 
legality and rule o f law, was quite out o f question.4
A vast literature on different colonial and post colonial suies sund as evidence to the similar nature of development that look 
place in various colonial countries. For a survey of literature on colonial and post colonial suies see P.Fitzpatrick. Law and Stale 
in Papua Now Guinea. 1980.
R.A. Hutlcnback, Racism and Empire: While Settlers as Colored Immigrants in the British Self-Governing Colonies, 1830-1910, 
1976, pp.13-16; R.B.Seidman, The Slate, Law and Development. 1978, p.201.
o Bikash (The Growth and D
History o f Bengal. 197S; H.Alavi. I 
J.Seville (ed.). The Socialist Register. 1971. A.A.Abdulla. The Class re­
presented at the R eg a l Studies ' '  '  ---------  .-»-.v n
Conflict in a Plural Society: hi
_________________________Of Nationalism: Pakisun and Bangladesh’, A paper
r. Toronto, 1972; R.Sobhan. Social Basis of Pakistan Crisis. 1969; fi.Broomfield, Elite 
Twentieth Century. 1968.
Researchers analysing sute and law during colonial period in other oeveloping countries also commented in the similar tone, see 
P.Fitzpalrick, op. cil., p.38.
Referring to the colonial sit Kenya. Ghai and McAuslan mention
Law, in this thesis, is looked at as a type of carefully designed state action, 
distinctive in certain operational ways. It is not seen as isolated from politics to form an 
outside constraint on political life: rather, law is a sub-branch of politics conditioned by its
purpose of legitimation.
Industrialisation is a precondition for a country to approximate to the western form 
of development. But Bangladesh lacked and is still lacking in foreign-exchange reserves, 
capital, technical know-how and managerial expertise required for industrialisation. The 
world Bank, IMF and other developed countries, through bilateral or multilateral 
agreements, provided the bulk of the capital, technology and key management. Although 
the state and the resident bourgeoisie did assume some significant independence from the 
foreign bourgeoisie, they still operate in close conjunction with foreign capital which 
continues to provide the bulk of capital and technology. Even when the stake of the 
foreign bourgeoisie was being restricted in terms of ownership, such bourgeoisie derived 
compensatory returns from management contracts, the licensing of the know-how and in 
other ways. These returns were often inflated through transfer pricing mechanisms.3 As 
well, the development of internal class conflicts and resulting inabilities had enabled the 
foreign bourgeoisie to manipulate the situation and contain the resident forces that sought 
to dominate it.6
In spite of all measures to boost private capital investment the response from the 
private entrepreneurs was so poor that the state had to participate directly in the economy 
by creating public enterprises. Investment, by donor countries in the public enterprises, 
provided for a convenient way for the guarantee of investment because state offered better
templar of bourgeois legality. Y.P.Obsi and J.P.B.McAuslan. Public /-o~ and Political Change in Kenya. 1970. p.M. 
of ine colonial situation. Halandier noted that ‘the country had to he controlled, 'held down', so that the administra
position, resulting from the limited penetration of capitalism.
5. B.KJahangir. op. cil. p. 26.
Ibid., tee also J.F.Pctrms. ‘New Perspective on Imperialism and Social Classes in the Periphery' \ o f Contemporary
Ana. vol.5, no.3.1975. pp.291-308.
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prospect of repayment and the payment of interest. Thus many of the public enterprises 
were created in Bangladesh using substantial amount of foreign aid or loans.
Law and state played a more specifically purposive part in the emergence of the 
resident bourgeoisie.7 Thus the political power is seen in this thesis as leading to economic 
power. Because of the dependence of bourgeoisie on state, it is of focal importance. State 
is not viewed here as an embodiment o f some abstract idea of political will or sovereignty 
but as a reflection of the social dynamics resulting from either the constant change or 
relative stability of a mode or modes of production and the resultant class cofiguration.
2.2. The Colonial State and the growth of Capitalism
As in other colonies, capitalism was transplanted in Bangladesh, which was part of India, 
by colonial rule. Capitalism did not grow in Bangladesh like it grew in Europe. One of this 
differential growth was that, in India for that matter in Bangladesh, the nature of social 
evolution was different from that in Europe. In India, the dissolution of the primitive 
society or clan organisation was not followed by a slave system and feudalism. Marx 
termed the mode of production in India prevailing before its colonialisation as Asiatic 
Mode of Production.8
7 This is evident from discussions in chspter 1. liso see B.KJahangir, op. cit. A similsr view has been expressed in other colonial
countries, especially in Africa, see C.Meillasaoux. A Class Analysis of the Bureaucratic Process in Mali' in the Journal of 
Development Studies, vol.6, 1970; M.Mamdani. Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. 1976; I.Shivji, Class Struggle in 
Tanzania. 1976; Y.P.Ghai. Control and Management of the Economy: Research Perspective* on Public Enterprise', in Ghai 
(ed.). Law in the Political Economy of Public Enterprise: African Perspectives, 1977 etc.
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because it was the supreme landlord. By using the term supreme landlord'. Marx implied that there might be revenue farmers 
(known as landlords) in India but they were not co-sharers of sovereignty with the sute. (K-Marx. Capital, vol.lt!, p.119.) Under 
the feudal system, the sovereignty or political power of the sute was decentralised because the private landlords were regarded as 
the owners of the soil. [M.BIock. Feudal Society. 1974; H.Pirenne. Early Democracies in the Low Countries. 1971, pp.46-7.1 
Under the Asiatic system the sovereignty of the state was undivided and concentrated because of the slate's monopolization of 
landownership. [Marx. Capital. voMlf)
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The king simply delegated to some persons the specific and individual rights of 
zamin i.e. the revenue collecting power. These zaminders and jagirdars (revenue 
collectors) were created by the King and could be removed by the king at any moment.9 
These jagirdars and zamindars were not feudal lords in the western sense of the term.10
The land lords, i.e., collectors of revenue, were not the owners of land. Land 
belonged communally (as usufruct) to the village, although ultimate ownership remained 
vested in the state.11 In fact, the state's ownership o f land was not in the nature of private 
but collective ownership. On the other hand, the responsibility for payment of the state's 
revenue was not an individual responsibility but the collective responsibility of the 
community. The de facto control of land remained vested in the village communities, and 
the supreme landlord was the state.
Since the owners of the conditions of production was the state, therefore, the claim 
on the surplus labour of the producers also lied with the state. The state extracted the 
surplus labour in the form of surplus commodity (both in kind and cash).12
The jagirders and the zaminders could neither raise the revenue (or rent) nor evict 
the peasants because they were not the owners of the soil. Thus one of the prime factors -
For details or Asiatic mode of production see K.Marx. Capital, vol.lll. 1894 reprinted later in various countries; B.Hindess and 
P.Q.Hirat, Pre-Capitalist Modes o f Production, 1975; LKrader. The Astatic Mode of Production, 1976; G. Uchtheim, Marx and 
the Asiatic Mode of Production', in S.Avineri (ed). Marx's Socialism, 1973; D. Thomer, Marx on India and the Asiatic Mode of 
Production', in Contributions to Indian Sociology. vol.lX. 1966.
9 According to Azizul Huque. in the Mughal Revenue Administration (the Mughals ruled India before British colonized India).
"the zamindar w as....an agent of the Emperor for malting due collections on behalf of the Emperor and was remunerated with a
percentage out of his collections for his labour. The term 'zemindar1 was a later development in the land system of the country. In 
the Ayeen- i-Akbari. he was the Amul - Guzar or collector of the revenues and he was directed to annuslly assist the husbandmen
with loans of money and to receive payment at disunt and convenient periods.....Certain allotments of land were usually given to
him rent free for his maintenance known as 'nankar’." A.Huque, The Man Behind the Plough, 1939, p.214.
This unique nature of lax - farming was slso noted by famous European traveller Francois Bernier, who came to India in the 
seventeenth century. According to his description, ’the king was the proprietor of the land, makes over a certain quantity of 
military men. as an equivalent for their pay; and this grant it called jah-gir, or as in Turkey. Umar The word jah-gir signifies the 
spot from which to draw, or the place of salary. Similar grants sre made to governors, also for the support of their troops, on 
condition that they pay certain sums annually to the king out of any surplus revenue that the land may yield* F.Bernier, Travels 
in Mughal India. 1972 (reprint), pp-224.
*0. In the words of Max Weber, they were the holders of 'office prebend’. The distinguishing characteristic of land relationship was 
that it was 'prebendalisation'. not 'feudalization.' M. Weber, The Religion of India, 1967, p.71.
U . K.Marx, Pre- Capitalist Economic Formations, (edited with an introduction by EJ.Hohsbawm). 1971. p.69; R-D.Bandopadhya. 
Banglar It, hash (History of Bengal), 1974. vol.l. pp.55-70.
12 A.Sen. The Stale, industrialisation and class formations in India, 1982. p.49.
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the separation of the peasants from their land - for the emergence of wage labour was 
virtually non-existent in India. The revenue collectors share in the surplus was dependent 
on the state's surplus (which varied from one tenth to one fourth of the state revenue, 
depending on various factors), and the state's approval was required to impose a separate 
rate on the peasants (only in cases where the zaminders were not allowed to take share 
from the state).
Thus, the claim of the state as the supreme owner of the soil, on the surplus labour 
of the direct producers determined the nature of social formation and the state structure in 
India. In short, the state's domination over the social classes was ensured by its supreme 
landownership. The classes that grew were naturally subservient to the state either as 
direct producers or as hangers-on (as nobility or revenue collectors, literati and even 
merchants). The crucial question here (for the development of capitalism) is whether the 
zamindars or jagirdar had proprietary rights over disposal of the soil, i.e. whether they 
could create a class of wage labourers by evicting peasants from the soil?
Since the reign of Akbar (late sixteenth century), the zamindars attained the right 
to sell their right to collect the revenue (zamindari) with the approval o f the state but they 
failed to acquire the proprietary rights over the land13 which was the hallmark of the 
landed aristocracy in Europe.
The nature of production in India was conditioned by the existence of the village 
communities, characterized by an organic unity between agriculture and industry.14
Evidently, production relations in these small communities were not based on 
exchange but on use value. In fact, the artisans in a sense were the employees of the 
village; craft production could function only as a subsidiary to agriculture. The artisans 
and other professionals were maintained at the expense of the whole community. They 
used to receive a fixed share of the produce from each cultivator for the services
13 I.Habib. The Agrarian System of Mughal India. 1963, p.115.
14 D.R.Gadgil. The Industrial Evolution o f India in Recent Times, 1860-1939. 1971. p.10.
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rendered.15 Because of communal ownership by the village community, and the absence 
of legal ownership, the tax collector was not a co-sharer of sovereignty with the king. 
Therefore there was no conflict between the peasantry and the landlord over the physical 
possession of land and of labour services.
The conflicts, of course, were there between the village and the state but these 
were confined to the size of the revenue or the surplus of the soil. The basis of agriculture 
remained unchanged.16 This was also the reason why there was no fundamental change in 
the nature of the state structure.
The absence of a conflict of interests between the peasants and the revenue 
collectors over the question of disposal of the land did not lead to the workers' separation 
from the land. Furthermore, the self-sustaining unity of agriculture and manufacturing 
contained all the conditions for reproduction and surplus production within itself.17 Where 
such small self-sufficient units existed as part of a larger unity, it was very natural that 
they would provide a part of their surplus products to the large unity for maintaining 
communication, irrigation, war, religious worship, etc.18 The unity of manufacturing and 
agriculture in the Asiatic mode of production resisted disintegration and economic 
evolution.
The merchants and artisans in Indian cities could not acquire power by balancing 
the feudal lords against the emperor. They had to remain satisfied with playing a role 
subordinate to the courts, noblemen, priests and soldiers. The city could not become a 
centre of bourgeois power struggle, first against feudal restraints and against the state
1S. ibn.
16 Hence. Marx rightly remarked that, in spile of incesaant changes of the dynasties, the structure of the economic element of
society. i.e.. the village community, remained untouched by the political sky. Marx. Capital. voMII. (Moscow edition). 1975,
p.120.
17. Marx, Pre - Capitalist Economic Formations, op. cit., p.70.
18 Ibid, pp. 70-71.
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itself19, as was the case in feudalism. The nascent bourgeoisie failed to overcome the 
hegemony of the state.
Despite these impediments, a prosperous merchant class came into existence in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a result of the opening of trade with the West. 
From the above discussions, the natural question is, how could this merchant class emerge 
as a social force when the Asiatic mode of production was a system based on, a more or 
less, inalienable interdependence between agriculture and the village artisan industry?
It should be noted here that it would be wrong to conclude from the above 
discussions that the Indian economy was totally immobile. In fact, under the impact of 
international trade, the Indian economy was undergoing a formidable change. In the urban 
centres of India there were merchants and artisans who catered to the needs of the court. 
With the expansion of sea trade, the demand for their products in foreign markets 
outstripped the demands of the court and its hangers-on. Since the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, Indian goods began to enter Europe directly via sea routes. This gave a 
tremendous boost to production in India, particularly to urban crafts.20 Consequently, 
these merchants and urban artisans became less dependent on the court and emerged 
slowly as an incipient capitalist class which began to erode the autonomy of the village 
economy.21
The towns which were centres of administration were transforming gradually into 
flourishing trade centres. Merchant capital also took the fundamental step towards 
manufacturing industry by separating the producers from the products. Under such 
circumstances, it was not impossible that the Indian bourgeoisie could have triumphed and
19. Marx. Pre-Capitalist__ ., op. cil., p.131.
20 S. Chowdhury. Trade and Commercial Organisation in Bengal, 1650-1720, with Special Reference to the English East India 
Company, 1073. p.29
21. That, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were many industries in India - the textile being the most important - that 
could compare favourably with the most flourishing industries of Europe at that period. For example. Delhi. Agra. Meerut. 
Lucknow. Lahore. Patna. Ahmedabad. Dhaka and many other Indian towns became great industrial centres. Usually a particular 
industry flourished in a particular city - for example, muslins at Dhaka, silk at Murshidabad. shawls at Srinagar. The towns in 
Bengal, especially Dhaka. Murshidabad and Malda. excelled in the production of both textile and silk. The muslin of Dhaka was 
the finest and best known of all these: a Manchester manufacturer, when he could not rival its fitness, said deprecatingly that it 
was but 'a  shadow of a commodity.' See Gadgil, op. at., pp.33-35.
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caused the birth of industrial capitalism. The development of the new form of commerce 
and industry was also working as a disintegrating force in the village community in some 
parts of India. The production of the village artisans, particularly in Bengal and other 
advanced areas, was no longer geared to meet the needs of the village; it was undertaken 
for foreign markets.
Until the beginning of the industrial revolution in England, the main interest of the 
British East India Company was not to turn India into a market, but to monopolize Indian 
exports which found a ready market in England and Europe. Before British colonization of 
India in 1757, wealth poured into India from various European countries.22
However, this trend was reversed when the company captured political power after 
the battle of Plassey in 1757. Since then, 'methods of power could be increasingly used to 
weigh the balance of exchange and secure the maximum goods for the minimum 
payment'.23
The victory of British East India Company destroyed indigenous capitalism in its 
nascent stage. The trade which was being carried on by the East India Company, and for 
which England had to pay huge amounts of bullion to Indian traders and manufacturers, 
was transformed into 'organised plunder1. The artisans were forced to accept whatever 
price the company and its native agents, known as gomaslhas, paid them. As a result of 
this unprecedented organized economic drain from India, the raising merchant and artisan 
classes were completely wiped out.24 *Indian merchants were prohibited from buying from 
local producers, and forced to purchase goods at higher prices from the company and its 
servants. Thus ended the days of prosperity of the Indian merchants. Henceforth they were
A. Sea. op cil., p.46. Prior to 1757 (he company had lo pay in ailver or gold ia exchange of Indian goods. mainly textile» and 
silk, because the British industries could not offer much in exchange for Indian goods. N.Karim. The Changing Society of India
------  1 .1961, p.73.
R.P.Dutt, India Today. 1970, p.101. 
What nd extra-economic pressures were adopted by the British East India Company to eliminate the nascent Indian 
Bourgeoisie have been vividly described by various Indian scholars. See R.C.Dutt. The Economic History of India (2 vote).
1956; R.P. Dull. India Today, op cit. and RICMukheijee. The Rise and Fall of the East India Company. 1956.
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allowed to exist only as the agents of the company and their employees, in the form of 
gomasthas and baniyans.
The British government imposed a number of prohibitive duties on Indian goods in 
order to transform India into a British market.25 The irony of the situation was that the 
Britain heavily interfered with economic affairs in India at a time when the ideological 
slogan was non-interference of the state in economic affairs.26
India's agriculture was gradually commercialised, which signalled the penetration 
of capitalism in agriculture, too.27 The process of changing India into a market and 
supplier of primary products which could be exported to other countries necessitated the 
restructuring of her land relations on a commercial basis. To this end, new land tenure 
systems were brought into being without undermining the traditional concept of the state 
as the supreme landlord.28
The new land tenure system superseded the traditional right of the village 
community. Under the village community system, land was not a commodity, and could 
not be alienated without the approval of the village community. But under the new system 
land was transformed into a commodity which could be disposed of in the market like any 
other commodity.
One of the reasons for the introduction of the new land tenure system was to 
replace production for village use by that for the market. As the rural economy partially 
monetized and the rate of rent gradually increased, the peasant's need for cash also
26 Neither Adam Smith nor Ricardo had anything to any when the policy of free trade was reversed in the case of India The British 
political economists were not ready to apply their theories in cnae of India until Britain crushed her industries. Hobsbawm 
pointed that the enthusiastic proponents of Utucz-fmirc conveniently ignored their own theories in the case of India. See EJ. 
Ilobshawm. Industry and Empire, op. at., p.148.
27 In the words of Sen. "Indis was turned into a supplier of primary products for the metropolitan capital, and a market for its
finished goods. The process was atxompanied by the conversion of Indian agriculture into a sour---- '  -------
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increased. He was, thus, forced to produce not only for home consumption but also for the 
market.
Moreover, the government's insistence on a regular repayment o f rent, irrespective 
of the quality of harvest, led to the peasants' increasing indebtedness. With the increasing 
burden of land revenue, their dependence on credit also rose. The nearest person the 
peasant could approach for a loan was the village moneylender. But with the 
commercialisation o f agriculture and the introduction of the British legal system, which 
recognised the absolute right of alienation of land, a significant change occurred in the 
function of the moneylender. He could then appropriate land for non-payment of a loan, 
something which would have been impossible under the village community system.
The transformation of agriculture on the basis of private property in land created a 
situation in which the peasants' burden of debt increased steeply and land ownership began 
to pass from the cultivators to the moneylenders. As a result a large class of parasitic 
landowners, moneylenders and land speculators came into existence and more and more 
people were drawn to these sources of income. Furthermore, since British rule destroyed 
the urban industries many uprooted people with no other employment fell back on 
agriculture, which in this way became the only source of livelihood for most o f the people 
in Bangladesh.
With the passage of time, the zamindars degenerated into a selfish parasitic class 
of absentee landlords. Many zamindars also leased out their interests, and the middlemen 
leased out in turn, thus creating a long chain of rent receivers and rent payers who 
intervened between the state and the actual cultivators. The zamindars and intermediary 
rent receivers, in most cases spent the surplus produced by the cultivators, not on the 
improvement o f agriculture, but on luxury goods imported from Great Britain.29
29
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British capitalists, for the extraction of raw materials and commercial penetration, 
had to invest in railways, tea, coffee, jute, coal, iron ore, and other mining industries.30 
The Indians collecting and transporting raw materials and delivering British manufacturers 
to the hinterland, as agents or businessmen also owned capital, could not be excluded. As 
commercial penetration grew, the Indian trading class was gradually drawn into industrial 
activities, but their basic capital was formed from commerce.
British capital was mainly invested in those areas of the Indian economy which did 
not come into conflict with metropolitan industrial interests, and was confined to such 
enterprises as railways, coal mines, jute mills, tea, coffee and sugar plantations - industries 
related to production and export of raw materials. Later, the British investments in steel, 
cement and chemicals were ancillary to the railways and other raw material industries.31
There were three important industries in India by 1880 - jute, coal and cotton 
(excluding the railways which were owned by the government). The Indian merchants 
only played a leading role in the cotton industries. Why did Indian entrepreneurs play this 
important role in the development of cotton industries? They knew from their experience 
as traders of British cotton goods that the country had a big market for textiles: local 
industry had declined in the first half o f the nineteenth century. Moreover, the market 
consisted of private Indian consumers, the discriminatory purchasing policy, as applied in 
the purchase of railway stores, could not be effective.
Once started, Indian entrepreneurs expanded their activities into other fields. In the 
emergence of the Indian Industrial bourgeoisie during British rule, capital was first 
accumulated in trade (even money-lending and landownership) and later invested in 
industry. While foreign finance capital operated in India unfettered, Indian capital had to 
function under various vexatious rules and regulations imposed by the government.32 Thus
30 J N.Bhagwati and PDesai. M ia: Planning for Industrialisation. 1970, pH
31 For the period 1830-1914. ike loial Briliah investment in India was £300 millions. However, there was little caoital export from 
Britain to India. Normally India'a exports were always in excess of her imports Only for seven years 1836-1862 there was an 
excess of imports over exports totalling 22.5 million pounds. R-P.Dutl. op. cil., p.l J3.
»  A .Sen. op. at., p.76.
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it was not surprising that the Indian industries were starving from capital shortage. 
Although there was no shortage of British capital, it was never invested into sectors which 
could have affected Britain's export market in India.33 The British industrialists were 
opposed to Indian capital spilling into sectors other than the development of raw materials 
and extractive industries. In these circumstances, the only area in which, Indian capital 
made some headway was the cotton industry. When the weak Indian cotton industry began 
to emerge in the 1860s there was a demand in England for the removal of import duties on 
cotton goods into India which (in the absence of Indian cotton industries) had been 
imposed for revenue purposes.34 The infant Indian industries needed tariff protection from 
the well-established industries of Britain. But in the name of free trade, protection was 
always denied to them.33 It may be mentioned, for development, Indian industries needed 
not only money and protection, but also technical know-how. However, the colonial 
government did very little to import technical knowledge.3* As a result, whatever progress 
Indian industrialists made before independence, they made without any help from the 
colonial state.
An industrial bourgeoisie came into existence in India in the second half of the 
nineteenth century; the commercial bourgeoisie was, of course, already on the scene. At 
the same time, a new middle class consisting of government employees, lawyers, doctors 
and other professionals began to form in the British established towns. This class was 
mainly recruited from the traditional 'literati' class which had been serving the 
administrative apparatus of the Moghuls and its potentates.
The professional middle class was created by the British to meet her administrative 
needs. The British government had to organize a huge and extensive state machinery to 
administer the country. It was not possible to staff this huge machine by bringing in
33 V » Singh, (ed). The Economic Hielory o f India. 1965. pp 507 8
34 A S ... op ext . p 76
33 /fcd
34 D.II.Buclun.il, The Development ofCapilalul Enlerprue in Indie. I«66, p.468.
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educated people from Britain other than to fill the upper posts. Moreover, the integration 
of colonial economy with the metropolitan needed youths educated in the English 
language. So in 1835, English was made both the medium of instruction of higher learning 
and the official language.37
So the middle class which emerged in India on the basis o f English education was 
not a result of the growing economy; it was an offshoot of British rule. The colonial state 
had no intention o f making education universal: its interests were best served by keeping 
the Indian middle class elitist in nature as was during the Mughal rule.38
Thus, the colonial state, as an extension of the metropolitan state, encouraged the 
development of an indigenous trading class from whom grew the Indian bourgeoisie, but 
its further development thwarted by various fiscal policies.
2.3. The Nature of the Bangladeshi State
After independence, the ideology of the civilizing mission found a counterpart in that of 
development and modernization. According to such doctrines the introduction of modem 
or western values and institutions would transform third world societies into a 
metropolitan likeness and in this way they would eradicate the backwardness that causes 
underdevelopment.39 As with the general ideology of modernization, this theorizing
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sometimes explicitly sets a better, modern, western world, towards which transforming 
law is to aim. The conservation of the traditional mode of production had somewhat 
opposite ideological effect. For scholars o f law and modernization, the introduced law 
itself, through some process o f ‘ethical infection', was to induce behaviour in conformity 
with bourgeois legality.
Due to their numerical shortage, the colonialists had to promote a compliant small 
group of people by building on hierarchies and inequalities within resident social 
formations to run colonial administration. Those in dominant positions within these 
formations had opportunities thrust upon them, becoming ‘entrepreneurs' and 
'businessmen'. Their sons monopolized educational opportunities and ‘leadership training' 
and hence monopolized advancement in the state system.40
At independence, both in 1947 and 1971, due to their positions held during the 
colonial periods, they captured the political leadership. With the political independence, 
the British or Pakistani commercial enterprises could no longer rule directly; there had to 
be some resident ruling class. As the ruling class was not 'naturally' emergent (because 
indigenous class forces had been stunted) law and state came to play a central role in its 
promotion. However, this promotion tended to contradict the conservation of the pre­
capitalist mode of production, which conservation was in the interests of the foreign 
bourgeoisie. Law and state then had a regulating or mediating role in relations between the 
resident bourgeoisie and the foreign, a role that predominantly, subordinated the resident 
element.
After gaining political independence both in 1947 and 1971, the functions of state 
and law and the forms o f law came to resemble more, but far from entirely, the position of 
law and state within the capitalist mode o f production. Some presence of the class 
formations characteristic o f capitalism indicated that economic determinants were of more 
effect. Therefore, there was less need for direct legal controls to free production and to
40 A Sen. op. dt.
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maintain the economy. The operative combination of the capitalist and the pre capitalist 
modes of production were more structurally set. The worker did not have to be forced so 
much to labour4' and then be compulsorily reintegrated into the old mode since he and his 
family were more dependent on wages. Through low wages and the precarious condition 
of employment the labourer were periodically expelled from the industrial sector and sent 
back to the rural areas.41 2 The peasants were more tied to production for the market; and 
there was the ruralisation of the cities. With the determination o f prices and the imposition 
of conditions as to output and quality; the peasants were not really selling their crops but 
rather their labour power. Thus peasants were really becoming disguised proletarians.43
Law and state also played (and are playing) a large part in containing competition 
from the national bourgeoisie. This function no longer took the form of direct legal 
prohibitions and controls of the colonial periods; rather, legality and the imposing of 
universal, 'modern' or 'modernizing' standards served to favour those who could comply 
with them. Laws attuned to metropolitan-style factors of production impose health, safety, 
environmental, quality and packaging standards on production and these standards serve 
to restrict the resident bourgeoisie.44 The process of urbanisation and the combination of 
personal laws of inheritance often undermined the reproduction o f big peasantry. Other 
classes and class elements were contained in a wide variety of measures which made for 
the continuation of colonial structures. Petty commodity producers were (and are) as well 
restricted and harassed through laws relating to trade licensing, health standards, traffic 
obstruction and to many other things. In this their urban existence was not only made 
precarious but they were restrained in competing with the bourgeoisie. The proletariat, 
especially its more skilled element was contained by laws restricting and even frequently
41. Before colonization, the nocinl formation in India contained little or no ’free' labour, so the producer had to be separated from the 
feudal means of production and legally coerced to work in various systems of forced and indentured labour. Taxes were 
introduced as an incentive to labour to earn cash to psy the lax. A-Sen. op. dl.
42 B.KJahangir. op eU.
43 IbU
44 For situations in African post colonial countries sec G.W.Kanyeihamhs. 'Hie Impact of the Received Law on Development in 
Anglo phonic Africa'. Paper delivered at the British Sociological Association Annual Conference, University of Warwick. April. 
1979. pp.7-9.
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prohibiting trade union activity and in laws which provided alternative, controlled form of 
'industrial relations'. The peasantry continued to be largely self regulating.
The conservation of the old pre capitalist mode and the fact that most people had 
only a limited stake in the capitalist mode of production undercut the establishment of 
legality as a popular phenomenon. These same reasons and the weakness of the state 
tended to make people look to traditional relations, including personal law; for security of 
life and property. The overwhelming majority were rarely penetrated by the national law 
in ways likely to win the inhabitant's gratitude or support. Police were generally disliked 
and distrusted.45 Legality at the national level and bourgeois legality in particular extend 
little mediating involvement to such people and must appear largely oppressive in 
upholding the interests of dominant class elements.
Beginning in 1947 with no industries in its modern sense, the industrial sector in 
Bangladesh now contributes about 10% of the G.D.P., of which more than half is 
contributed by public industrial sector.46 This modest growth has been possible mostly as a 
result of the initiatives by the state to promote industrialisation through the creation of 
various public enterprises. This is not to say growth is unequivocally or predominantly 
beneficial. The rich are becoming richer and the poor poorer, resulting in the acceleration 
of conflicts between the two.47 Moreover, with industrialisation the number of industrial 
labourers also increased.48 Conflict between labour and capital often led to draconian 
political repression, like political killings, firing at unarmed peaceful demonstrations, 
suppression of political oppositions, the declaration of state of emergency, rule by martial
45. The •¡illation ¡a not diffcrenl in other developing counthea. See M.B.CIinard and DJ.Abbot. Crime in Developing Countries: A 
Comparative Perspective, 1*73. pp.24-26.
46 Though indue!rial acctor contribulea only 10« of the GDP of Bangladeah. the aector perform« a very aignificanl aupportive role 
in the development of agriculture and infra-atructural growth of the country. 'Ihia modeat indue trial hear account« for about 70% 
of the foreign exchange eamtng of Banglade.h |A.K.M .M lloaaain. 'inlerdependability of Public and Private aector in a 
Developing Country*. CONCOPF., vol.5. no 2.1*87. p.13.)
47 Recent academic reaearch on poverty in Bangladeah lean fie« to the above alatemenl. See for example, H V A P n s ti op t  H
48 In 1947. the number of indualrial worker« waa 7.000 which roae to over 300.000 in 1969. See K. Ahmed. l abour Movement in 
Past Pakistan, 1969.
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law, detention without trial, arrest without warrant etc.49 Moreover, the economic base of 
the resident bourgeoisie was weak, while the foreign bourgeoisie was unable to rule 
directly, because after political independence of the country their direct domination was 
not acceptable, made for considerable political instability and 'pure' force in the form of 
military government, tended to be the frequent option.
Despite its weaknesses the resident bourgeoisie had considerable comparative 
advantage over the foreign in some economic activities. There was also potential for 
conflict between the foreign capital and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, with the latter 
wishing to extract more state revenue from the former. Since some of this revenue went, 
on extension services, grants and loans, to benefit the resident bourgeoisie generally, this 
issue gave some focus to pressures from the resident bourgeoisie. In this more complex 
situation law and state came to mediate between the foreign bourgeoisie and the resident.
The post-colonial Bangladeshi state played a more supportive role in the economy 
and, to some extent, a directive one. In doing this the state assumed flexible powers under 
broad, discretionary legal provisions. These provisions were applied in particularized 
ways. Legal subjects no longer operated outside the limits prescribed by the state, 
orienting their conduct by fixed rules of general applicability. Rather, whenever they had 
effective power or were otherwise recognised by the state, they bargained with the state 
for particularized outcomes on the context of those broad and discretionary legal 
provisions. The scarcity of administrative personnel with both competence and integrity 
made the discretionary policies all the more difficult to execute. Instead, discretionary 
policies increased the avenues of corruption. Big business were on the whole greatly 
favoured in the system of actually applied discretionary controls.
Law and state played a more specifically purposive part in the emergence of the 
resident bourgeoisie. Political power led to economic power. The state, fostered this class 
element through management and technical (extension) services, development grants and
«  chapter I.
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easy credits. Laws relating to trade licensing and to import controls created artificial and 
highly profitable monopolies for the resident bourgeoisie.50 It was also through the state 
that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie assumed its economic power and indeed, very identity.
Apparently, there were broad and discretionary legal provisions enabling the state, 
and the bureaucracy, to control the foreign bourgeoisie. These included trade licensing, 
natural resource regulation and investment codes. Increasingly, the laws required some 
involvement of national elements in enterprises with the foreign bourgeoisie but left them 
with the benefit of management contracts and of the licensing of technology and know­
how, these measures served to legitimate the continuing presence of the foreign 
bourgeoisie and to mask its persisting dominance. Since the presence of the foreign 
bourgeoisie was apparently so subject to restrictive conditions and apparently so 
controlled, there presence was rendered more acceptable. In this, the position of the 
ostensible controllers, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, was also legitimated.
The discussion in the above three sections revolved around how the state 
participated in the formation of the ruling groups and how these ruling groupa had used 
the state for their own qualitative and quantitative growth. The ruling party, the 
bureaucracy, both civil and military, and the donor agencies played their respective roles 
in this active nurturing. In this class configuration, however imprecise the differentiation 
process, the military and civil bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie it nurtured became part and 
psarcel of the ruling class actively perpetrating the expropriation by dominating the state 
apparatus.
Beside, the common class interests, the family and social bonds, kinship structure, 
matrimonial relationship, etc., tended to cement this union of convenience between the 
bureaucrats and the resident bourgeoisie. Power and class are not necessarily matters of 
individuals, but of families. The same men played many roles and took p>art in (politics,
50 This is derived from discussions in (he previous chspter. In other colonial countries slso more or less seme development 
occurred, see for exemple. R.B.Seidmsn, op. cil., pp.412-413.
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administration and commerce. Their brothers, cousins, fathers and sons did the same. The 
result was a web of relations that brought the holders of power into overlapping and 
sustained contact.
The absence o f a strong resident bourgeoisie allowed the bureaucracy to play a 
dominant role although, with bias to the resident bourgeoisie. Hamza Alavi described the 
bureaucracy in Bangladesh as "independent and superior to all social classes as being the 
dominant force in society rather than the instrument of the dominant class."51 But in 
reality, as discussed in chapter 1, those who have command over or have access to 
economic resources or political decision making power tended to gain cumulative 
advantage in the operation of free market forces or to strengthen their economic and 
political power by the manipulations of state patronage, controls and regulations in their 
favour52. This tended to be true equally of the intermediate or middle classes like farmers 
with surplus, traders, merchants, rentiers and middle class professionals etc., as of the 
large-scale private industrialists or financial interests.
Economic power tended to flow from political power rather than vice versa. First, 
the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (which included both civil and military bureaucracy) was 
directly involved in the control of the means of production through various government 
regulations, the running of public enterprises and involvement in governmental joint 
ventures with the foreign bourgeoisie. Second, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie had charge of 
the allocation of state resources because, as mentioned in chapter 1, the country was
51. II.Alavi. Tbc Suit io Posi Colonial Societica: Pakistan and Bangladesh' in K.Go ugh and ll.P.Sharma (cd). Imperialism and 
Revolution in South Rost Asia, 1973, p. 143.
ts described bureaucracy of various developing countries. For example N.Poulantzas observed 
— ie of society inevitably benefits the bourgeoisie, the slate trie* to maintain some degree of
_ ________Jl. N.Poulantzas. The Problem of the Capitalist Stale', New Left Review No.58, 1969. p.245,
id Stale Power and Socialism. 1978, p.12. The same voice is echoed by G.Therbom, What Does the Ruling Class Do When It 
Rules?, 1978; T.Skocpol, Slates and Social Revolution. 1979; B.Trimberger, Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, 
Turkey, Egypt and Peru, 1978 and many others in different ways but the essence remains the same. For example, in analysing the 
role of the bureaucracy in Turkey. Egypt and Pent, E. Trimbergcr pointed out that the state played a "dynamically autonomous 
role, because it is much more dominant than any social class and has a significant degree or freedom to impose its own design on 
society." E.Trimbergcr. op. cit., p.7.
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mostly governed by martial law, which often played a significant part in the promotion of 
other groups within the ruling coalition headed by the bureaucracy. Third, much of the 
public revenue, a revenue derived in varying parts from the peasantry and the proletariat 
as well from the bourgeoisie, was used to pay the comparatively high wages and facilities 
of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Fourth, its advantaged position within the state system 
was used by members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, especially with military 
background, to set up their own business enterprises.
It is noteworthy to mention that historically in Bangladesh, public employment 
continued to be more valued than any other occupation. Public officials and the literati, 
being nearer to the state, had more social prestige and political power than members of 
other professions. This situation instead of changing was reinforced during the British and 
Pakistani rules, because due to their numerical shortage the British and the Pakistanis 
needed compliant class of people. Thus the general social prestige of the bureaucracy was 
rooted in the social milieu.
The Bangladeshi educated class, which the British and the Pakistanis aimed at 
creating, was to be a class of imitators, not an originator of new values and methods.'53 
Unlike the West54, Bangladesh, under the British and Pakistanis, proceeded to encourage 
the type of education which would produce a class intended to 'develop' the economy in 
the interest of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Moreover, the traditional bias in Bangladesh 
for administrative jobs and against commercial and industrial occupations led to the 
gearing of the educational machinery to satisfy the needs of the public service, thus 
perpetuating the old emphasis on literary education.55 There was, however, a class of
53 B.B.Miin op. cti., p.l i.
54 The Writ encouraged education to satisfy Ike needs of a developing economy Max Weber has shown what an important role 
Western education (in particular Ike process of rationalisation) has played in Ike development of the capitalist economy. 
M Weber. General Economy Hiatory, 1967.
55 Misra. op. eil., p.l I.
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literati in Bangladesh that, unlike in the West, did not emerge from the rising bourgeoisie, 
but was a 'parasitic class' subsisting on state patronage.56
The public officials and literati were, in fact, the nuclei from which grew the 
educated middle class in Bangladesh. Public offices, both in pre-British India and under 
the British and the Pakistanis, were the instruments through which the economy was 
channelled. He who had control over public offices had control over the economy.57 This 
was due to the fact that the bourgeoisie did not constitute any political element in the 
Bangladeshi body politic, and hence did not or could not play the role of its European 
counterpart.
Since the present study is on the public enterprises the above raised question did 
not get adequate illumination but extensive literature on the topic is available.58 The issue 
was raised here only to describe the interplay between the state and polity in the context of 
Bangladeshi economy which influenced the emergence, development and gradual 
decrease in the numbers of public enterprises.
Over the years, since 1947, a new class of resident bourgeoisie gradually emerged 
mainly due to state patronisation. Since this class was the main beneficiary o f the system it 
did not participate with the mass in the establishment of legality and rule of law. Rather it 
supported the dictatorial regimes to suppress any kind of movement for the establishment 
of democracy in the country. By 1989 this group gradually consolidated. Its greatest fear 
was that if the bureaucracy is not displaced from its earlier political position then the 
emerging bureaucratic bourgeoisie, especially with military background, would threaten 
its position in extracting undue advantages. As a result this group, along with the broad 
mass, was interested in the end of military dictatorship of Ershad. While the interest of the 
mass was in establishing legality and rule of law through establishment of democracy in
56 T.Chand, History o f the Freedom Movement in India, vol. I, 1961. pp.301-2.
57 A-Sen. op at.. pS2.
58 See for example. Sobhan. op. cit.; Sen. op. c.'rBK . Jahangir. op. cil.
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the country, the resident bourgeoisie was interested in capturing political power 
themselves.59 Thus in spite of the election promises of the present elected government of 
BNP to scrap all 'black-laws' including Special Powers Act 1974, nothing has been done 
yet. Clearly the interest of the government is to retain power without changing the 
authoritarian cast of the law. Though this class, at the moment, is showing sigas of 
strength over bureaucracy but it is too early to predict which group in the ruling coalition, 
namely the bureaucracy (civil and military) and the resident bourgeoisie will be in control 
of political life of the country.60
2.4. Public E n terp rises  and  the Legal System  in Bangladesh.
Since Bangladesh was a colony of Britain, the common law system with a heavy private 
enterprise bias has a profound influence on the legal system of Bangladesh. Many of the 
detailed operating concepts and rules of the common law system, including such notions 
as property, contract, tort, and adjudication, were adopted with the assumption of 
regulating a private enterprise oriented economy.61 The company is the major institution 
for industrial and commercial activities.62 And rules have been developed on the 
assumption that the basic responsibility of the management is to maximise profits. 
Although it is true that various rules have evolved to protect the public interest, there is a 
basic reluctance to interfere with the internal affairs of the company. Thus the system 
ensures considerable autonomy to the management. Rules of contract and tortuous and 
corporate liability were to a large extent determined by the needs of the private sector and 
the company form.
59. la Ihe present elected Parliament most members are from bourgeois background. Hut about one third of the cabinet members are 
retired civil servants and military officers
60 With Ihe establishment of parliamentary government, the government is answerable to the elected parliament. Aa such 
theoretically the army and Ihe bureaucracy is under the control of Ihe parliament while aincc 1975 Ihe parliament was subordinate 
to the executive government, which used it only to legitimise its action, right or wrong.
61. In fact moat lawa (both adjective and subalantive) in Bangladesh date back to the British period.
62 The discussion in this section ia heavily dependent on Ghai's above mentioned work. Although Ghai's discussion is general his 
ideas are tested in Ihe present study while discussing the legal system in Bangladesh so far as public enterprises are concerned
9 0
It does not mean that the legal system of Bangladesh or the common law, does not 
provide for the management of public enterprises. On the contrary, it provides for the 
management of public enterprises through the creation of public corporations. But the 
structural characteristics of the public corporation owe much to the company analogy with 
its apparent separation of ownership and control and the resulting emergence of 
management as a vocation in the general interest transcending the particular interests in 
the enterprise. Even the courts in most cases apply rules by analogy from the private 
sector in deciding public sector cases.63 However, there are, relatively, fewer rules to deal 
with administrative behaviour of the public enterprises. This probably resulted in more 
dependence on executive discretion and ad hoc directives.64
Bangladesh inherited from the common law narrow and limited rules to regulate 
administrative behaviour. Moreover the courts have remained aloof from their regulation 
in line with the principle of autonomy granted to the board of directors. Thus, formal 
legislative and administrative controls have taken a more important role.
As in all countries, in Bangladesh public corporations have separate legal 
personality which means that, like any other private party, they are subject to the court's 
jurisdiction. In Bangladesh, however, no public corporation had ever sued another public 
corporation.65 All cases are brought against them by private parties. In practice, disputes 
between public enterprises are resolved out of the court through informal channels at the 
intervention of the ministries. Informal settlement though reduces the load on courts and 
saves both money and time, but it limits the scope of courts to influence the development 
of legal doctrines in the relevant fields. The resolution of disputes between two public 
enterprises is considered by the government a matter of public policy rather than of law 
and that a court dispute between two public enterprises would create a bad image for the
63 Sec the case of MJIChowdhury v. General Manager, Tilas Gas Transmission A  Distribution Co. Ltd.. BSCR I9WHSC) 373.
64 H.W.R. Wide. Administrative Law, <5lh ed.). 1982. p.19.
65 In a meeting on 23.2.85 between the President and the Executive Committee of CONCOPE (Consultative Committee on Public 
Enterprises) it was decided to make efforts to settle inter-corporation dues through CONCOPE Reported in CONCOPE, vol.3.
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government.66 The implication of settling disputes out of the courts seems to de-emphasise 
the importance of established legal concepts. Thus more reliance on informal settlement of 
disputes simply over-emphasizes the importance of different plans of the government 
rather than the existing rules of law and the mode of their interpretation.
It may be mentioned here that the Bangladeshi society itself is not a very litigious 
society because 80% of the population are poor, illiterate and live in rural areas. In the 
past, the courts were situated in the sub-divisional towns which were not always well 
connected with the villages. More over, the court language was English and some of the 
magistrates were from Pakistan and spoke Urdu which was alien to the vast majority of 
the population who even do not speak or understand literary Bengali, spoken by the urban 
elite. Above all, there even existed a credibility gap between the court and the population 
who for cogent reasons believed that the courts were not impartial and were only for the 
richer section o f the population.
After independence communication has improved67 and Bengali has replaced 
English as the court language in the lower courts. And since 1983 with decentralisation, 
courts are now situated in Upazilla (sub-district) towns68. In spite of all these 
improvements the population is still poor and illiterate. Most of the people are not aware 
of their rights and even when they are aware they cannot afford a costly and lengthy legal 
process. Moreover, the causes of the credibility gap have not been properly addressed, 
resulting in its widening instead of narrowing. Thus in Bangladesh, not only the disputes 
involving public enterprises but most other disputes are settled out of the court.
As has already been stated, during the first three years after the independence of 
Bangladesh, the declared goal of the government was the achievement of a socialist
66 The umc view ¡1 expressed by all official* during discuaaion with the preaenl researcher.
67 All 468 Upazilla (adminiatralive unit*) are now connected by road* and there are regular bun service« from the capital Dhaka.
68 During Pakistan, there were only 19 diatricta in East Pakistan and 62 subdivisions, the courts were situated only in district and
«■ihdivi.icnsl lown. Nnv conns srr .iluslcd in sit 46ft I Insults.
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society and the number of public enterprises attained its peak.69 Nevertheless, the inherited 
common law system, which was biased in favour of private enterprise, remained 
unchanged. Many of the assumptions and rules of the old legal system were contradictory 
to direct state intervention in the economy. The growth of public sector not accommodated 
within the legal system seems to posed a grave threat to the relevance and indeed viability 
of the legal system generally. In such a situation the role of the legal system in 
consolidating changes through rules and institutions, and acting as a source of legitimacy 
for the exercise of state functions is generally jeopardised.70 Instead of having even a 
minimum over-haul of the old legal system to accommodate the needs of the new society, 
the government tried to cope with the situation by retaining a wide discretion. The vesting 
of wide discretion in officials resulted in little concern to define standards and criteria for 
the running of the public enterprises. Therefore legislation to guide the exercise of power 
became less and less relevant. This had definitely its negative impact on the functioning of 
the public enterprises.
Any discussion on the legal system would be somewhat incomplete without 
looking at the provisions of legal services in the public enterprises in Bangladesh. All 
enterprises and corporations have their own legal departments. It is noteworthy that many 
of the personnel in the legal departments are not fully qualified lawyers and even many of 
them do not have any formal legal educational background. Thus in many cases opinion of 
private practicing lawyers is sought. Above all, in Bangladesh salaried lawyers i.e who are 
in full time employment cannot appear before a court as an advocate. As a result private 
practising lawyers are hired by corporations to appear before the court on their behalf. *I
This h u  already been discussed in chapter I.
I directly and indirectly by martial law for fifteen yeara out of ita twenty yean of 
■adc the major aegmenla of the prevailing legal rulea and inatitutiona inoperal' 
oral «no rnnaiitutional activity, the autonomy of the legal ayalem haa been eroded by freqi
a. If the legal ayalem ia not uaed in the management of political and economic life aerioua double are raiacd aa to how 
ic an a viable ayalem to regulate other acclon of a community. For inelancc, with the proclamation of Martial lew the
-------------- , --------- -------- ----------------v- ..— .--- - ---- ’-1UC<] by the C hief Martial lew Adminialralor. See the
II HI,6  (AD) 107: aleo aee the Pakielani caae ot StaU 
legal order under it ia diarupted by an abrupt political
X nol within the contemplation or the Conatilution......and ita legal effect ia not only the destruction of the Conatilulion hutvalidity of the national legal order " Pl.D 1950 SC 533
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Thus there are three main sources of legal services for public enterprises: their own staffs 
in the legal department, law staffs in Ministries and private practitioners.
One of the basic causes of inadequate legal services rendered by the public 
enterprises legal officers is connected with deficiency and inadequacy of legal education. 
In Bangladesh law schools do not offer any subject on public enterprises. The personnel of 
the legal departments are inadequately prepared for the types of functions they perform. 
Yet legal officers in the public enterprises are to solve problems connected with such 
specialised fields as taxation, labour and international trade.71
2.5. T he C onstitu tion  o f Bangladesh and  Public Enterprises.
The Constitution of Bangladesh was adopted on the 4th November 1972. When adopted, 
the Constitution envisaged the establishment of a socialist society. It reflected the 
economic objectives and political reality as conceived by the ruling Awami League. Part- 
II of the Constitution laid down the fundamental principles of state policy. This part 
comprises of 17 articles.72 Article 8(1) of the original Constitution spelled out the 
fundamental principles of the state as nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism.73 
But more than any other principle of state policy, it was the principle of socialism74 which 
had important ramifications in the economic field and is linked with the growth of public 
enterprises.
The Fundamental Principles of State Policy enumerated and visualized the 
economic and social pattern of life to be achieved. Article 10 said, "A socialist economic 
system shall be established with a view to ensuring the attainment of a just and egalitarian
7*. All officera interviewed felt the need for reform in Ike content and technique» of legal education.
72. Part II of the Constitution o f Bangladesh consista of Articles 8-25.
73 Secularism has been dropped by the Martial Law Order. Now the artide reads, *The principle of absolute trust and faith in the
Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice, together with the principles derived 
from them as set out in this Part shall constitute the fundamental principles of state policy.* See the Martial Law Proclamations 
(Amendment) Order, 1977, (Proclamations Order no ! o f1977)
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society, free from exploitation of man by man."75 Other articles that were considered to be 
basically socialist and have relevance to the creation of public enterprises are articles 13- 
20. Some of these articles are reproduced below:
13. The people shall own or control the instruments and means of 
production and distribution, and with this end in view ownership 
shall assume the following forms-
(a) state ownership, that is ownership by the state on behalf of 
the people through the creation of an efficient and dynamic 
nationalised public sector embracing the key sectors of the economy;
(b) co-operative ownership, that is ownership by co-operatives 
on behalf o f their members within such limits as may be prescribed 
by law; and
(c) private ownership, that is ownership by individuals within 
such limits as may be prescribed by law.
14. It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the State to emancipate 
the toiling masses-the peasants and workers- and backward sections 
of the people from all forms of exploitation.
15. It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the state to attain, 
through planned economic growth, a constant increase of productive 
forces and a steady improvement in the material and cultural standard 
of living of the people, with a view of securing to its citizens-
(a) the provision of the basic necessities of life, including food, 
clothing, shelter, education and medical care;
(b) the right to work, that is the right to guaranteed employment 
at a reasonable wage having regard to the quantity and quality of 
work;
(c) the right to reasonable rest, recreation and leisure; and
(d) the right to social security, that is to say to public assistance 
in cases of undeserved want arising from unemployment, illness or 
disablement, or suffered by widows or orphans or in old age, or in 
other such cases.
16. The State shall adopt effective measures to bring about a radical 
transformation in the rural areas through the promotion of an 
agricultural revolution, the provision of rural electrification, the 
development of cottage and other industries, and the improvement of 
education, communications and public health in those areas, so as 
progressively to remove the disparity in the standards of living 
between the urban and rural areas.
75 *• folk,w"‘ ^
95
19.(2) The slate shall adopt effective measures to remove social and 
economic inequality between man and man and to ensure the 
equitable distribution of wealth among citizens, and of opportunities 
in order to attain a uniform level of economic development 
throughout the republic.
From the above articles, especially from article 13 of the Constitution of 
Bangladesh, it is clear that the state should aim at securing common ownership or control 
over the instruments and means of production and distribution. Second, the same article 
prescribed the means of securing state ownership through the creation of an efficient and 
dynamic public sector embracing the key sectors of the economy. And lastly, it realises 
the importance of private ownership but recognises that private ownership should be kept 
within limits. True, the above mentioned articles fall under the heading of Fundamental 
Principles of State Policy. Indeed, it is not considered to be an operative part. However, it 
does not mean that these articles have no importance. The importance of Fundamental 
Principles of State Policy is clearly stated in article 8(2) of the Constitution which says 
that these principles "shall be fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh, shall be 
applied by the State in making laws, shall be guided to the interpretation of the 
Constitution and of the other laws o f Bangladesh, and shall form the basis of the work of 
the State and o f its citizens."76 But the same article also clearly says that the principles 
"shall not be judicially enforceable."77
The Fundamental Principles are intended as a guide to government action. In fact, 
they indicate the social and economic goals of the nation. The fundamental principles in 
fact have moral rather than legal force. The Indian courts initially took a very narrow and 
restrictive view on the role of the Directive Principles but recently socio-economic
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objectives of the state have been recognized in interpreting them.78 The attitude of 
judiciary in Bangladesh may also change towards the direction of the Indian interpretation 
because Bangladesh courts often follow the examples of decided Indian cases.
The ideals and objectives of the Constitution not only found their expression in
part-II but are also enshrined in the Preamble to the Constitution, which says:
We, the people of Bangladesh, having proclaimed our
Independence.... . through a historic war for national independence,79
established the independent, sovereign People's Republic of 
Bangladesh;
Further pledging that it shall be a fundamental aim of the state to 
realise through the democratic process a socialist society, free from 
exploitation-a society in which the rule of law, fundamental human 
rights and freedom, equality and justice, political, economic and 
social, will be secured for all citizens."80
Although, like the fundamental principles, the Preamble is not considered to be the 
operative part of the Constitution as it does not confer any power or create any authority, it 
broadly outlines the purpose and objects that it seeks to achieve and the inconveniences 
that it strives to eradicate. The preamble can be used as an aid to construing the enacting 
provisions.81 At times it plays a decisive role in the interpretation of the law. If any 
ambiguity or conflicts arise as to the meaning of the language in the text of the law, then a 
reference could be made to the Preamble because it expresses the intentions of the framers 
and can, therefore, contribute to the understanding of ideals which do not seem to be 
precisely expressed.82
78. See Chandra Bhavan Boarding and lodging Bangalore v. The Slate o f Mysore and Others, 1970 2S.C.R., p.612. Thi« c»se ii 
not the finl in it* kind but is one of the earlier canes marking the change of judicial attitude.
79. The italicised words are substituted for the words "a historic struggle for national liberation" by Martial Law Proclamations 
(Amendment) Order 1977, (Proclamation Order No.l o f 1977).
80 See the Constitution o f Bangladesh.
85. See Aminul Islam v. Bangladesh Biman. BLD (19S4) HC9.
82. In the case of Saj)an Singh vs. State of Rajasthan it was observed that the preamble is a key to open the mind of the coastitution- 
maken as to mischief which are to be remedied, and the objects which are to be accomplished by the provisions of the 
constitution. Sajjan Singh v. Stale o f Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC (S61). The importance of the preamble is lucidly expressed in the 
case of Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union o f India. Chandrachud. CJ.. speaking for the majority observed that 'the edifice of our 
constitution (Indian) is built upon the concepts cryslaliaed in the Preamble* Minerva Mills iJd. v. Union o f India, op. cit.
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Although, the Constitution of Bangladesh initially envisaged the establishment of a 
socialist society through the democratic process, the subsequent amendments and the 
enactment of new oppressive laws83, by the same party (Awami League, who framed the 
Constitution) in power, raise serious doubt as to the real intentions of the framers.
Whatever was the ideological position of the Mujib Government, the Constitution 
envisages, among others, "state ownership that is ownership by the state on behalf of the 
people through the creation of the efficient and dynamic nationalised public sector 
embracing the key sectors of the economy."84 Various organisations were created in the 
public sector during the first few years covering a wide spectrum of activities. At one end 
were enterprises whose roles were predominantly commercial and the other enterprises 
which were predominantly social service oriented.
It is clear from the above discussion that part II of the Constitution put enormous 
responsibilities on the state. The functions that were reserved for the state, in principle 
were in line with the public pronouncements of the party leaders. In any case, they were 
far in excess of the functions undertaken by a pure capitalist state. The state undertook 
many social-welfare responsibilities.85 Part-II expected that the state through public 
enterprises should play more direct and dynamic role in the transformation of society and 
economy. Diverse objective ranging from production and commercial profitability to 
contribution to socio-economic development were sought to be achieved through public 
enterprises. Thus, the successful operation of the public enterprises is a constitutional 
obligation and sacred trust devolved upon the government.
It was mentioned in the earlier chapter that nationalisation took place in 
Bangladesh at a time when the country did not have a Constitution or a parliament to enact
83 Set the Special Powers Acl, 1974, the Constitution Second and Fourth Amendments tic.; lt*o tee discussions in the previous 
dupler
84 Article 1 «2) of the Constitution o f Bangladesh, op . dL
85. See Articles 10-19 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. It nuy be mentioned here that after the change of Awami League 
government through military coup, the new military government through martial law ordinance amended above articles and 
inserted new articles in their place. Sec the Martial Law Second Proclamation Order 1978.
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Constitution, framed after eight months of nationalisation, contained a clause which
legitimized the executive orders nationalising the banks, insurance companies and
industries amongst a number of other executive orders which are listed in Schedule one of
the Constitution. Thus article 47(2) reads:
Notwithstanding any thing contained in the constitution the laws 
specified in the First Schedule (including any amendment of any such 
law) shall continue to have full force and effect, and no provision of 
any such law, nor anything done or omitted to be done under the 
authority of such law, shall be deemed void or unlawful on the 
ground of inconsistency with, or repugnance to, any provision of this 
constitution;
Provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the modification or 
repeal of any such law or provision by Act of Parliament, but no Bill 
for such an Act, if it contains provision for or has the effect of 
divesting the state of any property, or of enhancing any compensation 
payable by the state, shall be presented to the President for assent 
unless it is passed by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total 
number of members of Parliament.86
l a w s ,  h e n c e  n a t io n a l i s a t io n  w a s  c a r r i e d  t h r o u g h  a n  e x e c u t iv e  o r d e r  o f  th e  P r e s id e n t .  T h e
The above article made it difficult for the state to divest itself of public enterprises. 
They were given a constitutional status in the sense that the parliament could pass any law 
by a simple majority but the disinvestment of state property needed a two-thirds majority 
as is the case with the amendment of the constitution itself. But the military government 
amended this provision by a Martial Law Ordinance in 1977 empowering the parliament 
to divest any state property by a simple majority.87
The Constitution is the basic law of the country and it lays down the broad 
principles and objectives of the state. But, the realisation of these principles and objectives 
is done by specific legislation which aims at attaining specific results. The Bangladesh 
Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) Order 1972, which will be discussed below, was 
aimed at establishing and regulating public enterprises in the industrial sector.
86 Article 47(2) of the Constitution o f Bangladesh before (he amendment of 1977.
87. See The Proclamation Order No.t. o f1977, op. cit.
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2.6. The Nationalisation O rd er (P .O . 27) o f 1972.
The concept of nationalisation, generally speaking, means taking over the ownership of 
established private enterprises by the state.88 It is in one form or another, the fundamental 
technique in the establishment of state ownership and public control of the means of 
production, exchange and distribution.
"Nationalisation" as a legal concept first appeared in the Constitution of Mexico 
and in the first decrees after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Although state 
direct management of economic life had occurred centuries prior to these developments, 
the social function of property was not recognised. The fundamental innovation in this 
new attitude towards property was that the basic aim of nationalisation was the utilization 
of all or part of the means of production in the interests of society as a whole, and not of 
individuals by converting private ownership into communal property.89 Such a conception 
is opposed to the principle of absolute property rights derived from natural law as 
embodied for centuries in the positive law.90
There are differences between states using nationalization policy as an integral part
of socialist strategy91, legitimized by organic laws instituted towards this end; and states
which have used ad hoc nationalization strategies for different reasons. These latter states
88 Nationalisation hu  hern defined by vnrioiu group» from different angle» of view. Nalionaliaalion baa been viewed by Sharraa an 
one of a number of wayi in which the »talc can alter or terminate the control or ownerahip of private property. II.C.S harms. 
Nalionalitation o f Banks in India Relroapacl and Prospect, 1970. p i While conniderm it aa a mea»ure which acta in motion a 
legal proceaa whereby private right» and inlemia in property are compulaorily transferred. O. While. Nationalisation o f Foratgn 
Property, 1961, p 41 For varioua definition» of nationalisation ace M.Domke. 'Foreign Nalionaliaalion. Some aapecta of 
Contemporary International l iw ' in The American Journal o f International Law, vol.SS, 1961; S. Fried mi 
(1957); ICC. Hhandari (1962). K. Katzarov (1964) W.A. Rohnon (1966) C D. Fouler (1971) G.M. Ingram 
(1973) M.O. Webb (1976)
To attain thia aim it ia neceaaary for the meana of production, if in private handa. to become the properly of the community. W.A. 
Robson. 'Preface' in K-Katzarov, The Theory o f Nationalisation. 1964. p.v.
'The 19th Century »landa againal properly aa an excluaive righi, (inilaally made by St Simon nnd Proudhon in emotive terni», and 
lalcr by Marx and l-.ngela in a more acienlific mannet), ha» heen uaed by government» in thè 20lh Century lo bolli conaolidale and 
overthrow capitolini relation» of production * D.Bolton. Nationalisation ■ A Road To Socialismi, The lesioni of Tanzania. I9S5.
91. The Marxiat definition of the mechaniama of worker exploitation built into capilaliat production ayatemn demonatrated that thia ia 
in no way aynonymoua with aocialiat nalionaliaation theory. Nationalization an a aocialial atralegy waa lied up with the question 
of clan» atructure. power interaction and conflict. Hie change in ownerahip brought about by nationaliaation bring» into focua the 
question of new distribution patterns on terms of clans interest» Thus, nationalization aa a part of a aocialial strategy had a 
momentum of ila own. which mual include a capacity to calculate and redistribute resource use and benefit. This is not to imply 
that nationalisation atralegy cannot coexist constitutionally with me enure« giving protection to private property. In this cane the 
role of private property sad private enterprise need to he converted from being the basis of economic life to being a mere link ia 
the economic chain. ICKalzarov. op cil„ p.13.
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have, on the whole, retained both their respect, and their commitment to private enterprise. 
Nationalisation within this context usually represents a strategy aimed at repairing or 
consolidating a capitalist economy. In such cases, the underlying political interests of the 
state have generally been geared to the utilisation of nationalisation theory in order to 
prevent any basic restructuring of the politico-economic infrastructure of that society 
along socialist lines.
It is necessary to differentiate between policies of nationalization and what Bolton 
terms "étatisation", by examining the effects of state ownership on structures of 
production, relations of production, and the character of economic integration central to 
development strategy. In the case of étatisation, nationalized activities are merely 
absorbed into governmental machinery; there is no theoretical reason for changes in the 
values and ethics of enterprise management, nor any requirement for the state to give 
socialist political form to any concept o f 'public good* related to its take-over of economic 
activities. In contrast, economic activity of the state within the framework of 
nationalization strategy follows imperatives of a new order, the objective being to serve 
the general interest without sole regard for commercial gain or fiscal consideration.92 In 
Bangladesh, clearly, the policy was one o f étatisation.
As described in the previous chapter, the ruling party suddenly after independence 
adopted a nationalization strategy mainly for immediate reasons of regime stabilization in 
a crisis situation. To some extent, the regime's enshrinement of politico-economic 
initiatives with an appropriate ideological framework made the situation complex. This 
involved some adjustments to property relations, but did not respect the structural change 
implicit in the terms of its political framing. Nevertheless, 'nationalisation' as embodied in 
the election manifesto of the Awami League, was more an expression of economic 
nationalism, verbally linked with, but not synonymous to socialist transformation.93 In
92. D.Bolton. op. ci!.. p.6.
93 Th» proposition has now lost its earlier credibility evea widtia the todalis». For example, the Socialist Iatematioaal which met 
ia Stockholm ia June 1989 and participated by more than 80 left-wing sad social-democratic parties from arouad the world, 
rejected nationalisation as a remedy for social ills. Willy Brandi, the president of the organisation, observed that broad 
experience' convinced the socialist parties that they were mistaken in having a strong confidence in the role of the stale ia the 
economic process. The new socialist manifesto asserted that 'markets can and must function as a dynamic way of promoting
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fact, contradictions soon became evident when the state tried to synthesize its control of 
production with continuing commitment to relatively unchanged patterns of economic 
development. Popular expectations which were raised through political appeal to 
sentiments of economic nationalism failed to be met in material terms.
The Nationalisation Order 1972 is an omnibus piece of legislation of a general 
nature. It consisted of only 26 articles but covers a wide area of activities.94 It covers jute 
goods, cotton textiles, sugar, food products of various sorts, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
fertilizers, steel products, timber products, cement, mineral products, leather goods and 
development, exploration, transmission and distribution of gas and other minerals.
After nationalisation, the "conglomerate" structure of EPIDC/BIDC was 
dismantled and in its place 11 new sector corporations were set up. It seems the 
government wanted to establish some uniformity in its interface with all corporations. As 
such, all provisions of the Order were equally applicable to all corporations regardless of 
diversities in the areas of operation and nature of activities, in spite of the fact that 
operationally it is difficult to accommodate the diverse characteristics of the corporations 
and their enterprises through general legislation owing to the special nature of their 
activities and responsibilities.95
Another characteristic o f the Nationalisation Order is that it did not give any guide­
lines on many important issues. It merely proclaimed in the preamble that:
It is expedient to provide for the nationalisation of certain industrial 
enterprises in Bangladesh and for the establishment of corporations for the 
purposes of control, supervision and co-ordination of the nationalised and 
some other enterprises and for the establishment and development of new
innova II on and lignai ling I he deairea of conaumcra through the economy.' Reported in The Financial Tima. 23 Jane 1989, 
London.
94 The Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) Order 1972 being President's Order No.27 o f1972 ia reproduced in 
appeadix-3.
95 la a •lady attempting to analyae the need for a general law on the working of public enterprise* in India it waa found that aucb a 
law would be impracticable aa it would lead to greater rigidity by ignoring the individual charade rial ice of varioua enlerpriaea. 
R.C. Maacarenhaa. General Law for Public Haterpriae in India', in International Review of Administrative Sciettcm. vol.30, 1964. 
pp.398-403.
In India the Adminiatralive Reforma Commiaaion recommended a ae pa rale law to be enacted for each lector corporation. Sec 
Adminiatrative Reform* Commiaaion. Report on Public Undertakings, 1967, pp. 14-24. cited from LNarain, op. cit., p.120.
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industrial enterprises and for matters connected therewith or incidental 
thereto.96
Neither did the law indicate in unambiguous and definite terms what objectives 
such "control, supervision and co-ordination of the enterprises" were to achieve. The law 
left room for the executive to decide the objectives.97
Another reason for talcing over was stated to be in "public interest"9* although the 
leaders in their public speeches were referring to socialism.99 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that in the absence of an expressed ideological motivation for the nationalisation and the 
subsequent conduct of the government, some critics described Bangladeshi socialism as 
the socialism of abandoned properties.100
The mere assignment of functions in respect of control, supervision and co­
ordination for the affairs and business of the enterprises without identifying their, 
objectives or purposes was inadequate to evolve an appropriate organisational and 
administrative structure for the nationalised industries.101
Order, P.O.27, op. cil.
97 On the contrary, Ihe liw that look over the abandoned properliea waa more apedric. It tuied Ihe reasons for taking over was 'the
absence of the owners and managers to occupy or supervise or manage in person their industrial enterprises.* See The 
Bangladesh (Taking Over.....Concern) Order, A.P.O.l o f1972. op. dl.
98 Sec  P O . 27. 7972
99 For the speeches of the leaders see Chapter I.
100 A.F. Iluq. Constitution Making in Bangladesh' in the Pacific Affairs, vol. 66.1973. p.69.
This evasiveness on the part of the basic nationalisation law in Bangladesh is in contrast with such laws in many other countries.
Thus, for instance, in Yugoslavia. Ihe Preamble to 1946 Act specified the motive of nationalisation as the desire *lo give a total 
impetus ...to the principle of the collective ownership of the means of production, the main foundation of the state for Ihe 
development of Ihe national economy...(and to) the principle of Ihe defence of the people against exploitation.* Cited from 
Katzarov, op. cil., p.59.
In France, nationalisation laws were preceded by Ihe declaration of the National Resistance Council led by General de Gaulle that 
included nationalisation in its programme foe the future organisation in France. Nationalisation was viewed as *an economic 
system designed with a view to the development of national resources and not for the advantage of individual interests, in which 
the great source of common wealth belong to the nation.* Cited in Katzarov, op. cit., p.43.
In Britain The Transport Act, 1947 nationalised rail communications, the docks, inland waterways, lighterage and London 
Transport and placed the British Transport Commission under a general duly *lo provide or promote the provision of an efficient, 
adequate, economic and properly integrated system of public inland transport and port facilities within Great Britain for 
passengers and goods with due regard to safety of operation.*
,0 *. As T.B. Heath points out. it is dearly important that the underlying purpose should be articulated in some form so that those 
concerned with managing Ihe enterprise can know what is expected of them at the highest level of policy. T.B.Heath, 'Control
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There was obviously no clear conception about the exact place the nationalised 
industries and corporations were to hold in the administrative structure of government. As 
the economic, financial and social obligations of the nationalised industries and their 
corporations were not spelled out, it was likewise not clear if the industries were to be 
organised as business concerns or otherwise.* 102 Therefore, it was essential to have a broad 
statement of objectives for public enterprises as a whole, and specific objectives and 
obligations for each individual enterprises.103 Neither the Nationalisation Order 1972 nor 
any subsequent policy declarations clearly spelled these aspects. Not only that, the P.O. 27 
o f 1972 neglected the central question of how goals were to be set for the industries.
In the Bangladesh situation, the executive may have found it advantageous not to 
define policy so as to allow a convenient compromise between the government's political 
rhetoric and its actual practice. Thus, during the first three years of Bangladesh, a reverse 
process of policy formulation took place, with public enterprise determining major policy 
trends in production, technology, marketing, industrial relations etc., instead of being 
guided by policy.104
According article 4 of the Nationalisation Order, ownership of the shares, assets 
and liabilities and other proprietary interests in the enterprises vested in the government 
and the enterprises were to be controlled, supervised and co-ordinated by the corporations 
in respect of the activities, business and other affairs. Little consideration was given to the 
means through which public enterprises would be linked to government policies or how 
the enterprises would engage in policy formulation in practice. Judging from the
System* for Public Enterprises in Developing Countries: A Framework for Contrai Systems', in P.Fernandez (ed.). Control 
Systems for Public Enterprises in Developing Countries, 1979, p.87.
102 TVs* part is «Titles after discussion with government and corporation officials in Bangladesh and the observations reflect widely
103 In the similar circumstances of Anglo-phonic African countries. Ghai has argued that such legislation presupposes the existence 
of already well denned goal of public enterprises and 'while such legislation can provide for the outline of institutions and 
relationships, it cannot so easily deal with questions of policy: it lends to be in the nature of s certe blonche for the executive to 
determine the purpose and scope of the public sector '  Y.P.Ghai. Law and Public Enterprises in Developing Countries' in 
V.V.Ramsnadham (ed.). Public Enlerpnse and Developing World. 1984. p39.)
104 On the other hand, after the rail of Mujib regime a clear policy existed but was not enshrined in the fundamental Guide-lines 
thereby increased the possibility for individual and varying interpretations of policy.
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provisions of the P.O. 27 o f 1972, it seems, the underlying assumption was that once 
ownership had changed, these problems would solve themselves. Thus the issue of 
ownership, which is a private law concern, resulted in the neglect of public law issues like 
institutionalising proper relationship between the government and the public enterprises.
The transfer of ownership of the shares, assets and liabilities and other proprietary 
interests of the enterprises, nationalised, to the government and allowing their control and 
supervision by the corporations, however, created confusion in the interpretation of the 
provisions because enterprises placed under the public corporations were incorporated as 
limited companies under the Companies Act 1913. But articles 5-7 of the Nationalisation 
Order 1972 empowered the government to dissolve the Board of Directors, appoint new 
Directors, modify or amend the memorandum or articles of association. These enterprises 
after nationalisation clearly were not governed by the provisions of the Companies Act 
1913 gave rise to confusions regarding the legal status and character of the companies 
which were placed under the corporations105 and the extent to which the Companies Act 
continued to be applicable to such companies.
The entire scheme of the Nationalisation Order seems to have retained the 
corporate status of an individual enterprise and allowed the enterprises to function as 
companies as they were functioning before the promulgation of Nationalisation Order 
1972.106 But articles 5-7 virtually took these enterprises out of the jurisdiction of the 
Companies Act 1913.
The properties owned by the enterprises continued to be considered as the 
properties of the companies and as such the companies continued to conduct the business 
and affairs relating to those properties. The Board of Directors of a company placed under 
the sector corporations constituted by the corporations were not the same as that
105 The extent of confusion is evident from a scries of cases brought before the courts where the main i 
sutua of the individual enterprises. For details see next chapter.
106. See A K-MAyub Ali v. Eastern Refinery Ltd. and Others, 32 DI.R (19S0) 33.
105
constituted under the Memorandum and Articles of Association of a company or the 
Companies Act 1913. It was a board completely subservient to the will and wisdom of the 
government.
Not only had the provisions of the Companies Act relating to the mode of 
appointment of Directors been violated but also the very concept of the Board of Directors 
as a body vested under the law with power of company management was completely 
replaced by the wide sweep o f power which was reserved for the government by article 
5(b) of P.0 .27  o f 1972.
Since the government was the sole shareholder, it retained the power of appointing 
the Management Board. The corporation, on the authority of the power delegated by the 
government, could form management boards for the individual enterprises under the 
corporation.107
P.O. 27 o f 1972 conferred power to the Board of Directors of the Corporations in 
such general terms and formulated them in such language that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for the courts to apply the doctrine o f ultra-vires. For this reason attempts to 
invoke the aid of the judicature in defining or limiting the power of the public corporations 
are unlikely to be successful.
There were only six articles pertaining to the financial operation of the nationalised 
industries, but they laid down a detailed procedure for financial accountability. The six 
articles were related to aspects of control, submission of annual budget, annual statements 
of accounts and audits etc.108 Articles 18 and 20 referred to operational aspects of 
financing. Article 18 provided for an authorised share capital of Tk.10 million for each
107 Sec Anide 17 or the Nationalisation Order, op. cil.
It is to be mentioned hen that even large private business conglomerates with subsidiaries appoint the management boards which 
in practice are subservient to the I lead-quarter. For the control mechanism of large private corporations see T. Hadden. The 
Control of Corporate Groups, 1983.
108 In the next chapter these issues will be discussed in detail.
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Corporation to be subscribed109 entirely by the government and an initial share capital of 
half a million Taka fully paid up and subscribed by the government. Article 20 conferred 
powers upon the corporations to spend such sums as they would think fit within the limits 
of their annual budgets approved by the government. Other than these aspects, the 
nationalisation statute did not contain specific Guide-lines on matters such as investments, 
pricing or profits. Nor did it seek to define the financial, social and economic obligations 
of the nationalised industries.
With the changes of governments in Bangladesh the Nationalisation Order 1972 
also underwent many changes. In spite of the fact that, since 1975 a programme of 
privatisation has been vigorously pursued, the corporations have a number of enterprises 
under them. It is likely that many enterprises would continue to remain under these public 
corporations for a long time.110 Under these circumstances, it was expected that the Order 
would be replaced by specialised legislation on each corporation filling the lacunae and 
omissions o f the original Order.111 The specific features of the sector corporations and the 
circumstances of the markets encountered by them while defining objectives and broad 
means of achieving these objectives could have given due attention in drafting the new 
legislation. Instead, successive governments from time to time amended the 
Nationalisation Order 1972 by executive orders, not as part of improving the efficiency of 
the enterprises but, to accommodate various degrees of privatisation.
As has been said, nationalisation in Bangladesh took place through an executive 
order of the President at a time when the country did not have a constitution and there was 
no parliament. It is interesting to note that the subsequent amendments to the 
Nationalisation Order were also made by executive orders. This performance of the 
legislative function by the executive resulted in executive i.e bureaucratic control
109 This expression is used in the article itself.
110 For reasons, why many enterprises would remain under public corporations instead of the programme of privatisation, see chapter
*1*. About 72%. of total 45 officers interviewed, fell the need for specialised legislation.
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becoming a significant feature of public enterprise management in Bangladesh at all 
stages, i.e. from the formation to determination of how surpluses generated should be 
appropriated. It is quite hypothetical to try to figure out the forms the enterprises would 
have taken if they had been formed by Parliament. But even in rubber stamp parliament, at 
least there could have been an opportunity to discuss and debate the provisions of the law 
more elaborately, and various views could have emerged that could have helped to refine 
them. This omission allowed the bureaucracy to determine the financial and organisational 
structures of public enterprises and their accountability patterns by consolidating its hold 
on them and setting up structures congenial to it.
The law is crucial to the efficient operation of public enterprises, but law itself is 
created by a group o f people. It reflects the character of the law givers.
In retrospect it is clear now that the lack of a definite purpose, the existence of 
many lacunae and omissions in the nationalisation law itself was mainly due to the 
following reasons: a) it seems that the government soon after independence won through a 
war, did not have a clear idea of the objectives to be achieved by the enterprises or the 
mode in which they should operate. The government did not have enough time to evolve a 
policy for the public sector industrial enterprises or to the institutional implications o f  the 
policy; b) whatever policy the government had in mind could not properly communicate 
its intentions in clear terms to the draftsmen; c) since the drafting was made in haste, the 
draftsmen, burdened as they were with overwork, instead of giving serious thought had to 
rely as far as possible on precedents. “ 2
112 Derived from the interviews with various government officials.
Professor Ghai made a study on law and public enterprise in the Anglo-phonic African countries and his observations seem to (it 
the Bangladesh situation loo. (For detail see Y.P. Ghai. Law and Public Enterprises in Developing Countries', in 
V.V.Ramanadham fed). 1984. op. ciI.. p.S9.) His description, no doubt, renects the true stale of law in the Anglo-phonic 
developing countnes. I would like to add that it seems that some of the lacunae and omissions ate consciously or subconsciously 
committed in Bangladesh to serve the inletest of the law giving class.
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C H A P TE R S
Institutionalising Public Enterprises
3.1. Introduction .
The public corporation is the most widely used legal form for organising public enterprises in 
both developed and developing countries. The disadvantages of departmental enterprises 
under the direct control of the Ministers gave increasing popularity to an organisational form 
where government delegates responsibility to an autonomous or semi-autonomous body to 
manage public enterprises on its behalf. These bodies have been variously described in 
different countries as "public corporation’’, "national corporations", "statutory 
corporations", "parastatals", "public boards" etc. Out of these expressions, the term public 
corporation has for one reason or another, emerged as most fashionable in the contemporary 
use by various writers.1
Robson has rightly observed that, "the underlying reason for the creation of the 
modem type of public corporation is the need for a high degree of freedom, boldness and 
enterprise in the management of undertakings of an industrial or commercial character and 
the desire to escape from the caution and circumspection which is considered typical of 
government departments."2
Public enterprises are mostly organised in the form of public corporation, when it is 
expected that their operation should be run on commercial and business lines in order to 
generate profit/surplus to contribute to the revenues of the state. In this form of organisation 
public enterprises are judged by their total results and, subject to predetermined performance
*. D.N.Chesicr. Public Corporation» and the claiaification of Admini.tr.tivt Bodiea'. Political Studies, vol.l, p.34.
2. W. ARobson. Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership, 1962, p.77.
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criteria, they should be given full freedom of operation. The form recognises that complex 
industrial enterprises are not suitable for administration by government departments and by 
civil servants not trained for the job. It therefore aims at a balance between the flexibility and 
autonomy enjoyed by private commercial enterprise, with an independent legal entity with 
funds of its own and largely autonomous in its management, but with the responsibility to the 
public as represented by ministers and parliament.
Although a number of public corporations were established before the last world war, 
the main developments in this field in Great Britain have occurred since the end of the war 
with the advent of the Labour government and its policy of nationalisation o f a number of 
basic industries in Britain.
In advocating the use of the public corporation form for public enterprises in Britain, 
Herbert Morrison sought a combination of public ownership, public accountability and 
business management for public ends.3 According to him, the primary objective of the public 
corporation is the conduct of its business in the public interest, as opposed to private or 
sectional interests. It must break even or pay its way, although the profit motive should not be 
paramount. Furthermore, in Morrison's opinion, since it is impossible to set out what 
constitutes the public interest in legislation, adherence to this goal depended on the public 
spiritedness of the minister and the board of directors of the public corporations, who should 
be appointed by him on the grounds of competence to carry out the business in question. 
Checks on ministerial exercise of discretion with respect to the appointment and removal of 
the boards of directors, were to be provided by legislative provisions. These should require 
the minister to consult appropriate government agencies in making the appointments, and 
specifying certain qualifications which appointees shall have. Reliance would also be placed 
on civil service procedures. Recommendations of the minister's civil service advisers would 
appear in their minutes to him, which would be open to public inspection. The minister
3. H.Morrison. Socialisation o f Transport. 1933. p. 149.
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would also be accountable to parliament, and the press would act as an additional check on 
the exercise o f his discretion.4
Thus the public corporations are created with the objective of securing the best of 
both worlds: on the one hand, autonomy, flexibility and initiative found in the private 
enterprise system; on the other hand, securing accountability to the public, to whom they 
belong and whom they serve. The public corporation is thus a hybrid organisation, combining 
some features of a government department and some of the features of a business company, 
and standing outside the ordinary framework of central and local government.5 Indeed, 
Professor J.F. Garner has described public corporation as "an important third arm of 
government in addition to the traditional instruments of the central executive and local 
authorities."6
The administration of public corporation by a board appointed by the government but 
autonomous, within very wide limits, in the management of the enterprise, is now a fairly 
universal feature. It is an almost universal feature of the modem public corporation that the 
board is subject to an overall policy control by the departmental minister but the later does 
not form part of the actual management. A corporation has a separate legal personality from 
its owners-the shareholders - who are represented by the Board of Directors. Varying degrees 
of overlap occur between these two groups from a Salomon7 type of private company to a 
large public company. The larger the group of shareholders and the more complex the 
operations o f the corporation, the more distinct is the separation between ownership and 
management. In case of the public corporation, the sole shareholder is the Government, being 
directly represented by the Minister who supervises the activities of a corporation. The
4 Ibid.
5 H W R W.de. Administrative Law. 1977, p.70.
6. J.F.Garner. 'Public Corpo ratio ns in the United Kingdom' in W.Friedmaiui (ed). Government Enterprise. 1970, pp.4-5.
7 See the case of Salomon ». Salomon (1*97) AC 21
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relationship between the Government and the corporations is expressed in the nature of this 
supervision.
The degree of ministerial supervision, where the minister is not represented on the 
Board, is perhaps the difficult and delicate aspect of this whole construction. Even if the law 
creating the corporation itself is satisfactory, it will always leave some room for the 
development of conventions which may hamper the work of the enterprise. It is now a 
universal practice to vest the power to appoint and dismiss the corporation’s management 
board in the hands of the concerned Minister and to give him authority to exercise general 
supervision over the enterprise. The corporation is an indirect organ o f  government, hence, 
cannot, in the last resort, defend its autonomy against governmental intervention, "unless, of 
course, that government is so weak, ill-organised and feckless that it has lost authority over 
its creations."8 If the minister intervenes frequently in matters of management, however the 
idea of public corporation is undermined.
Side by side with legal forms the socio-economic and political environment of a 
country is very important for the implementation of the norms of law. The role of legal norms 
is to "indicate, with all the authority that the law has, the type o f  relationship that is 
considered best to fulfil the purposes for which the enterprise has been created."9 Unless such 
indications are realised in practice, little can be expected by taking the enterprise out of the 
department and handing it over to a corporation board.
The problem of executive interference is only one side of the coin. The practice in 
different developing countries testifies to the fact that the autonomy and freedom conferred 
on an enterprise by this form of organisation can be so large that it might grow into a quite 
uncontrollable empire unto itself. In such a situation, ensuring public accountability becomes 
a major problem. The danger that corporations may make good their escape from public
8 A.H. hUnmon. op. cU.. p.343.
9 Ibid., p.344.
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accountability probably forced the governments of the underdeveloped countries to give 
autonomy to public corporation with one hand and promptly take it away with the other. This 
form of organisation constantly gives birth to tension between autonomy and control. Even 
developed countries, with experienced and sophisticated administrative apparatus and more 
stable political regimes than developing countries, are by no means certain that they have 
already established the right balance between autonomy and control. The controversies 
arising out o f  finding a right balance between autonomy and control are still continuing.
Many questions are still being raised as to the desirability of the adoption of public 
corporation form. Political interference has not been eliminated, and the governments in 
many developing countries are indiscriminately contracting out functions which they are not 
capable of discharging has given rise to a problem of co-ordination and supervision. Any of 
the positive advantages which are supposed to accrue from the use of the corporation device 
have remained mostly unrealized. Instead of witnessing flexibility and autonomy of operation 
with adequate public accountability one often witnesses sporadic and ill-judged intervention. 
Thus the quantitative growth of autonomous corporations has been simply an addition in an 
already chaotic administrative system of Bangladesh.
3.2. P ub lic  C orpora tions in Bangladesh
In Bangladesh it was not so much the question of public ownership (since prior to 
independence a number of enterprises were already under government control and after 
independence the government had to assume the ownership of abandoned industries) as of 
business management or the commercialisation of state financial activities which required to 
be addressed. In order to achieve this, it was deemed necessary to adopt the public 
corporation form which embodied the Morrisonian concepts of "public accountability" and 
"public interest".
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The use of the corporation form was justified in terms of the scale o f operation and 
the need for specialised management and commercialisation of public enterprises. It was 
realised by the policy makers that civil service methods and the stifling effects of Treasury 
Financial controls would limit efficiency and initiative of the public enterprises. It was also 
felt that if ministerial responsibility applied to the running of the public industrial enterprises, 
there was the risk of undue interference by the Parliament which would lead to inflexibility 
and undue centralisation. The advantages of the form lay in the fact that it "could be clothed 
with the powers of government but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private 
enterprise."10
Another reason for adopting the public corporation form was that before 
independence, the quasi-departmental form of EPIDC faced various organisational problems. 
"A number of studies connected with the organisational problems of EPIDC suggested the 
need to (i) break away from the overcentralised and bureaucracy dominated structure; (ii) 
provide professional management with clearly defined lines of responsibility; (iii) create 
conditions so that the enterprises could operate with sufficient freedom to be able to secure 
their own commercial viability."11
The government, while nationalising manufacturing enterprises, was guided by the 
recommendations regarding organisational problems of the erstwhile EPIDC.12 As a result, 
these were reflected in the P.O. 27 o f 1972. It originally created 10 corporations to supervise 
and coordinate the industries placed under them. Article 10 of the Order established the 
corporations for jute industries, cotton mills, sugar mills, steel mills, paper and board, 
fertilizer, chemical and pharmaceuticals, engineering and shipbuilding, minerals, exploration, 
transmission and distribution of oils and gas, food and allied industries, and forest products.
10 The »uiemcni is attributed President Roosevelt (his message to Congress in 1933) quoted from A.D. Singh. Judicial Control of Public 
Corporation» in Modern India. 1984. p.4
R.Sobhan. Nationalisation .... op. cit., p.190.
12. Derived from interview with Rehman Sobhan who was the member of the Planning Commission, in charge of industries, during 
Mujib Government.
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In September 1972, the Government created the Bangladesh Tanneries Corporation 
and placed 30 enterprises under it.13 Additional enterprises were placed under the 
management of corporations from time to time and the Nationalisation Order 1972 was 
amended to accommodate such changes.
Table-3
SECTOR CORPORATIONS WITH NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES UNDER THEM 
AS IN DECEMBER, 1972.
Name of the Corporation Number of Enterprises
Jute Industries Corporation 77
Textile Industries Corporation 72
Sugar Mills Corporation 16
Food and Allied Corporation 54
Fertilizer, Chemical & Pharmaceutical Corporation 13
Paper and Board Corporation 9
Tanneries Corporation 30
Steel Mills Corporation 20
Engineering and Shipbuilding Corporation 34
Minerals, Oil & Gas Corporation 7
Forest Products Corporation 20
Total 352
Source: Ministry of Industries, 
Nationalised Industries, 1975, p.6.
Despite a preference for the corporation form, the operations of some public
enterprises were allowed to remain organised as departmental undertakings and control
boards as they were during Pakistani rule and some public enterprises were also organised as 
limited companies. Generally, the enterprises in the nature of public utilities organised as 
departmental undertakings were financed through appropriation from the government 
treasury and were subject to the same budget, account, audit and control procedures as the 
government departments. For example Bangladesh Railway, the postal service, and the 
Telephone and Telegraph Board etc. are departmental undertakings. It may be mentioned
here that although Telegraph and Telephone Board is a departmental undertaking still it has
iment) Order, 1972 being P.0.108 o f1972.
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been granted considerable autonomy14 compared to the Postal Service. In Bangladesh, since 
some degree of autonomy is granted to some public enterprises falling within the 
departmental form of management compared to those of pure departmental form run as part 
o f  government department operated by civil servants, they are referred to as semi- 
autonomous bodies.
Public enterprises organised as public corporations are sometimes referred to 
autonomous bodies. In the case of departmental undertakings of a commercial nature, the 
government realised that their commercial character demanded degrees of flexibility and 
autonomy in their operations. Some reforms were made from time to time relaxing the 
normal rigid bureaucratic rules and regulations but in spite of this, they remained a part of the 
government department. It is thus evident that the legal form was not all that decisive, 
because the form could be manipulated, depending on socio-economic conditions of the 
country.15
In July 1976, corporations were reorganised by the Second Amendment Ordinance.16 
Accordingly the Bangladesh Sugar Mills Corporation and the Bangladesh Food and Allied 
Industries Corporation were merged to create the Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries 
Corporation. Likewise, the Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation was constituted to 
embrace the activities of the three corporations dealing with the chemicals, fertilizer, paper 
and leather industries. Bangladesh Steel Engineering Corporation was set up to include 
industries in steel, shipbuilding and engineering. The Bangladesh Forest Products 
Corporation was merged with the Bangladesh Forest Industries Development Corporation 
(established during the Pakistani regime). Similarly some enterprises and their assets were 
transferred from Bangladesh Oil and Gas Corporation to the Bangladesh Mineral Exploration 
and Development Corporation, which was set up under P.O.120 of 1972. In December 1976
e, 1975 (Ordinance No. XLVH o f1975).
la Bangladesh there was eo pubi 
India. On the nature of public di 
vol.l. 1961. pp. 16-26.
ig the adoption of public corporation form unlike :
*) Ordinance, 1976.
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the Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation was set up with four marketing companies, two 
blending plants and a refinery.17 In 1985, Petrobangla and BMEDC were merged and 
BOGMC (Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Minerals Corporation) was created. The restructuring of 
the corporations were done on the ground of economy. It may be mentioned that the 
government at that time was privatising a number of enterprises and restructuring was 
necessary to accommodate privatisation.
Table-4
RECONSTITUTED SECTOR CORPORATIONS WITH NO. OF ENTERPRISES UNDER 
THEM AS IN DECEMBER, 1976
Corporations No. of Enterprises
BD. Jute Industries Corporation 78
BD. Textile Mills Corporation 75
BD. Sugar and Food Industries Corporation 58
BD. Chemical Industries Corporation 65
BD. Steel and Engineering Corporation 54
BD. Oil and Gas Corporation (Petrobangla) 4
BD. Mineral Exploration & Dev. Corporation 10
BD. Forest Industries Dev. Corporation 7
Total 351
These corporations were organised according to the technical similarity of products 
and processes of the enterprises under them. But in some cases the products were 
heterogeneous. For example, BCIC products ranges from fertiliser, pharmaceuticals, paper, 
boards and newsprints to cosmetics, dry cells, soaps and detergents. Likewise the 
manufacturing activities of BSEC encompassed steel making, steel products, manufacture of 
cooking utensils, bicycles, electric fans, television, radio, twin-ones, refrigerator, VCR, auto­
rickshaw, ship-building, assembling of cars and buses to industrial plants and machinery. The 
corporations also varied in size, number of enterprises, number of employees, fixed assets *1
17 See the Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation Ordinance 1976, (Ordinance No. IJCXXVII1 o f 1976)
1S. The Bangladesh Gazelle Extraordinary. 19th April 1976.
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etc. Some of the variations of the corporations (manufacturing ones only) as in 1976 are 
shown in the table below:19
Table-5
VARIATIONS IN THE SIZE OF THE CORPORATIONS.
Corporation No. of 
enterprises
Fixed assets 
in mill. Tk.
No. of 
employees
BJMC 78 1700 199600
BTMC 75 611 65500
BSFIC 58 407 31600
BCIC 65 2017 25300
BSEC 54 804 14500
Source: A n n u a l R eports o f  the re sp ec tiv e  co rpo rations
Thus we see that the idea of integration of similar types of enterprises is behind the
concept of sector corporations, each corporation being responsible for many enterprises.
Let us now examine the legal status of these corporations.
3 J .  Legal S ta tus o f Public C orpora tions and  S ta te  Im m unity in Bangladesh.
The Nationalisation Order clearly determined the legal status of the corporations it created. 
Article 10(2) says, "Each corporation shall be a body corporate, having perpetual succession 
and common seal with power, subject to the provision of this Order, to acquire, hold and 
dispose of property, both movable and immovable, and shall by its name sue and be sued."20
The Supreme Court of Bangladesh had occasion to consider the true nature and 
character of public corporations in Bangladesh in Bangladesh Small Industries Corporation
19 The table is prepared on the basis of Ihe annual reports of the respective corporations. The year 1976 is chosen deliberately becauae in 
that year the corporations were reorganised and also because after this year many enterprises were privatised.
20 See Article 10(2). The Bangladesh Industrial... op. cil.
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v. Mahbub Hossain Chowdhury.2I In this case the court observed that a statutory corporation 
is neither a department of Government nor its agent.22 *
Since the above mentioned article 10(2) o f the Nationalisation Order 1972 made clear 
the status of public corporation in Bangladesh and in view of the observation made in the 
case of Bangladesh Small Industries Corporation v. M.H. Chowdhury23 there is no 
controversy as to the legal status of public corporations. In a number of cases24 the real 
controversy arose as to the legal status of individual enterprises placed under the corporations 
and to decide whether a nationalised company placed under a corporation retains its 
corporate character or not.
It seems from the decided cases that the effect of nationalisation on corporate 
character of individual enterprises is not uniform.25 In M.H.Chowdhury v. General Manager, 
Titas Gas Transmission and Distribution Co. Ltd. Munim, F. J., mentioned a few criteria to 
ascertain the corporate personality of the enterprise. They are: whether the enterprise was 
incorporated as a company under the Companies Act prior to nationalisation, how far the 
enterprise is controlled by the corporation, composition of the Board of Directors, degree of 
autonomy enjoyed during the actual functioning o f the enterprise etc.26 27
In the case of Nishat Jute Mills Ltd. v. Md. Sanaullah27 the Supreme court held that 
"article 4 of P.O.27 of 1972 has vested cent percent shares of an industrial enterprise in the
21. |29DLR(1977)(SC)41|.
22 ibid
2J Ibid.
24 Sec for example New Dhaka Industries h i  v Quamrul Huda mad others. [31 DLR (1979) (AD) 2341; Bangladesh Chemical 
Industries Corporation and another v. Sk. Abdur Rashid, IBSC'R 19*0 (SC) 27|, Motahar Hossain Khan v Bangladesh Jute Mills 
Corporation, (36 DI.R (1984) (AD) 2821 and Senior Manager, MIS Dost Textile Mills Ltd v. Sudhansu Bikash Nath, (19** BI.D 
(AD) 67).
25 M.H. Chowdhury v. General Manager, Titos Gas Transmission and Distribution Co. Ltd., (BSCR 1980 (SO  373).
26 He observed. "If in »pile of a company or a enterprise being a public enterpriie or a nationalised enterprise it is allowed by the 
corporation to manage ilx affair» according to the rules of its Constitution, that is. its Memorandum of Association and Articles of 
Association or agreement or deed under which it was originally created, it may be said that such compaay or enterprise has 
maintained its corporate character. If this is not so and iu  functioning is seen to be controlled by the corporation, whatever 
Independent entity it might have before its becoming a nationalised enterprise or company is submerged into that of the corporation .*
27. 140 DI.R (1988) (AD) 29S|
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Government but it has retained separate entity of the enterprise as an independent company
under the Companies Act."28 Similar view was taken in the case o f Mobarakganj Sugar Mills
Ltd. v. A.B.M. Kazi Nazrul Islam.29 The Supreme court observed that, "notwithstanding the
fact that under P.O.27 of 1972 the company was brought within the ambit of the corporation,
that does not mean that the company became extinct nor, for that matter, can it be argued that
the proceeding should not be initiated by the company itself."30 In fact, according to the
court, a reading of articles 4-8 of the P.O.27 o f  1972 together and as a whole indicates that:
After vesting of the shares o f the nationalised company in the Government, 
care has been taken to protect the corporate existence of the company both 
from the mischief of being wound up under the Companies Act because of 
the legislative changes, and from any action being taken under the 
Memorandum or Articles of Association of the company affecting in any
way its corporate existence......The corporate character of the company
under the Companies Act was never obliterated nor contemplated to be 
so.31
In the case of Chairman, Bangladesh Steel Mills Corporation v. Md. Masood Raza 
and Others32 the Appellate Division made clear the legal position of a corporation in 
Bangladesh. The fact of the case was that a commercial firm was taken over by the 
government on 30.12.71 and was subsequently placed under Bangladesh Steel Mills 
Corporation. On representation by the partners of the firm the government on 17.1.1976 
cancelled its earlier notification placing the firm under the said corporation and asked the 
corporation to hand over possession of the enterprise to the ex-partners. But the corporation 
did not deliver possession of the firm to the partners. The latter filed a writ petition in the 
High Court Division which directed the government and the corporation to deliver possession 
of the firm to its partners immediately. The corporation preferred an appeal against the order 
of the High Court Division to the Appellate Division. Amongst a number of issues in the case 
the court addressed the question raised, which is whether the corporation can challenge the
28 / « .
29. |I987BLD(AD)182|.
IBSCR 1978 (SC) 70].
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release order of the government and has locus standi to maintain the appeal. The court 
observed that:
The position of the appellant corporation is not that of an agent required 
merely to carry out the directions of the government in respect of an 
enterprise placed under it, but its position is that of a juristic person 
functioning in accordance with law as contained in President's order no.27 
of 1972. The Government o f the country which is the executive organ of 
the State undoubtedly exercises immense powers for the administration of 
the affairs of the State. But the exercise of such powers must be subject to 
the law of the country. From the provisions of President's Order no.27 of 
1972 it is clear that the corporation is not, in the strict sense, an agent of 
the Government, but that all the actions of the corporation in respect of an 
industrial enterprise placed under Art. 10(l)(d) of the Order and also 
those of the Government in relation to such an enterprise are to be 
controlled and regulated by the provisions of the Order and the rules and 
regulations made under it. (Para 80)
The corporation has been invested with a legal personality and has the 
necessary legal competence to raise a question as to the legality of an act 
which seeks to affect its scheme of administration and management o f the 
enterprise which was purported to have been lawfully entrusted to it for 
such administration and management. When such a question is raised, the 
Court is bound to give its decision on the question in the light of the law 
applicable thereto. The corporation also has its duties and responsibilities 
under the said Order and is accountable for all its actions. If in course of 
discharging its duties which are regulated by laws, the corporation comes 
across an order of the Government which in its opinion is not in 
accordance with the provisions of the Order or any other law, it will be its 
duty not to implement such an order but to place the matter before the 
appropriate authority for proper decision in the matter. (Para-81)33
Thus we notice that the Nationalisation Order created the corporations as a separate 
legal person which means they are technically separate and distinct from the Government. 
They do not enjoy the sovereign immunity of the state.34
How far is government liable for the actions of its agents and for the contracts 
executed by it?
In the Indian sub-continent since the time of East India Company, the sovereign has 
been liable to be sued in tort or in contract, and the common law immunity never operated in 
India. Section 65 of the Government o f  India Act 1858 says "all persons and bodies politic
33 IU4.
34. For ■ detail discussion of the theory of public corporation as a separate legal entity, see R.S. Arora, Administration....op. cit, pp.65-
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shall and may have and take the same suits, remedies and proceedings, legal and equitable
against the Secretary of State of India as they could have done against the said company."“
Since 1861 the practice of the court was to separate commercial activities and the sovereign
activities of the state. The leading case arising under the above section, is P & O Steam
Navigation Co. v. Secretary o f State.*6 The case was decided by Calcutta Supreme Court in
1861. In this case the P & O Co. made a claim for damages for injury caused to its horse by
the negligence of some workmen in the Government Kidderpore Dockyard. It was held that
the Secretary of State for India was responsible for the action of his servants in respect of
what were described as the trading activities of the East India Company and of the
Government of India. In an obiter dictum, the court added that:
There is a great and clear distinction between act done in the exercise of 
what are usually termed as sovereign powers, and acts done in the conduct 
of undertakings which might be carried on by private individuals without 
having such powers delegated to them. The latter and not the former acts 
are justiciable and cognizable by the courts.35 67
The functions of the modem state are so complex that it is not always easy to 
compartmentalize functions of the state into sovereign and non-sovereign. This leads to 
unnecessary uncertainty regarding the legal position.
In Bangladesh, there is no separate Act in the model of British Crown Proceeding Act 
o f 1947 or the State Immunity Act 1978. In determining the liability of the state in respect of 
contracts, reference to article 144 o f the constitution of Bangladesh should be made, which 
says that the "executive authority o f the Republic shall extend to the acquisition, sale, 
transfer, mortgage and disposal of property, the carrying on of any trade or business and the 
making of any contract."38 Thus in exercise of the executive power given by Article 144 the 
government can carry on trade or hold property and enter into contracts. However, the article
35 Sec section 65, The Government o f India Act. I8S8.
36 (5 Bom. I LOR. App.| cited from AD Singh, op cil.. p.21.
37 Ibid., p.22.
38. Article 144 of the Constitution o f Bangladesh.
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is confined only to giving capacity to the government to do these things. The actual carrying 
of trading by the government or the acquisition of property by it or the entering into contracts 
are governed by the laws relating to such trade, property and contract. In carrying out these 
activities, the government is on the same level as any other person. The contract is governed 
by the Bangladesh Contract Act 1872 and the government as well as the other contracting 
party is bound by the terms and conditions of the contract. Thus article 145 (2) of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh says:
Where a contract or deed is made or executed in exercise of the executive 
authority of the Republic, neither the President nor any other person 
making or executing the contract or deed in exercise of that authority shall 
be personally liable in respect thereof, but this article shall not prejudice the 
right of any person to take proceedings against the government.
It is evident from the article that making and executing a contract is not a sovereign 
function imposed on it either by the constitution or by any statute. But in acting under a 
contract the government is legally on the same footing as other private persons. A party 
aggrieved by the exercise of a constitutional or statutory power by the government can bring 
a writ petition39 against the government but a party aggrieved by the conduct of government 
under a contract cannot do so. It may enforce such right by suit for specific performance or 
may sue the government for damages for breach of contract.40 Under article 146 of the 
Constitution the "Government of Bangladesh may sue or be sued by the name of 
Bangladesh."
The main objectives in setting up sector corporations were co-ordination and 
provision of common services among individual public enterprises in the same field. P.O. 27 
o f 1972 looked at the sector corporations as apex bodies to supervise and co-ordinate41 the 
enterprises placed under them. The stress on the theoretical advantages of public corporation 
in terms of efficiency led to the neglect of the important question of how goals were to be set
39. Article 102 of the Constitution o f Bangladesh.
40 See the Indian caae of Niranjan LalDalmia v. Union o f India. IA.I.R. (1976) Delhi IS4|.
41. See article 17 of the Nationalisation Order 1972, op. cit.
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for the enterprises. Efficiency after all, is merely a means to an end, and how the ends were to 
emerge was not made clear.
The next two sections will discuss what functions are assigned to public corporations 
and examine how the corporations and enterprises under them are organised and function in 
reality.
3.4. Functions o f the C o rp o ra tio n .
In Bangladesh, the Ministry o f Industry controls directly three corporations, namely the 
BCIC, BSEC and BSFIC. The pattern of management is more or less the same in all these 
corporations and they are created by the same legislation. But the workings of these three 
corporations differ.
The following case study of BSEC would give a general idea and indication of the 
workings of the other corporations.
BSEC is one of the most important public sector corporations. It is a heavy industry 
sector and as such likely to remain in public sector for a long time. It has enormous potential 
for production but is not performing so well due to many management problems.42
P.O. 27 o f 1972 says that "it shall be the function of a Corporation to control, 
supervise and co-ordinate, subject to any regulation made in this behalf, the activities, 
business and affairs of the scheduled industrial enterprises placed under it... and to establish 
and develop new industrial enterprises within their respective fields."43 The above functions 
are too broad and vague and can be interpreted in different ways. Moreover it has failed to
42 M.A. Mohsin. The Public Enterprises of Bangladesh: An Assessment of Bangladesh Steel and Engineering Corporation'
[unpublished], a paper submitted to the BPATC in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the completion of the 5th Senior Staff 
Course held during 5.7.87-5.10.87,1987, p.9. [The author was a Joint Secretary, Ministry of Industry.]
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define the functions of the enterprises under them. Therefore, the Cabinet Division in 1976 
issued guide-lines on different aspects of public enterprises.
The Cabinet Division's Guide-lines on the Relationship between Government and 
Autonomous bodies/Corporations and the Autonomous Bodies/Corporations and Enterprises 
under them44 entrusted a corporation with a number of functions,45 in particular, to operate on 
commercial considerations, having due regard to national interests, in the most efficient and 
economic manner; within the policy frame- work and guidance given by the Government.
Under the Guide-lines the functions of the corporation should be discharged, by 
advance planning of activities including investment programme setting target and allocating 
tasks, constant review of the targets set and the tasks given, by continuous research, and 
mechanisation.46
In April 1982 the Chief Martial Law Administrator appointed a Martial Law 
Committee to examine the organisational set-up of Ministries/Divisions, Departments and 
other organisations under them under the Chairmanship of Brigadier Enamul Huq Khan.47 *
The Enam Committee assigned to the BSEC with as many as 23 functions in line with the 
Cabinet Division's Guide-lines o f 1976. The functions included fixing up of annual targets in 
consultation with Enterprise Managements and as approved by the Ministry, so that 
reasonable profit can be earned, guiding the enterprises to generate funds, sustaining 
uninterrupted production by procurement of required raw materials economically, ensurance 
of proper distribution of the consumer goods throughout the country at the same fixed price, 
encouraging private sector in establishing ancillary and linkage industries, maintaining
44 Government of Bangladesh. Cabinet Division; Guide-lines on the Relationship between Government and Autonomous 
Bodies ¡Corporations and the Autonomous Bodies/Corporations and Enterprises under them, 1976.
45. See clause 5 of the Cabinet Division's Guide-lines, op. cit.
46 /bid.
47 See Bangladesh Gazette. Committee for Examining Organisational Set Up of Ministries/Divisions, Departments and other
Organisations under them. 18.4.82. The Committee is often referred to Enam Committee, after the name of its chairman [Among the
terms of reference of the committee were to review/recommend charter of duties (in brief) of various Sections. Branches. Wings,
Divisions and Departments and to suggest rationalisation of organisation and functions of Ministries/Divisions/ Departments and
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desired level of employment and generating new job opportunities, and contributing to the 
creation of the social infrastructure within and outside the Corporation. Thus, it clear that the 
Committee entrusted the corporation with both commercial and social functions.48 But the 
committee did not spell out how far the commercial functions be prioratised against the social 
functions. This created many problems and confusions. While the management strives at 
maximisation of profit the trade unions demand more social spending.
3.5. O rg an isa tio n  a n d  M anagem ent o f  C orpora tions .
In 1972 , the Bangladesh Steel Mills Corporation and the Bangladesh Engineering and 
Shipbuilding Corporation were established.49 These two corporations were merged in July 
1976 and renamed the Bangladesh Steel and Engineering Corporation with an authorized 
capital of Tk. 20 million and a paid up capital of Tk.4 million. It had 65 enterprises under its 
control.50 However at the moment it has 19 enterprises, with a net fixed asset of Tk.6441.3 
million as at June 1988, under its control.51
The Board o f Directors of the Corporation is responsible for the overall direction and 
administration of the affairs of the corporation.52 The Board of Directors of BSEC consists of 
a Chairman and 4 other Directors viz. Director (Finance), Director (Planning and
See lhe Reporta o f the C ot
ih clause (1) of article 10 of P.O. 27 o f 1972 it
ns. volJÜII, pan-2, chapter IX, 1983.
o notifications. No. FIST-111851 at
I 17th May 1972. establishing Bangladesh Steel Mills Corporation a
Between October 1976 and July 1989, BSEC divested 27 enterprises through sale by open tender, 10 returned to their fort
Bangladeshi owners, 4 were transferred to other corporations, 5 were wound up being nr------ **------1 1—J------ --------------*
enterprises at its control. (BSSC Annua! Report 1987-88. V---  ------------
forme HîPuS?,'!'
I [ E 1989, p.12 and p.45.) They comprise 2 units of bas 
s. 6 transport sector industries and S under miscellaneous category. Of these again, 8 w 
,-rties and one was established by the BSEC itself.
52 Article 11 of the P.O. 27 of 1972 says that 'the general direction and administration of the affaire and business of a corporation shall 
vest in a Board of Directors which may exercise all powers and do all acts and things which may be exercised or done by the 
Corporation.* Article 12 says that "the Board shall consist of a Chairman and such number of other Directors not exceeding six as the 
Government may fix." See the P.O.27 o f1972, op.cit.
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Development), Director (Production and Engineering) and Director (Commercial).53 Each 
director is in charge of a number of divisions. The Chairman is the chief executive officer of 
the corporation.54
Although theoretically the Board is the supreme policy making body of the 
corporation, in most cases the four full time functional directors of the Board function as 
"advisers" to the Chairman. Article 15 (2) says that "the Board may delegate its power to the 
Chairman for the purpose of efficient functioning of a Corporation."55 In accordance with this 
provision the Board o f Directors executed a power of attorney56 delegating all powers to the 
Chairman. In reality , although the Board has delegated its collective powers to the chairman, 
the board members being executive directors meet frequently and informally discusses 
almost all issues. Apart from frequent informal discussions between the Board members, the 
Board generally formally meets once in a month.
The Chairman is made responsible for the performance of the corporation and has 
been given very wide powers. Therefore the Corporation must have the benefit of a 
competent head, if targets laid down and results expected of it, are to be achieved. At least, 
he should be in a position to inject the life and vigour required for the efficient operation of 
the organisation. He should be in a position to influence the process of growth and create the 
image which may spell success or the lack of it. It goes without saying that the personality of 
the Chairman is also important in the relationship with the government.
53 BSEC Annual Report, op. cit., p.3.
54 Article 13 of the P.O. 27 o f 1972.
55 Article 15 (2). ibid.
56. Learnt from the officials of the corporation.
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TABLE-6
DIVISIONS OF BSEC
Divisions Officers in-charge
1. Secretariat
2. Personnel
3. Training, Organisation and Method
Chairman
1. Accounts
2. Finance
3. Audit
4. Cost and Budget
5. MIS
Director (Finance)
1. Planning
2. Implementation
3. Construction
Director (Planning 
and Development)
1. Engineering-I
2. Engineering-II
3. Steel
4. Ship Building
Director (Production 
and Engineering)
1. Purchase
2. Marketing
3. Engineering-Ill
Director (Commercial)
Source: BSEC Head Office.
The functions of BSEC are conducted by 18 Divisions at its head office. A list of the 
Divisions along with the officers in charge of the Divisions is described in the table above. 
The organogram of the Bangladesh Steel and Engineering Corporation is shown on the next 
page.
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3.6. O rg a n isa tio n  and M anagem ent o f  E nterprises.
The chief executive of the enterprise is a Managing Director or a General Manager57. He 
(MD or GM ) is appointed by the corporation from its senior staffs. While it is the function of 
the corporation to appoint the chief executive of the enterprise, often the appointment is made 
with the informal concurrence of the Ministry of Industry.
Each of the 19 enterprises under the control of BSEC has a Management Board. The 
Management Board is the highest policy making body at the enterprise level58 and at the 
same time the top management organ responsible for implementing the objectives of an 
enterprise. No qualifications or criteria were set out for Board membership. The criteria of 
selection are vague and permit of almost any person deemed fit by the corporation. The 
members o f the Board are appointed by the corporation formally (but in reality by the 
Ministry) for such period as decided upon by the corporation. The Board members have no 
specific assignments and they are not individually responsible for any one or more spheres of 
the enterprise's working.59
The Board consists of such number of members as laid down in their respective 
Memorandum and Articles of Association.60 The size of the Boards vary from 5 to 9. It is 
obvious that smaller Boards are more efficient. When the Board is a large one there is seldom 
unanimity o f decisions, and there is often the practical problem of ensuring the presence of so 
many members of the Board especially when they are to meet frequently.
The board is headed by a chairman. Presently61 Chairman of the Board o f Directors of 
BSEC is the chairman of 3 enterprises, other directors of the BSEC work as the chairman of 5
57. Out of 19 enterprises in IS the Chief Executive is called a Managing Director and in rest 4 General Manager, See BSEC Animal 
Report, op  ciL. pp.66-68.
58 Clause 3(4) of the Cabinet Division's Guide-lines. opcit.
59 For a detail discussion on the appoi ntment procedure see chapter 4 (4.2.2.1).
60 The Cabinet Division's Guide-lines of ¡976 provided for the composition of the Enterprise Board. According to it. the board should
consist of....Chief Executive of the Enterprise. Corporation Appointee, Financial Institution nominee and worker's representative.’
¡bid. No worker's representative has ever been appointed to the board in spite of the clear provisions to this effect.
61. After nationalisation all enterprises, including those under the control of EPIDC, used to be managed by a Management Board, 
usually headed by a member of the Board of Directors of the Corporation. The Secretary of the Ministry of Industry was the
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enterprises, Additional Secretaries of the Ministry of Industry are the chairman of 2 
enterprises, past and existing Joint Secretaries of the Ministry of Industries work as the 
chairman o f  4 enterprises and Members o f Parliament work as the Chairman of the remaining 
5 enterprise.
The inclusion of the Members of Parliament in the board internalises political 
influence at the level of board decisions. Non-commercial objectives are often given 
priorities due to the fact that the M.P. is more interested in his chance of re-election. The non­
commercial objectives, like expenditure in setting or maintaining school for the children of 
the staff where children of the locality also have the access, often negatively influences 
profitability o f the enterprise while increases the popularity of the M.P.
The chief executive of the enterprise is the only full time member of the Board. The 
other members of the Board are all part-time members drawn from different Ministries, 
Planning Commission, Universities and the BSEC itself. Thus the board is a part time policy 
board.
A  part-time "Policy Board" has the advantage that the government can draw the 
talents from different sources.62 The other advantage is that not being involved in day to day 
management, it can take a more objective view of the manager's performance, and take a 
rather independent and critical view of the enterprises management. There are also 
disadvantages that members of the Board being appointed from different sources may not 
form a homogeneous working team. Since they are not responsible for carrying out the 
policies, the policy formulation may not conform to the needs of the situation. The part-time 
board members are generally unable to devote the time and attention needed for the purpose 
because most of them are pre-occupied with other responsibilities. Moreover, the part-time 
members are neither fully aware of the problems of the concerned enterprise nor in a position 
to make any significant contribution to the better performance and growth of the enterprise.
62 The discussion in (hit pan is baaed on interviews with difTereal officials both at corporation and enterprise level.
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Sixty per cent of the total number of members of the management boards of public 
enterprises under BSEC are government servants. The appointments of civil servants have 
certain theoretical advantages like, a) they help in co-ordinating the activities of a public 
enterprise with government policies and national criteria, since they are supposed to have 
knowledge of them; b) they eliminate delays in government response to, or approval of, a 
board decision which needs it; and c) being bound by public service codes, they act 'fairly' 
and without self-interest.
The presence o f civil servants on the boards have certain practical disadvantages too.
a) The inclusion of civil servants in the board in establishing co-ordination between 
the government and the enterprise, or in orienting the enterprise towards efficiency, remains 
unproven.
b) It is not certain that they carry to the boardroom clear policies or responses of the 
government. Their participation in board discussions does not necessarily represent the kind 
o f enterprise-government dialogue which is desirable. They refrain from committing 
themselves clearly; instead, they play safe by deferring an issue for further consideration or 
by recommending too frequently that an issue under discussion be referred to the government 
before a final decision is taken which can ultimately prove restrictive of the initiative of top 
managers of the enterprise and condition its efficiency.
c) Since most members are government servants and the government itself is 
supposed to spell out national policies, there may be duplication or even conflicting efforts 
and above all, there is always a danger of some kind of hostility breeding between the Board 
and the management.
d) The government officials act more as representative of their respective ministries 
than as members of a team entrusted with the management and development of an enterprise.
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They come to meetings with the pre-conceived government policies and try to remain in that 
mental framework. Business dynamism and innovation thus tends to suffer.
e) While civil servants find themselves placed on a board by virtue of their ex-officio 
position, it is not certain that they have inherent capability for the directorship concerned. 
Further, their impact on the board is likely to be out of proportion to their competence.
f) They can be an easy medium of transmitting a minister's interest, which the 
minister himself is not prepared to issue as a directive.
However, it is difficult to establish precise responsibility of the civil servants on the 
boards for lapses in enterprise efficiency. Thus, it will be unrealistic to expect that the 
government will not continue to keep civil servants in the boards. But some improvements 
should be done, for example, the number of official members should be kept to a bare 
minimum; they should be sent to board meetings with clear instructions on major issues, 
reflecting the government's views; the articles of association governing the board should 
indicate the nature of issues on which prior consultation or approval of the government is 
deemed necessary; and can take care of this aspect substantially. In the course of an inquiry 
or evaluation of the enterprise, the responsibility of the official members, along with the 
others, for any composite errors of the board should be presumed as a rule, unless there is 
specific evidence to the contrary. A different official should not be sent to the board meetings 
from a ministry every time; official directors should be given some training or orientation in 
the discharge of their responsibility with knowledge; and after every board meeting the 
official members should be asked to submit brief reports to their respective superiors on 
matters of major interest.
About twenty percent members of the management boards are appointed from the 
private sector. Appointments from the private sector can be useful, if the selection is made on 
considerations of merit and not patronage, and if the talents and experience o f an appointee
132
are relevant to the enterprise concerned. But in the case of BSEC enterprises, in many cases, 
the above '  ifs' are absent.
Since many enterprises are loss making enterprises hence about ninety two percent 
officers interviewed felt the need to change the present policy board. However, only forty 
three percent felt that present policy boards should be replaced by functional or executive 
board with members drawn from within the enterprise itself. Their technical utility to the 
board would be at a maximum, once the objectives and targets of the enterprise are set by the 
corporation, agreed by the government, in a clear manner. They argued that since enterprises 
are showing poor performance during non-executive dominance on the boards for a long time 
- not necessarily for that reason alone, a change is likely to improve their performance. If the 
board is composed of people from the corporation then there will be no distinction between 
the board and the management. A board composed exclusively of insiders can have the 
disadvantage of excessive inbreeding. Hence it is in the interests of efficiency to include in it 
a sizeable number of non-executive directors so that they can bring into the boardroom 
considerations and questions that knowledgeable outsiders assume to be important.
It seems there is merit in having a mixture of Policy and Functional Board63 i.e to 
have a few full time directors and a few part time directors. This would have the advantage of 
providing effective collective leadership, and if more members were selected from the ranks 
of the enterprise, chances are that they would stay at their posts longer and provide continuity 
in policies and actions. Most importantly, the functional approach can be conducive to 
injecting professional behaviour in policy formulation and implementation.64 A hybrid board 
rather than the functional one will allow the persons directly concerned with the enterprises 
to sit in the board and decide things within the objectives set by the corporation and decide 
the strategy of achieving things themselves. In other words that will allow more autonomy to
63. About 57% of the officers are of the same opinic
64 Over 72% of the officials interviewed agreed.
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them and make them more accountable for their actions since there would be none to blame 
excepting them.
Judging from the actual workings of the management board, it seems that the present 
policy board is all right, not because it is functioning well, but because it is not of much 
importance to have a policy board or a functional board since most things are decided by the 
corporation and the government. Hence, the functions of the board are very formal. Above 
all, the chief executive always is a key figure in the board as he controls the flow of 
information. There are practically many factors like personality of the members, deciding 
agenda, timing of the meetings etc., that come into play and either form can work well or 
badly depending on those factors. Indeed, it was clear that the success of the enterprise lay 
not so much in the hands of the board but in the hand of the Managing Director. The chief 
executive, depending upon his personal qualities and personality can manipulate many things 
including the board. Whether a board is a functional one or a policy making one there will 
always remain some controversies. Hence under the present system also one should not 
discount the possibilities of certain institutional problems cropping up which may cause 
management efficiency to deteriorate unless simultaneous corrective measures are taken.
An enterprise is basically an economic entity under the charge of a Board, owing 
allegiance to a political entity to whom it looks for survival and continuance. In reality the 
management board of an enterprise is not a supreme body in matter of management. There 
are two other tiers of authority, namely, the government and the corporation under whose 
direct control the management board operates within the rigid boundaries set for it. Thus an 
individual public enterprise industry has practically very little hand in shaping the industry. 
Its functions are only to manage it as desired by the government through the corporation. The 
government and the corporation exert much influence through a wide range of mechanisms: 
the organisation structure, the planning process, informal discussions, the norms and values 
of centrally imposed culture, the capital approval process, setting the targets, the centre's 
reaction to poor performance, the role of the staff department at the head office and many
134
more. All these mechanisms influence the behaviour of the individual enterprises. They also 
influence the behaviour of managers in the enterprises and as a result can influence the 
decision taken, and the motivation and efficiency of employees.
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CHAPTER-4
Relations between the Government 
and
Public enterprises in Bangladesh.
4.1. In troduc tion
In the previous chapter it was mentioned that P.O 27 o f 1972 brought many industrial 
enterprises under public ownership. The government, instead of managing them directly, 
created some corporations to control and supervise the enterprises placed under them, on 
behalf of the government. The corporations have been made the guardians of the assets of 
the enterprises placed under their respective control and are responsible for ensuring that 
overall targets and objectives of the public enterprises are achieved. In short, the 
government, by an act of conscious policy, has created public sector corporations, given 
them an autonomous status and conferred on them a juridical personality.
A three tier system has been adopted for the management of the public industrial 
enterprises in Bangladesh consisting of the government at the top, sector corporations in 
the middle and the enterprises at the bottom. The interrelated activities in the system may 
be accordingly identified as follows:-
i) Government sets the overall policies and objectives for the industry;
ii) Corporations guide and supervise the individual enterprises to achieve the 
overall objectives;
iii) enterprises act to achieve individually their share of required production of 
the sector.
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The adoption of the public corporation form is based on the assumption that 
bureaucracy and bureaucratic methods are not conducive to efficient business 
undertakings. But in so doing, the government has created a new politico-managerial 
situation-the problem of defining the relationship between itself and the corporate body it 
has created, i.e., "the optimisation of the linkage between the state and the enterprise 
which can provide a sound foundation for the enterprise's success."1 Fernandes writes that 
the successful functioning of public enterprises is conditioned by the nature of their 
relationship with the government and that "their efficiency and effectiveness can only be 
secured by a rationalisation of this relationship, and that, politically sensitive though the 
subject may be, there is a need for and a possibility of 'managerialising' the interlinkages 
between the state and the enterprises."2 The relationship is expressed mostly in the extent 
and areas of control exercised by the government and the autonomy enjoyed by the 
enterprises.
In fact, a fundamental characteristic of public corporation form is a careful balance
between control by the government of the policy of the corporation and the operational
autonomy of the corporation. As Gamer points out:3
A powerful corporation, having great financial resources, employing 
many personnel and possessing monopolistic powers conferred by 
statute, should be answerable in some measure to the elected
representatives of the nation and to the courts of law ...... In many
respects controls over such corporations seems tenuous and ineffective.
On the other hand, any large commercial enterprise must be allowed 
freedom to carry on research, to experiment and even on occasion to 
make mistakes. Indeed the justification for the constitutional device of 
public corporations has been said to be as to secure freedom from civil 
service (and particularly Treasury) controls and from the influence of 
party politics.
A proper division of labour between the government and the corporation (under 
which the former makes policy and the latter manages), is implicit in the constitutional
1. P.Fernandes. Managing Relations between Government and Public Enterprises, Management Development series No.25. 1986.
P-6
2 Ibid.
3. J.F.Garner, Administrative Law, 1989, p.368.
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theory of the public corporation. Autonomy is necessary for strategic innovation, for 
adaptation to local and sectoral conditions and for implementation, since managers have a 
better understanding of markets, prices etc. than the government. The management cannot 
function well unless it has a certain freedom of operation.
Earlier, control and autonomy were seen as irreconcilable goals involved in a zero-
sum game: the more one enhanced control the more one cut down on autonomy and vice
versa.4 The extent to which this is true, however, depends on the way in which control and
accountability are effectuated. A UN Report on the subject finds that operational
autonomy and policy control can be simultaneously enhanced provided the public
enterprises are directed by objectives and controlled by results. The Report notes5:-
In a real way, a higher degree of operational autonomy could reinforce 
the degree of enterprise integration with public policy. Through better 
practices of direction and target-setting, of performance measurement 
and control, more accountability can be secured. But it is 
accountability not individual actions and decisions but for results.
The establishment of a coherent institutional structure itself is not sufficient to 
guarantee that the functions and principles essential for sound management of the public 
enterprises will be carried out and observed. It is also necessary that the processes that 
underly the relations between the public authorities and the enterprises, and organize the 
exercise of the different functions, be defined and put into effect. Public enterprises are 
operated, influenced and affected by a series of external factors which make their 
operations different from those of private business enterprises. In a private firm, all 
management decisions are taken by its own board of directors, subject to the due 
observance of the laws and regulations laid down by the state. This is not the case in the 
public enterprises. Critical management decisions, particularly those of a strategic kind are
». 1973. p.41.
taken at the government level-i.e., their policies and activities are controlled externally, 
involving different government agencies, which, at times contradict each other.6
There are varying strands in the relationship between the government and the 
public enterprises, namely, the government as the owner; the government as planner, 
investor and development banker; the government as regulator; and the government as the 
Executive answerable to Parliament for the public enterprises. All these are reflected in a 
network o f formal and informal controls and institutional arrangements. Thus most of the 
control emanates from the government. An examination of the system of control is 
therefore important for an understanding of the nature of public enterprises and the mode 
of its operation. A knowledge of the consequence of control is essential for policy 
prescriptions on the organisation of the enterprises and the optimum allocation of 
decision-making powers between the government and the enterprise management. The 
problem concerning this relationship is too much interference by the government in the 
management of the public enterprises, impairing their efficiency.7 The cause of this 
problem is mostly the lack of clarity in the definition of the roles o f government. 
Corporate form envisages that the government, through the appropriate Minister, should 
exercise control over policy making only, and not interfere in the day to day management 
of public corporations. Of course, to draw a clear demarcation line between policy making 
and day-to-day management is very difficult.
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between the government and 
public corporations as well as with individual enterprises to have a better understanding of 
the actual workings of the public enterprises in Bangladesh. In doing so, an account of the 
institutional working out of contradictory pressures for, on the one hand, autonomy for the 
public enterprises and on the other hand, political control is discussed. The chapter will 
discuss the areas, instruments and structure of control; accountability of public
6. Thi* U discussed in greater detail in P.Fernandes. opt. cit. p.4.
7 Even in Britain the situation is not very different. For example, the Committee on Public Accounts referred to the 'present level
of departmental intervention in matters which are properly the responsibility of the industries .... leading to s blurring of
responsibilities and possible resentment.' See Seventh Report, Deportment of industry, Transport and Energy, The Monitoring 
and Control Activities o f Sponsor Departments of Nationalised Industries, 1983, p.xvii.
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corporations, co-ordination of public corporations, performance evaluation, etc. This will 
help us to conclude how far the corporation form has been successful in Bangladesh in 
making a balance between executive control and enterprise autonomy. In fact, a study of 
law remains by and large incomplete without a study unveiling its actual implementation 
and the effectiveness of law can only be judged from its implementation. Above all, the 
actual degree of control may not correspond to the formal legal framework established.8
The discussion in this chapter will be mostly limited only to executive control over 
the public enterprises in Bangladesh because of the fact that other forms of control like 
parliamentary control (as will be seen later in the chapter) would not be very effective in 
the case of Bangladesh.
4.2. Executive C o n tro l O ver Public E nterprises
Public enterprises have a close and continuous relationship with the government; 
therefore, it is quite natural that a substantial degree of informality will always be there. 
There is widespread feeling that government makes public enterprises carry out its wishes 
without public acceptance of responsibility through what has been called in England the 
"lunch table directives”.9 The Board of Directors of the Corporations are afraid of 
annoying their ministers because it may affect their personal career. Though the 
government-public enterprise relationship is quite intimate, yet necessary distance has to 
be maintained in those areas where autonomy has been granted to public enterprises. If the 
enterprises are not allowed to benefit from their autonomy, there would be no point in 
establishing them as autonomous corporations with high-powered boards and their own 
independent staff. Formal powers of the government are laid down in wide terms in the 
P.O 27 o f 1972 and in detail in rules made thereunder. But to what extent public
8 G Sorensen, and OJ.Sorensen (ed*.). Stale Enterprise: Development or Business as Usual. 1982, p.27.
9. First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries. 1967-68 (U.K). Ministerial Control of Nationalised 
Industries. 1968, p.20.
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enterprises are enjoying their autonomy and whether or not there is any balance between 
executive control and enterprise autonomy depends on the form, substance and application 
of executive control.
The term "control" has wide and various connotations. It may connote, "at the one 
end, the enunciation of general principles of policy and, at the other, supervision of the 
minutest aspects o f the running of an enterprise including the setting of targets as well as 
the supervision of the day-to-day operations of the enterprises to ensure that the targets set 
are achieved."10 In its latter connotation there is a danger of confusing between control 
and management. The constitutional theory of public corporations distinguishes control 
and management. Management is the carrying on the day-to-day operations of the 
enterprise within the parameters of legislative and administrative regulations. Control is 
used here to mean control of the enterprise by institutions extraneous to it. In order to 
maintain a distinction between control and management it is important that the regulations 
should be set out in broad terms and by general principles. Control should consist of 
policy formulation, target setting, evaluation of performance and the correction of 
erroneous methods.
The basic focus of this section is on the control purported to be exercised by the 
government.
4.2.1. T h e  Need fo r Executive C ontro l.
Since public corporations are deliberately set up as autonomous self-governing units, 
should they not be allowed to govern themselves and get on with the job? Is there any 
justification for government control over them?
10 Y.P.Ghai, Executive Control over Public 
p.183.
Enterprises in Airies' in O R.Reddy (ed.). Oc I Public Enterprise, 1983,
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The answer to the questions posed is yes, public corporations should be given 
autonomy to function without interference in the day to day affairs of the enterprises but 
within the control of the government. Government control is not only desirable but 
necessary. The danger of non-control has been seen in other developing countries. For 
example, Mihiyo11 mentions the formation of fictitious companies such as Mwanukwacha 
Company in the early seventies in Tanzania. Again, there was acquisition of obsolete 
equipment for enterprises knowingly and corruptly as was in the case of Talcoshiliin in 
1975, also in Tanzania.12 Apart from the aforesaid, the right of the government to control 
public enterprises arises from:13
a. the government is responsible for the management of the overall economy, 
hence it should posses the right to control both public and private sector;
b. government is the sole/majority share holder o f the public enterprises, hence as 
owner it has the right to control as a means of ensuring that the public investments are safe 
and productive and that the objectives for which the enterprises were set up are in fact 
achieved;
c. public enterprises are deliberately created as instruments to implement certain 
state policies and in the words of Professor Daintith14 policy instruments based on 
dominium rather than imperium are likely to be more effective;
d. public enterprises are repositories of vast social, economic and political power 
and must therefore be controlled by the government on behalf of the society and should be 
accountable for the ways in which power is used.
•2. /**.
13 For a more detail of argumenta for the necessity of executive control see P.Femandes. op. ci!.. 1986. pp.23-29.
14 T.Daintith, 'Legal Analysis of Economic Policy’. Journal o f Law and Society, vol.9. 1982, pp. 191-224.
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Thus, we notice that the demands of the management of the economy and the 
social purposes o f the public enterprises constitute the basis for executive control. There 
appears to be no diversity of views on the necessity of executive control over public 
corporations; the argument is over the degree o f control and the manner of its exercise. Let 
us first look at the instruments of control available to the government in Bangladesh.
The problem of executive control over public enterprises in Bangladesh is 
complicated by the fact that apart from formal legal channels and methods of controls 
there exist official and unofficial interference in the functioning of enterprises. Public 
enterprises management are overburdened with various interferences from different 
quarters. In fact, one chairman of a public corporation viewed official and external 
unofficial interference as the biggest management problem of public enterprises in 
Bangladesh.15 In spite of complains from the corporation officials, it is desirable that the 
government should undertake constant consultation with the enterprise management, so 
that its understanding of the workings of the enterprise improves and ensures proper 
monitoring, control, and evaluation. The dialogue should differ from a monologue from 
the side of the government or from a crisis probe.
4.2.2. In s tru m en ts  o f Executive C o n tro l O v er Public E n terp rises in B angladesh.
Article 11(2) of the P.O. 27 of 1972 says that "the Board shall be subject to the
superintendence and control of the Government.... " In Bangladesh executive control over
public corporations covers an extensive area and virtually no functional area or general 
management is free from it.16 In Bangladesh the following instruments of control are 
available to the executive:-
15. A.ICM.M.Hossain (Ihen Chairman BCIC). Problems of Managemenl in Public Enterprises'. CONCOPE Journal, vol.l. No.l. 
1983. p.7.
16. The following observation of H.R. Zayyad on Nigeria applies to Bangladesh, lie observed 'the Ministry usurps the powers of the 
board of directors; the latter tramples on the rights of managemenl The managemenl in its own turn centralise all powers 
themselves.* Nigerian Management Review, June 1986. p.156.
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1) A ppo in tm en t an d  Dismissal o f the B oard o f Directors.
One of the key instruments of executive control over public enterprises is the appointment 
and dismissal of the Board of Directors of the public corporations. The power of 
appointment and dismissal is important control, because firstly it enables the government 
to choose persons who subscribe to the objectives of the government as regards the public 
sector and who the government considers have the necessary skills and experience; 
secondly, it ensures the continued responsiveness of the board to the government policies, 
as well as the exercise of care in implementing them.
The sponsoring Ministry (in this study the Ministry of Industry) suggests the name 
of the Chairman of a corporation to the President. After Presidential approval 
appointments are not made by the sponsoring Ministry but by the Ministry of 
Establishment. Terms and conditions of all public enterprise officers are same and 
appointments are not made on contract, reflecting the market worth of an effective 
executive. Other Directors are appointed by the Ministry of Industry although they get 
their appointment letter from the Ministry of Establishment.
The P.O. 27 o f 1972 remained silent on standard procedure to be followed while 
appointing. Considering, however, that such important but unrestricted power may 
constitute an invitation to political interference or as has been expressed, in the abuse of 
appointment right itself, the P.O. 27 o f 1972 should have stipulated the minimum 
qualification to be possessed by members of the Board of Directors of the Public 
Corporations. Furthermore, fixed tenure of office for Board members should have been 
stipulated in the legislation. These would have provided a check on the arbitrary exercise 
of the right o f appointment by the government. The Nationalisation Order 1972, however, 
simply says that "the Chairman and other Directors shall be appointed by the Government 
for such period and on such terms and conditions as the Government may determine."17
17 Article 12(2) of the P.O. 27 o f1972. op. ci».
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The Ministry of Establishment on 16th January 1988 issued a Memorandum18 
which sought to lay down the conditions of service of the Chairman/Managing Directors 
and Members of the Board to be equally applicable to all public corporations. The 
Memorandum does not spell out the procedures for appointment but simply states that the 
Chairmen/Managing Directors and Members/Directors shall be considered from amongst 
a) senior executives of the Statutory or Autonomous bodies, b) in service civil and military 
officers, c) retired civil and military officers and d) people of competence from amongst 
the general public. The Memorandum is silent about who should recommend the name 
and on what basis and who the people to be consulted are, etc. But it was learnt from the 
officials that the respective Minister is consulted before the appointment of the Chairman 
by the President. The Minister, before recommending any name, consults the permanent 
secretary of the Ministry. In appointing the other board members the Minister generally 
consults the Chairman because top management is expected to work as a team and it is 
important for the chairman to know the other members of the Board. In some cases the 
Chairman of the corporation initiates the suggestion to the Ministry. Generally the 
Ministry suggests two or three names to the President but before any name is confirmed 
the President consults the Minister. The President sometimes appoints directly without 
consulting anyone. Once a name is recommended by the Minister to any post the President 
seldom objects because before recommending the Ministers informally agree with the 
President on the name.
It could not be learnt what criteria the government applies in appointing the 
chairman and the directors. It seems the Memorandum was mainly issued in order to 
standardise the conditions and privileges of the Board of Directors in different 
Corporations. By doing so it also legalised the appointment of military and civil 
bureaucrats in different managerial posts in Public Corporations. It may however, be 
mentioned that the Military government, even before this Memorandum, appointed a few 
military officers. On enquiry about the chairmen and other directors appointed since 1972
18 Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of Establishment. Memorandum So. Eslb (Rulcs-4)-Misc-6l87-3(200).
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in the three corporations under study, it was found that professionals serving for a long 
time in the corporations were mostly appointed in these corporations. In all other 
corporations the chairmen and directors were appointed mostly from civil service or from 
the armed forces (both retired and serving). It was alleged by 90% of the officers of 
different corporations interviewed that the officers from the armed forces seldom showed 
much understanding of the technical and commercial aspects of the operations of the 
corporations while civil servants, although having some skills and are closer to the overall 
policies of the Government, were not sufficiently oriented to the exigencies of the 
industrial and commercial world. The situation worsened because often chairmen and 
directors were transferred to another job or reverted back to army or civil service for 
reasons of administrative exigency. This created more problems than it solved because by 
the time the appointees get to learn the intricacies of the job they were replaced by one 
who would also take some time to leam and by the time he learns, he is transferred. The 
cycle in this way went on and on.
S.M. Al-Hussainy (now Chairman of the Public Service Commission) in a paper
presented in a seminar19 correctly wrote:
Government's right as the owner of the enterprises to appoint the 
members of the Board and its Chief Executive and keeping them on
their toes for likely removal at any time is understandable......But what
is not clear is the necessity to appoint people without sufficient 
education, skill and experience in the business of the enterprise.....
The appointment of the chairmen and members of enterprise board is the statutory 
power of the corporation. But all appointments are generally approved by the Minister not 
because this is a requirement of law but because the corporation board wants the firm 
backing of the Minister. In some cases the Minister directly appoints them. A few 
Members of Parliament from the ruling party are also appointed chairmen of the enterprise 
board.
id Fall of Public En lei
d  by BPÂTC [unpublished), on It
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minar on Public Enterprises in Bangladesh.
1 4 6
2) Directives:
Another major means of policy control envisaged in the P.O. 27 o f 1972 is the power of 
the Government to give directives to the Corporation Board of Directors in discharge of its 
functions. Article 11(2) says, "the Board shall be .... guided, in the discharge of its 
functions, by such general and special instruction, as may from time to time, be given to it 
by the government." Here the use of the word 'instruction' instead of 'directive' is worth 
noting. The general practice is that all directives are to be published in the official gazette 
and the government is accountable for them in parliament. By the deliberate use of the 
word 'instruction' the government is not required to make it public and hence can avoid 
the responsibility.20
As far as the constitutional theory of public corporation is concerned the directives 
should be of general nature on matters of policy involving public interests, but from 
the above article it is evident that the article conferred the power of giving specific 
instruction.
Theoretically speaking the system of control through directives has various 
advantages. In so far as the directives are confined to matters of general policy, they 
emphasise the division of responsibilities between the executive and the enterprise-policy 
versus management. Even when the directives relate to specific matters, they provide a 
clear method for the statement and communication of government policy. Directives 
increase the pressure for principled rather than ad hoc intervention. They help in the 
evaluation of the performance of the enterprise, because losses and inefficiencies resulting 
from the implementation of the directives cannot be ascribed to the enterprise. They can 
also be the basis of calculations of compensation to be paid by the government to the 
enterprise for pursuing non-commercial goals.
20 Gathered from interviewa with eome government officials.
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Despite these considerable theoretical advantages, little use is made of these 
formal directives. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the government is reluctant 
to accept responsibility for its actions. Second, there are alternative methods of control 
whereby the government can achieve the same objectives without perhaps the same degree 
of accountability.
In practice the power to issue instructions is used very sparingly, and 'general 
policy' is interpreted liberally. The government generally prefers to use advice, persuasion 
and informal pressure. A directive, somehow, is considered in the nature of'overruling' an 
enterprise, or the government imposing upon a recalcitrant unit, and is, therefore, avoided. 
It is, of course, desirable for the instructions to be written rather communicated by phone 
or any other method in order that the public and parliament may know where the 
responsibility lies for certain crucial decisions taken.
Less formal but quite a common instrument of control are circulars issued from 
time to time by different ministries. The circulars are meant to serve a variety of purposes. 
For example, they may communicate policy, co-ordinate and also provide advice. The 
number of executive orders that are issued by different ministries is enormous. Once an 
order is passed, it is circulated to all organisations "for information and necessary action" 
regardless of their relevance. However, depending upon the nature of their contents, the 
enterprises give them weight according to their own judgement and approach. Sometimes 
circulars passed by a ministry contradict circulars of other ministries and clarifications and 
reversals take up quite some time. There is usually no systems approach in promulgating 
rules, regulations or issuing executive orders to guide the corporate management. More 
often than not, they stem from reactions of the government to sporadic happenings, but 
however, well intentioned they may be to correct errors, set the order and bring about a 
uniformity of practice, a series of ad-hoc directives do not necessarily add up to a 
systematic whole.
14«
In Bangladesh, often unstructured interferences are made. Unstructured 
interferences are those interferences for which there is no formal provision in the 
instruments of government business applicable to public enterprises. They stem from 
either political preferences or personal interests and reasons of patronage. Top officials are 
often the source of such interventions. Enterprise managers generally collude, sometimes 
directly and sometimes passively, in the hope of favours or under fear of losing the job. In 
such system of wide scale unstructured interventions the managers take advantage of them 
for personal ends resulting in the development of a union of illegitimate interests between 
the managers and their masters.
3) Approvals.
Another instrument of control is through the mechanism of government approval, audit 
report and inspection. In Bangladesh certain decisions of the Board cannot be effected 
without the approval of the executive. Approval of the government is a must in most cases 
relating to the financial affairs of the enterprises. The Annual Budget Statement of the 
enterprises need approval21, investments also need approval; accounts are audited not only 
by an external auditor, but at times by the commercial audit office of the Auditor-General. 
The government has the right to extend the scope of audit including procedures of audit.
Though the budget of the enterprises is approved before the commencement of the 
financial year, the enterprise needs the permission of the government for procurement and 
expenditure beyond certain specified amounts. The borrowing of the enterprises requires 
ministerial approval. New investments, diversification and modernisation of the 
enterprises also require government approval. Bylaws made by the corporation in exercise 
of its power under article 17(3) of the P.O. 27 o f 1972 also require prior government
2>. See article 19 of the P.O. 27 o f ¡972.
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approval. The corporations are also entitled to make regulations in regard to their working 
and operations, which are subject to government approval.
The Nationalisation Order o f  1972 contains only few wide provisions regarding 
government control. But numerous matters of detail are contained in the rules made by the 
government from time to time. Indeed, the government enjoys authority over a large 
number of subjects through its rule making and regulation-approving powers.22
4.2.3. Areas of Control.
(a) Finance
The finances of the wholly government owned public enterprises in Bangladesh are 
derived from the following sources23, a) grants made by the government and local bodies, 
b) loans obtained from government, c) loans obtained from other sources with general and 
special sanction of the government, d) foreign aid and loans, e) sale proceeds of bonds, 
securities, debentures and similar instruments issued under authority from government, f) 
all fees, levies, charges and rates received by the enterprise, g) sale proceeds of excess raw 
materials, finished goods, disposal of assets etc., earning from services rendered and i) 
earnings from investment.
The most extensive and elaborate controls relate to finance. Financial controls 
provide the basis for other controls, e.g. the choice of technology, location of projects, 
investment policy etc. Management of finance forms the core of overall management since 
every decision in an enterprise is ultimately a financial decision. Financial controls have 
assumed great importance in view of the fact that enterprises frequently need financial 
injections even sometimes for their current operations, and many need inputs from abroad
22. The various rules and regulations are not available to the public. The fact that these are not always gazetted as such are treated as 
confidential. Even when these rules are gazetted from time to time, they are not of help because the dates of their publication are 
not easy to know and it is often difTicull to obtain the relevant gazettes.
23. Learnt from enterprise officials.
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which require the use of tightly controlled foreign exchange. Moreover, public enterprises 
do not have access to the commercial capital market. Enterprises turn to the government 
for their equity and borrowing. Industrial enterprises requiring special dispensation to 
overcome their liquidity crisis need the intervention of the sponsoring Ministry, Ministry 
of Finance, Bangladesh Bank (central bank of the country), the appropriate corporation 
and occasionally even the cabinet.
Foreign borrowing are also controlled by the government through the above 
mentioned agencies in addition to the External Resources Division of the Ministry of 
Finance. All agreements with foreign agencies are vetted by the Ministry of Law and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Bangladesh Bank if any bank guarantee is 
involved. Financial controls have also developed due to Parliament's traditional concern 
over the allocation of money from the treasury and over its expenditure. A further reason 
for their importance lies in the fact that it can be easily quantified and a control over 
money can be used to bring about other forms of control. As a result of the importance of 
financial controls the Ministry of Finance assumes a key role in the regulation of public 
enterprises.
The law requires that all public corporations to submit their annual budget to the 
government for approval. The budget to be approved by the government covers revenue 
expenditure because capital budget expenditures (except those covered through surplus in 
the current budget and so appropriated with the concurrence o f the government) are part of 
the ADP (Annual Development Plan). The enterprises are required to obtain permission of 
the Government, particularly of the sponsoring Ministry and Ministry of Finance in 
respect o f disposal of surplus.
The corporations prepare their budgets according to specifications laid down by 
the Ministry of Planning and submit them to their respective administrative Ministries. 
The Ministry after due consideration sends them to the Ministry of Finance. The relevant 
divisions of the Planning Commission hold detailed discussions with each corporation
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about their investment portfolio for inclusion in the ADP.24 In this task they are guided by 
the experience of the corporation in the previous year and its actual expenditure 
capabilities in the current year. The final programme for the corporation is then collated 
with similarly discussed budgets from other corporations and aggregated into the 
development budget for the public sector. These worked out projects are, however, liable 
to cuts even when the same is finalised in view of the availability of resources and claims 
of other sectors. Further cuts are again negotiated by the division with the corporation. 
These cuts could go all the way through to the end of the cabinet decision approving the 
budget. The Ministry of Finance then integrates them in the national budget which, after 
the approval by the cabinet, is presented to the Jatiyo Sangshad.
It has now become a practice that although a financial budget for each corporation 
and enterprises under them are prepared at the beginning of each financial year, following 
a long and cumbersome procedure, these budgets require revision from time to time due 
to many factors, like inflation rising beyond expectation, fluctuations of currency in 
international markets, or delay in aids/loans/grants in time etc. One researcher25 found that 
owing to unscientific capital expenditure planning and control the actual costs of almost 
all enterprises exceeded both the original and revised budget estimates from 1% to 
118%.26 It was found during research that the planners every year failed to estimate the 
working capital requirements resulting in the shortage and liquidity crisis.27 Therefore, 
enterprises take the exercise of presenting budget demands to the government lightly, on 
which intensive technical inputs ultimately proves wasteful.28
24 See Govern meet of Bangladesh. Ministry of Law and Justice. Public Corporations (Management Co-ordination) Ordinance, 
1986, Ordinance No.XLVIl of 1986.
25. M.Z. Hoque. Financial Planning and Control in Public Sector Industries ,n Bangladesh, unpublished Ph D thesis. Department 
of Finance. Univemity of Dhaka. 1981.
26. Ibid., p.213.
27 M.Z. Hoque found that financial management inefficiency is the most vital factor leading to the bad financial performance of 
public enterprises in Bangladesh. Ibtd., p.6.
28 One senior official of BSECwhile discussing this point with me commented. 'Though the annual budget works as a guide, it
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Moreover, the government annual budget is mainly 'resource-based' while the 
enterprise budget is 'need-based'. Above all, the finance ministry always feels constrained 
in funds and public enterprises need funds, even, sometimes, towards working capital and 
to improve the utilisation of capacity already set up. Therefore, public enterprises demand 
more funds in accordance with their needs. The finance ministry, on the other hand, finds 
it difficult to allocate them on grounds of scarcity of resources. The finance ministry in 
fact allocates money without knowing the needs of the individual enterprises under the 
Ministry of Industries. While allocating the money the finance ministry often cut the 
requirement of the Ministry of Industries in a mere arithmetic manner, i.e., a per centage 
cut in original demand, or allocates in an ad hoc manner. The chances of getting funds 
depend on the bargaining ability of the parent ministry with the finance ministry or the 
President's office. The allocations mostly depends on the mutual personal relationships 
amongst the parties involved. Thus, the budgetary process encourages ad hoc triangular 
bargaining among the corporation, the Ministry of Industries and the Ministry of Finance 
which ends up in the nature of a distribution of patronage. At the end, some enterprises 
feel abandoned in mid-stream.
The entire process of financing gets complicated by the system of annual lapsing 
of funds. Enterprises which do not utilise the allotments in a given financial year, even for 
cogent reasons and in the interest of economy of expenditure, tend to forfeit the allotment. 
This encourages them to draw the fund and use them up, even if spending them later on 
might be more economical.
Since, a cut of the demands made is expected, the enterprises follow the familiar 
trick of over-demanding, with the expectation that, after the inevitable per centage cut, 
enough funds may be received.
Thus, both economic logic and empirical review suggest that the present system of 
budgeting and financing are in need of fundamental change. The enterprises should be 
treated as investments; and the treasury should look for investment incomes in term of
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cash every year. Where reinvestment is needed, the government should, as far as possible, 
openly rank as a shareholder or as a lender.
(b) Investment
Investment is another important area of executive control over public enterprises. Control 
over public corporations is exercised through their development budget for financing 
investment. Investments and capital expenditures require executive approval and the 
process of investment approval is a very complex one.
The Planning Commission is the main government agency which allocates 
resources for the development activities of the public corporations, particularly the 
expansion of existing capacity in an enterprise, including balancing and modernization of 
equipment and/or setting up of new projects. Individual enterprises submit their BMRE 
(Balancing, Modernization, Reconstruction and Expansion) programmes to the 
corporations controlling them. The corporation prepares a consolidated proposal on behalf 
of the corporation and submits it to the sponsoring Ministry after due consideration of all 
the proposals o f the individual enterprises under it. The corporation determines the priority 
and take decisions about which enterprise under its control needs to be expanded or 
modernized or proposes to establish a new enterprise. The sponsoring Ministry in turn 
submits the proposal in the form of a working paper to the relevant technical division of 
the Planning Commission for inclusion in the ADP for the release of funds. The request 
for funds may have a domestic and a foreign resource component. Domestic resources are 
provided from the revenue surplus o f the government on current account or by borrowing 
from the nationalised banks. The foreign exchange component comes entirely from 
foreign aid or credits. This means that any project from the public sector included in the 
development budget either has to have foreign credit already available or to have it lined 
up during the financial year. Negotiations with foreign agencies are the responsibility of 
the Planning Commission.
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The feasibility of new investment projects, before inclusion in the budget, have to 
be evaluated and approved. Such projects are prepared according to a Project Evaluation 
Proforma (PEP) prepared by the Planning Commission, which takes account of the 
opportunity cost of such resources as foreign exchange, labour and other inputs. The 
technical division of the Planning Commission sifts the requests of all the corporations 
through mutual consultation with the corporations and tries to modify the projects list and 
works out a schedule of priorities in case there is shortage of funds. The evaluation of the 
project is submitted to an interministerial committee chaired by the member in charge of 
the relevant sector in the Planning Commission. Once the project is approved by the 
committee it is submitted to the National Economic Council (NEC), a sub-committee of 
the cabinet for final approval. The NECs approval is usually a matter of formality, but 
decisions take time due to delays in convening the NEC. The approval of the project itself 
is not a guarantee of funds but is a precondition for funding from the ADP.
The net result of this funding procedure is that the corporations have no control 
over the shape, size or phasing of their investment portfolio. They can only voice their 
intentions and have to wait for the eventual approval of the budget in the cabinet meeting 
finalising the ADP in June of each year to know whether their plans can go ahead or not. 
Even here the phasing would be uncertain since this depends on aid being lined up and the 
phasing of the aid proposals for the project.
The decision making process on investment is a long and dilatory one. There is a 
large element of uncertainty and the enterprises are unable to plan ahead; the enterprises 
themselves have little say over their future plans and investments; and although the legal 
formulation envisages merely approval by the executive, in practice, decisions are made 
by the executive and foisted on the enterprises, frequently against their better judgement. 
It was reported by the Secretary General of the Consultative Committee of Public 
Enterprises (CONCOPE)29 that the government, in principle, agreed that the public
29 CONCOPE is discussed later in (be chapter.
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enterprises should be allowed to invest directly part of their surplus in joint ventures or to 
invest in their modernisation.30
(c) Prices
One of the major factors determining profit or loss of any enterprise is the pricing of 
product and their marketing. The pricing problems of public enterprises are important 
because most of them are monopolies. The problem of pricing is aggravated because of 
the lack of clarity on the cost to which to relate a price, on the financial objectives, and on 
the adequate managerial incentives for improved performance.
In Bangladesh the price of product of public enterprises is often controlled by 
government thus causing loss at times. The government imposes one-sided control on the 
price of the end products while it has no control over the price of inputs which seriously 
hampers the economic profitability. The effort of the enterprises is directed primarily 
towards fulfilment of the production targets in order to show their performance but due 
emphasis is not generally given to marketing. In most cases the enterprises do not have the 
liberty to sell their products at their discretion, resulting in stock piling, with its dangerous 
consequences in some of the enterprises.31
Procurement prices of some of the agricultural products like jute and sugar cane, 
which are used as main raw materials for jute and sugar industries, are also fixed by the 
government.32 This fixing of prices o f raw materials by the government causes problem of 
procurement and ultimately affects productivity and profitability of the enterprises. For 
example, the price of jute in the open market was very low in 1983.33 As a result the
30 See 'Secretary General's Annual Report', published in the CONCOPE Journal, Post-Flood Issue. 30.10.1988, p.21. The decision
31.
32
33
for a detail of pricing of products of public enterprises see, S Jahan. ' Pricing and Subsidy in Public Enterprises', paper presented
at a seminar on PubTic Enterprises in Bangladesh (unpublished], organised oy BPATC from 16-17th March 1986.
Information derived from discussion with General Manager (Audit) BJMC.
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growers were in trouble. In order to bail out the farmers, the government instructed the 
nationalised jute mills to procure jute at a fixed price determined by government which 
was much higher than the market price. Again, the nationalised mills were obliged to buy 
certain quantities of jute which they did not require. The prices of sugar cane is Fixed 
below the market price so the sugar cane producers do not get an incentive to grow 
enough sugar cane for the mills. Moreover, the growers sell their sugar cane to private 
parties at a higher price.
Theoretically the government directly fixes the prices of only three essential 
goods, viz. fertilizers, sugar and newsprints. The prices of all other products are supposed 
to be determined by the enterprises in consultation with their respective corporations.34 
But practically, the government has a big say in determining the prices of all products of 
the public enterprises. Increase o f prices beyond 10% requires approval of the 
government.35 The administrative Ministry is constantly kept informed about changes in 
the prices of products.
The prices o f the products determined by the government is much lower than their 
production cost, not to speak of any profit. The prices of 80% products o f BCIC are fixed 
by the government.36 On many occasions, the government approval on price adjustment 
proposals was delayed and even refused.37 As a result, the price adjustment could not be 
made for many years, thus seriously affecting profit. Although the cost of production 
increased due to factors beyond the control of the corporation, such as devaluation of 
Taka, enhancement of wages and salaries, upward revision of gas and electricity prices 
and the impact of inflationary tendency on the overall economy.38 Price adjustments to
34. Ixarnt from Mr. Anwaruzzaman Choudhury. Joint-Secretary. Ministry of Industries. Government of Bangladesh.
35 See Ministry of Industries. New Industrial Policy. 1982.
36. M.A.Rashid, Industrial Development of Bangladesh: A Case study of BCIC. paper submitted to the BPATC in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for successful completion of the sixth Senior Staff Course held from the 17th October. 1987- the 21s<
January. 1988. p.30.
37 Ibid.
38 For example, the cost of production in the gas consuming enterprises increased byT k 162.50 million due to the enhancement of
C price by 20%. Moreover, the cost on account of imported pulp increased by Tk. 74.20 million due to higher price of pulp in international market and devaluation of taka in 1986-87. But the selling pnee of fertilizer, paper and newsprint could not be 
revised by the corporation in keeping with the rising cost of production. It may be mentioned in this connection that the selling 
price of newsprint was fixed at Tk. 14.000.00 per ton including subsidy from government in October 1982. Since then the cost of
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reflect changing circumstances are often delayed and fall short of what is needed to keep 
up with rising costs.
The government, of course, has the right to determine the prices lower than the 
cost price in the pursuit of social goals like consumer subsidies, control of inflation, and 
resource mobilisation. It is however important that when prices are so fixed, the 
enterprises should not be blamed for inefficiency or loss. Either the government should 
transfer a compensatory sum to the enterprise or the accounts of the enterprise, and other 
publicity, should make the cause of the loss clear.
However, in an ordinance in 1986, the government took the responsibility of 
reimbursing to a public corporation the financial loss incurred by it or by any of its 
enterprises "consequent upon the following by it or by such enterprises of any specific 
instructions given by the government on matters relating to the business or administration 
of such corporation or enterprises."39 But serious doubts have been raised by the officials 
of the corporations; after three years of the Ordinance no concrete step had been taken to 
reimburse the loss. Even in future if this provision of the Ordinance is implemented, it is 
unlikely that the government would promptly reimburse the amount. There is danger that 
by the time the corporations receive the money, its value shall have declined due to 
inflation while the corporations would carry on with the burden of paying the bank 
interests.
The above ordinance failed to ensure that executive control do not unduly restrict 
enterprise autonomy in determining its price structures while ensuring that the pricing 
policies of the enterprises do not represent an abuse of monopoly power, where the
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enterprise enjoys it. Most of the periodic interventions by the executive in fixing the prices 
turn to be ad hoc in nature and inconsistent among different enterprises and consumer 
groups.
(d) Personnel
In the area of personnel the control by the government is extensive. The corporation or 
enterprise management is not free to prepare and staff its own organisation structure. The 
corporations are required to submit an organisation chart with a staffing pattern through 
the administrative Ministry to the Staffing Pattern Committee of the Establishment 
Division. An inter-ministerial committee meets to decide on the acceptability of the 
proposed pattern. Commenting on personnel control in Bangladesh, Sobhan and Ahmad 
write:-
The approach of the bureaucratic machinery to staffing patterns is 
tradition bound, office oriented and static. It normally does not take 
adequate cognizance of the needs of a growing enterprise nor of the 
externalities of on-the-job training. The basic approach fails to 
appraise the rationale of the organizational structure, job 
specifications, specialisation and span of control. Instead it 
demonstrates an inherent desire to administer cuts for the sake of 
asserting the principle of control. This in itself takes time and 
constrains the enterprise from equipping itself to discharge its 
responsibilities effectively.40
Furthermore, the government retains the prerogative to stop recruitment either as a 
measure of economy or as an attempt to relocate surplus personnel. The government 
determines the wages, fringe benefits and incentive bonus for the public enterprises. One 
National Pay Scale has been introduced both in the civil service and in the industrial 
sector. This was done under the apparent policy of establishing parity with the civil 
service. But this brought down the financial benefits of the employees and managers o f  the 
public enterprises to what they used to enjoy before independence. So, there is little scope
R. Sobhan and M. Ahmad. Public Enterprises in 
p.298.
I Intermediate Regime: A Study in : Political Economy o f Bangladesh. 1980,
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to reward the managers and employees financially. Although the government had fixed the 
lowest level of pay for the industrial workers, this was far less than the minimum index of 
living. Unsatisfactory pay perhaps motivated the skilled workers, supervisors and 
managers to migrate to other countries, especially to the Middle East, in quest of better 
wages and salaries. Fresh recruitment of competent personnel to the managerial cadre was 
rendered difficult because o f the absence of attractive terms and conditions of services.
On the other hand, many ad hoc employees were thrust upon various public 
enterprises by government for political reasons. These employees were maintaining their 
jobs virtually without doing any work. Some of the enterprises have fictitious labour force 
and at the end of the month the salaries of those fictitious employees are withdrawn by 
various labour leaders in conjunction with the management. These sorts of gross 
corruption and financial irregularities are used to pacify the labour leaders in order to 
destroy a healthy trade union movement. The labour leaders sometimes have the blessings 
of the government and the local management of the concerned enterprise in some cases 
was helpless in eradicating these corruptions due to the direct and indirect blessings of the 
government. In short, a sound personnel management policy is not pursued in the country.
Following the recommendations of the Enam Committee, the government took the 
decision on 24.7.83 that, "the corporations shall liberally offer contracts with appropriate 
salary and attractive terms and conditions of service to qualified and able persons having 
requisite expertise, experience and qualification."41 But like many other government 
policies this has never been implemented and, given the dominance of bureaucracy in the 
Bangladeshi society, there is little hope that the bureaucracy will ever allow the employees 
of the public enterprises to get better salary levels than itself.
41. The decision* or Ihe government wee published in Bengledeeh Gezetlc Extreordinery deled 24.7.83.
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(e) P rocurem en t
Procurement by the public corporations is controlled by various government rules. The 
rationale for restricting the procurement by the corporations up to a certain limit is to 
check corruption and irregularities. Public enterprises are allowed to make purchases up to 
a certain limit. The limit is small for any enterprise. Beyond this prescribed limit, it has to 
be processed through the ministry for approval of the cabinet sub-committee. This 
limitation by the government in the name of checking corruption helped in the 
concentration of powers by the executive eroding autonomy of the enterprises. This has 
not only a negative impact on the operations of public enterprises but the constitutional 
requirement as to non-interference in the day-to-day operations of the enterprises is in 
effect violated. So far as corruption is concerned, the government has other means at its 
disposal for checking it. This limitation on the power o f procurement constitute an 
important area of executive control and is seen by many officers of corporations as a 
means of direct interference with the day to day operations of the enterprises. The 
bureaucracy does not seem to loose control of the channels o f corruption. It does not seem 
eager to stop corruption rather wants to have a due share in it.42
The Finance Division's office Memo No.MF/FD/ABW/S-1/124/85 describes the 
limit of financial powers delegated to the public enterprises for procurement, as shown in 
the following table:-
42 Derived from peraonal interview with many perions of vi
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TABLE-7
FINANCIAL POWER FOR PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
Name of agencies Limit of financial 
powers
A. Enterprises Upto Tk. 2 crores
B. Corporations
a) large sector corporations/Autonomous 
Bodies viz. BADC/BWDB/PDB/BJMC/BTMC/ 
BPC/BCIC/BSEC//BSFIC/BOGMC Upto Tk. 5 crores
b) Other Corporations/Autonomous Bodies 
and Executing Agencies upto Tk. 2.5 crores
C. Ministers upto Tk. 15 crores
D. Cabinet Committee on government 
purchase Above Tk. 15 crore
Source: BSEC: Administrative and Financial Authority,
1988, p.25. Based on Government of Bangladesh, 
Finance Division’s Memo No. MF/FD/ABW/S-1/124/85 
dated 6.7.85.
The procurement procedure is no simpler than the investment procedure as 
discussed earlier. Let me first describe the procurement procedure in Bangladesh.
i. Procurement Procedure
Foreign procurement of materials is based on the Annual Import Policy published by the 
Ministry of Commerce and is divided into two shipping periods: July to December and 
January to June. 50% of the foreign exchange quota is available in each shipping period.
Procurement procedure of the corporation is laid down in the Manual of Purchase. 
The following procedure is followed in making purchases of materials from abroad.
Stores Purchase Requisition (SPR) is the basis of all procurements. The SPR 
indicates budgetary sanction and contains all basic important information regarding 
materials to be procured. On receipt of the SPR, Purchase Division of BSEC initiates 
procurement action in the following manner: if the purchase falls in the category of non- 
proprietary types and their estimated value is above Tk. 100,000, the item is advertised
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through at least two widely circulated dailies (one Bengali and one English). If the goods 
are of proprietary nature, quotations are invited directly from manufacturers or their 
authorised agents irrespective of value.
Tender documents form the basis o f  evaluation and selection o f any offer. Tenders 
must be accompanied by earnest money equivalent to 1% of the total quoted value subject 
to a maximum of Tk. 500,000 and minimum of Tk. 1 thousand. All purchases except cash 
purchase have to be processed through a Tender Committee. For purchases above Tk. 5 
million Tender Committee composes of:
1. Secretary, BSEC
2. Chief Finance Officer
3. Controller of Accounts
4. Head of concerned Division
5. Head of concerned enterprise
6. General Manager (Purchase)
: Chairman 
: Member 
: Member 
: Member 
: Member 
: Member Secretary
The finance Division of the Corporation is entrusted with the responsibility of 
arranging foreign exchange allocation from the government for financing all imports 
whether made by the corporation or by an enterprise.
As soon as the purchase order is placed with the supplier, BSEC processes 
application for import licence to be issued by the Controller of Imports and Exports 
(CI&E). Letter of Credit (LC) is opened in the nominated commercial bank in favour of 
the supplier.
Foreign procurement is mostly done against Credit/Grant/Barter/Trade Agreements 
with foreign countries or agencies etc., having their own rules. The purchase is made by 
the Purchase Division of BSEC in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
respective protocols. The involvement o f the government and the specific rules contained 
in Credit/Grant/Barter/Trade Agreements make the procurement procedure highly
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complicated and lengthy often resulting in the failure of contracts, shipment, 
nonavailability of required type of raw material at needed times and in most cases 
materials are procured at high prices due to tied nature of sources.
Two specific case/of foreign procurement of raw materials during financial year 
1986-87 made by the BSEC for Chittagong Steel Mills Ltd. (CSM) are described below as 
examples to show the complexity of the procedure. The two cases i) procurement made by 
BSEC requiring the approval of the Ministry of Industries (sponsoring Ministry) and ii) 
procurement made by BSEC clearly illustrates the extent o f government controls over 
public enterprises. The cases will show that public corporations ought to be given 
meaningful practical autonomy and not the autonomy in theory.
U. T w o cases o f foreign p ro c u re m e n t
a . A C ase o f  P rocurem en t th ro u g h  th e  M inistry
The first case deals with import of (i) 10,000 MT (metric ton) of Heavy Melting Steel 
Scrap No.l and (ii) 10,000 MT Bundle Steel Scrap No.2 for CSM. As the cost of the 
purchase was more than Tk. 5 crores (10 million = 1 crore) it was beyond the financial 
limit o f BSEC therefore, had to be sent to the Ministry of Industries for approval.
Since the inception o f CSM, almost all its steel scrap requirement has been met by 
importing against international tender. During the initial years, out of the total requirement 
of about 70,000 MT, only 5-6 thousand MT of steel could be procured locally per year and 
the rest was imported. From 1981-82 ship breaking industries started growing up in the 
country creating an alternative source of scrap for the CSM. Government also directed 
Bangladesh Railway to supply all its scrap to the CSM. It was felt that these sources could 
sufficiently meet the needs of CSM. Therefore, the government banned import of scrap in 
1982. Since then the CSM had been using locally procured steel scrap. From 1984-85 the 
situation began to change; many re-rolling mills were set up and started using steel scraps
3<» The information, in the two cue studies, is derived from relevael Hies of the BSEC. made accessible during Held work conducted 
in connection with the present thesis.
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as raw materials. With increased demand for scrap, its price also went up and the ship 
breakers found it more profitable to supply the scraps to the re-rolling mills. On the other 
hand supply of scraps from Bangladesh Railway continued to decline.
In order to meet the situation, the CSM made a detailed proposal to the BSEC on 
11.9.85 for import of 10,000 MT of heavy melting steel No. 1 and 10,000 MT of bundle 
steel scrap No.2 during 1986-87. The BSEC in turn sent the proposal to the Ministry of 
Industries (MOI) on 16.10.85. On 3.11.85 the MOI asked the BSEC to furnish the 
following information: i. price of scrap procured from local sources and ii. estimated price 
of imported scrap, if import is allowed. After getting the information from the CSM, 
BSEC supplied the detailed information as asked by the MOI on 1.4.86.
On 27.8.86 a meeting was held in the MOI with the representatives of the BSEC 
and Ship Breakers Association (SBA) where it was decided that the SBA be allowed to 
take part in the international tender and they would enjoy 15% price benefit as usual.
After a series of correspondence between MOI and BSEC, the MOI approved in 
principle the import proposal after nearly a year. On 13.10.86 the MOI advised the BSEC 
for obtaining Right to Refusal (ROR)43 from the MOI.
International tender notice appeared in the national dailies on 23.10.86. In response 
to the tender notice, 14 and 11 quotations were received for the two items respectively. 
The SBA did not participate in the tender, but made a representation that they were willing 
to supply scrap at the rate of Tk. 5500 per MT against import price @ TK. 6000 per MT. 
On 21.2.87 the BSEC wrote to the MOI objecting the representation and stated that the 
lowest bidder offered to supply @ US $ 103 i.e Tk. 3130.44 per MT.
Three bidders, namely, Trade Venture, Meghna Enterprises and Jamal & Brothers 
claimed themselves to be the lowest bidders. All these three parties managed to get
its with the foreign suppliers. This system hi
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recommendations in their favour either from the Deputy Prime Minister (who was in 
charge of MOI) or the State Minister for Industries.
Two meetings of the Tender Committee of the BSEC were held on 14.12.86 and
19.1.87 respectively to consider the tenders. The recommendations of the Tender 
Committee were placed before the Board of Directors. The Board at its meeting held on
31.1.87 accepted the offer of M/S. Trade Venture, being the lowest bidder, for supply of
10.000 MT (+ - 10%) HMS scrap No.l @ US$ 112.22 per MT and also the offer made by 
Meghna Enterprise, being the lowest bidder, for supply of 10,000 MT (+ - 10%) HMS 
scrap No.2 @ US$ 95.90 per MT. Since the estimated values of steel scraps was US$
2.289.320.00 (Tk.70,723,047.00), the Board recommended sending the proposal to the 
MOI for approval. On 5.2.87 BSEC sent the proposal along with the following papers to 
the MOI:
a. Minutes o f the meetings of the Tender Committee,
b. Resolution of the meeting of the Board of Directors,
c. Filled in proforma prescribed by the MOI,
d. Tender documents.
The CSM, in the meantime, sent reminders on several occasions stating the 
alarming situation of the stock of raw materials (steel scraps) it had.
On 8.2.87, BSEC requested Trade Venture and Meghna Enterprise for extension of 
their Bank Guarantee of earnest money and the validity of their offer up to 15.3.87. 
Accordingly these two firms extended their validity of offer and Bank Guarantee. Finally, 
the tenders received approval from the MOI on 12.3.87.
It is curious to note that even after the approval of the tenders by MOI, it requested 
the BSEC for submission of necessary papers/documents for issuance of ROR on 15.3.87. 
It is to be recalled that the BSEC had already done so on 1.11.86 and on 23.11.86 once 
again sent a reminder to the MOI. On receipt of the letter from the MOI, BSEC with
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surprise on 20.3.87 wrote explaining the position to the Ministry that the procurement 
proposal and the tenders had already been approved. Order was issued in favour of M/S 
Metalink Marine Corporation, USA (Principal of M/S Meghna Enterprise) for supply by 
May, 1987. Trade Venture did not submit performance guarantee and as such instead of 
issuing supply order to it BSEC initiated the process o f procurement under STA/Barter.
b. A  case o f  P ro cu rem en t d irec tly  by the C orp o ra tio n
This case describes import of 3,500 MT (+ -10%) Cold Rolled Steel Strips (CRSS) under 
Barter/STA for CSM during Financial year 1986-87. On 11.4.87 BSEC invited tenders 
from 11 agencies for supply of the above quantity of CRSS for CSM since these 11 
agencies were registered agencies to supply the specific item under Barter/STA In 
response to the tender invitation, 3 tenders were received, from M/S Bangladesh Export 
Import Co. Ltd. (BEXIMCO), M/S Transcom Ltd. and M/S Inter-Trading Ltd.
The tender Committee in its meeting held on 20.4.87 decided that BEXIMCO, the 
lowest bidder, would furnish the name of the country of origin of supply and the last date 
of shipment. Keeping in view of the increasing trend of price of CRSS in the international 
market and also taking into account the stock position of CSM, it was also decided that 
additional 3,700 MT of the same item might be procured from Transcom, the second 
lowest bidder. The Tender Committee also decided that Transcom would be asked to say 
whether it was willing to supply at the lowest price quoted by BEXIMCO along with the 
country of origin and last date of shipment.
Tender Committee again met on 21.4.87 and the committee was informed that 
BEXIMCO mentioned that Belgium would be the country of origin of its supply and also 
indicated that shipment would be possible by August 1987. Transcom informed that it 
could not contact its principal due to Easter holidays and requested the extension of its 
offer up to 22.4.87. The meeting recommended to accept the tender of BEXIMCO and
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decided that the last date of acceptance o f offer would be 27.4.87. The Tender Committee 
also agreed to extend the validity of offer up to 22.4.87 as requested by Transcom.
On 22.4.87 the recommendations of the Tender Committee were placed before the 
Board of Directors meeting and the Board accepted the recommendations. On the same 
day Transcom replied to BSEC to the effect that it was ready to supply at the price quoted 
by BEX1MCO, Belgium would be the country of origin for supply and August 1987 
would be the last date of shipment. On 26.4.87 Transcom in supersession of its previous 
letter informed BSEC that the country of origin for supply would be South Korea in lieu of 
Belgium.
On 28.4.87 the recommendation of the Tender Committee for accepting the offer 
of Transcom was placed before the members of the Board of Directors through 
circulation. Instead of considering the case the members decided to hold an emergency 
meeting. Instead of holding an emergency meeting of the Board, on 6.5.87 the 
recommendations were again placed before the members of the Board of Directors 
through circulation and it was approved.
On 20.5.87 a meeting was held in BSEC to consider certain amendments of terms 
and conditions of the tender submitted by BEX1MCO. The amendments as proposed were 
(a) acceptance of charter party bill with the condition of liner delivery and (b) acceptance 
of the thickness o f 0.70 mm instead of 2.50 mm of the inner tube sheet of coil. These were 
approved and a proposal of BEXIMCO for supply o f additional quantity of 300 MT CRSS 
was approved as well.
Another meeting was held in BSEC on 29.6.87 to consider the request of 
Transcom for extension of last date o f shipment up to October, 1987 and it was approved. 
On 30.8.87 Transcom wrote to request for some modification of CRSS was approved on 
2.9.87.
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In a telex message dated 29.9.87 Transcom informed BSEC that the shipment of 
2999.08 MT out o f 3700 MT had already been done and requested extension of period of 
shipment for the remaining part up to 31.10.87. The Corporation approved the extension.
From the analysis of the two cases described one can see that in the case of the 
procurement involving permission of the Ministry it took about one and half years to take 
a decision on procurement of the raw materials (during this time on several occasions 
CSM informed about the alarming situation of stock); while the procurement by the 
corporation took only 4 months time. If the enterprise i.e CSM was allowed to procure 
directly probably it would have been much earlier.
Secondly, with the present delegated financial power to corporation i.e Tk.50 
millions, it was learnt from the officials of CSM that it is possible for BSEC to import 
2300 MT BP sheet which can cater the needs of CSM for 15 days only. Likewise a 
quantity of about 8,000 MT steel scrap/pig iron can be imported with the same amount of 
money. But the monthly requirement of BP sheet is 4,500 MT and that of pig iron and 
steel scrap is 8,000 MT each. In consideration of the monthly needs of the CSM I was told 
that 10,000 MT is economic. But the value of import of this quantity would go beyond the 
financial power of BSEC.
Thirdly, the time lag involved in the first case may be attributed to the delay in 
decision making process caused by lengthy and cumbersome procurement procedure.
Fourthly, the work of the MOI seemed to be ill co-ordinated and too bureaucratic. 
This is evident from the fact that on 13.10.86 MOI advised BSEC for obtaining ROR 
which the BSEC did on 1.11.86 and BSEC issued a reminder on 23.11.86 about the 
issuance of ROR. But it was noticed that even after the approval of the procurement 
proposal by MOI on 11.10.86 and approval of tenders on 12.3.87, MOI on 15.3.87 asks for 
submission of necessary papers/documents for issuance of ROR.
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Fifthly, external pressure made procurement slow. As we find in case no.l that 
Chittagong Steel Mills (CSM) was very concerned with pressure of the private suppliers 
mostly from the SBA (Ship Breakers Association). This is another example of the 
correctness of my hypothesis made in chapter 1 that public enterprises in Bangladesh were 
used by the state to create a class of indigenous bourgeoisie. CSM expressed concern to 
BSEC in its letter dated 28.5.86, "we request to protect CSM from the far-reaching 
collusive activities of SBA..." We also noticed that three bidders got recommendations 
from the DPM and State Minister for Industries and thereby tried to influence BSEC.
Sixthly, we have noticed that the corporation did not explain why instead of calling 
a fresh tender the second lowest bidder was given the contract to supply 3,700 MT and 
what was the compulsion to agree to the proposals of the two bidders to change the 
specifications. It may be a possibility that had the changed specification been announced 
and a fresh tender called more bidders could have participated even with lower price.
Thus we see that procurement of materials in public enterprises suffers from many 
ills and bad tradition like lack of proper coordination between procurement and production 
departments, untimely requisition, inadequate check and inspection and biased attitude. It 
was alleged by officials and trade union leaders that the procurement of spares and 
accessories is made more or less from a selected few businessmen. Sometimes poor 
quality raw materials rather than those specified are purchased and the public enterprises 
are compelled by the government to accept them.44 It is to be borne in mind that cost of 
raw materials constitutes a major cost component and the malpractices in procurement 
adversely affect the performance of public enterprises for which they are blamed for no 
fault of theirs.
44 82% of (he official* and trad* union leaders, out of 77 interviewed, expressed the ssme opinion.
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4.3. A ccountability  o f  Public E nterprises in Bangladesh.
In addition to maintaining control over the public enterprises during a financial year the 
government monitors the performance and conduct of public enterprises periodically 
(generally after a financial year) against pre-determined norms and targets. Article 22(2) 
says, "a corporation shall, as soon as possible after the end of every financial year, furnish
to the government a statement of accounts audited by the auditors.... together with an
annual report on the conduct of its affairs for that year." This a posteriori control can be 
termed as accountability45 which means the public enterprises are responsible to explain 
their conduct/performance.46
We can therefore state that accountability exists when there is some form of a 
principal-agent contract.47 In case of public enterprises in Bangladesh the target mutually 
agreed by the government and the corporation serve as the said contract. We can similarly 
identify the form that accountability must take when we have established the terms (i.e. 
the actions required) of the contract.
P.O. 27 o f 1972 emphasises the role of audit as the primary method of evaluation. 
Public enterprises are required to keep proper accounts and other relevant records and 
prepare annual statement of accounts, including profit and loss account and balance 
sheet.48 The prepared accounts are audited by at least two Chartered Accountants within 
the meaning of the Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance X  o f 1961)
45. "The term accountability means the onua. requirement, or responsibility to provide an 
financial account) or reckoning of the actions for which one is held responsible.* R.Gray, 
Social Reporting, Accounting and Accountability, 1987, p.2.
46. M.Ahmad. Law. Organisational Framework and Management Infrastructure of Public Enterprises' in M.Ahmad, Stale and
Development: Essays on Public Enterprise, 1987, p.48.
47 The practical meaning can be more dearly illustrated by talking in terms of prindpals' and agents'. The terms prindpal’ and 
agent are used in their common law of contract sense, to mean one party (the agent) acting on behalf of some other party (the 
principal). There exists, between the principal and agent, a contract which determines the rights and duties of the parties. The 
contract need be neither written nor explidt. Under the contract (possibly implidl). the principal typically gives instructions to 
the agent on what adions are expected of him. gives some consideration (typically remuneration) and some power over resources 
with which to fulfil these actions. In so doing the prindpal places two responsibilities upon the agent: responsibility for adion, 
responsibility to account for those actions, ¡.e. accountability. For more detail of the theme see R.H. Gray, 'Accountability, 
Finandal Reporting not-for-profit Organisations', in The British Accounting Review, vol. IS. No. 1. pp.3-23.
48 Artide 21. (1) of P.O. 27 o f1972.
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appointed by the government.49 The auditors in their report upon the annual balance sheet 
and accounts are required to state "whether in their opinion the balance sheet is a full and 
fair balance sheet and contains all necessary particulars and is properly drawn up so as to 
exhibit a true and correct view of the state of affairs of a corporation and in case they have 
called for any explanation or information from the Board, whether it has been given and 
whether it is satisfactory."50 The government also retained the right to enlarge or extend 
the scope of audit including procedures of audit.51 The audited accounts are then 
submitted to the administrative Ministry and are published in the official gazette.52 The 
reports are then submitted to Parliament.53
In all cases the Government Commercial Audit is undertaken after the periodical 
internal audit by the Corporation auditors and statutory annual audit in accordance with 
Article 21.(2) are completed. Thus the Government Commercial Audit can be regarded as 
nothing but post-mortem review and analysis of the accounts and performance of the 
enterprises.
Apart from the Government Commercial Audit, the Auditor General has 
constitutional responsibility for ensuring that public funds are properly spent and 
managed. However, he has certain limitations as institution of evaluation. He cannot go 
sufficiently into the merits of any policy objectives or decisions of the enterprise.
The system of accountability through audit is more concerned with probity and the 
correct compliance with procedures, rather than with efficiency with which an enterprise 
had carried out its functions. Moreover, a careful review of the accounting and financial 
practices relating to public enterprises reveals that the costs, on the basis of which the net 
revenue figure is calculated, are not economic costs, and that the real net revenues are,
49 Article 21. (2) of P.O.27 o f1972.
50. Article 22. (3) of P.O.27 o f1072.
51. Article 22. (4) of P.O. 27 o f1072.
52 Article 22. (4) of P.O. 27 o f1072.
53 Article 22. (5) of P.O. 27 o f1072.
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therefore, lower than even the low recorded figures. Thus resulting in unnoticed losses 
sustained by the economy through the undervaluation of resources used by public 
enterprises.54 The basic criterion for evaluation is financial measured in terms of money. 
The accounts and reports mostly fail to provide much information which could enable one 
to make an assessment of the performance of the enterprise and its contribution to national 
economic and social development. This is because it is based on the traditional company 
audit. The public enterprises need the vision of social audit. For example, energy used for 
a unit of output or wastage per unit of output is better indicated in social accounting than 
in financial terms, free from the changing price levels of product, energy and materials. It 
may be mentioned here that even now a days the private companies are more and more 
adopting social auditing to evaluate their performances.55
4.4. P erfo rm an ce  E valuation
Performance evaluation is an attempt to establish how far an enterprise has achieved what 
it intended to achieve. The need for proper evaluation is increasingly felt because of the 
complicated nature of functions public enterprises perform. They have both commercial 
and extra commercial objectives. Thus only profit and loss based evaluation is not 
sufficient for them. Moreover, simple profit and loss account would give a very distorted 
picture of the situation since public enterprises are characterised by many price distortions. 
Indeed, the implications of the 'public' characteristic of the enterprises are not addressed 
by the evaluation processes designed so far. Therefore, the problem of evaluating the way 
in which the public and enterprise characteristics are synthesized is mostly left untouched.
In Bangladesh to help constant review of performance of the enterprises the 
corporations were required to submit their monthly MIS report to many government
54. The dci revenue is the difference between revenues and costs as recorded in the accounts.
55. For a detail of social auditing and the practices in private companies of UK, USA and France see Gray, Owen and Keith, op.cil.
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agencies.56 This adds up to a tremendous workload of reporting. The MIS Division of 
BSFIC, for example used to issue 19 regular reports, and many ad hoc reports. Most of 
these reports contained duplicate data which was already available e.g. in the standard 
monthly MIS report. There was no standardisation or co-ordination. Any government 
agency could call for any data at any time, and the public corporations had to meet the 
demand, whatever the cost. Bennet in his article mentions in detail the archaic condition of 
affairs. He writes, "despite this volume of data, government agencies never seem to have 
the information they need."57 Thus, it seems there is clear influx of aimless routine 
information into government offices, which helps neither evaluation nor control in a 
logical manner.
In order to solve the problem, the Ministry of Finance, in association with the 
Ministry of Industries, since 1984 has worked out a project for development of 
management information system (MIS) and performance evaluation of public enterprises. 
The project is designed to implement a system to provide government agencies with 
information which is regularly required for (i) budgetary and financial control, (ii) 
financial, economic planning and policy making and (iii) performance evaluation.
Since then, a system called SABRE (System for Autonomous Bodies Reporting 
and Evaluation) involving computerised database in the Monitoring Cell collects regular 
information on standard input forms and the computer then generates standard (output 
forms) reports for distribution at regular intervals to major users, such as President's 
Secretariat, Finance Division and External Resources Division of the Ministry of Finance, 
Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Industries, Ministry of
57 A.H.M. Bennet. ‘ Performance évaluation and Monitoring of Public linlerpriKs' in the CONCOPE Journal, vol.4, No.2,1986,
p it-
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Commerce, Bangladesh Bank, Ministry of Labour and Manpower Development. The data 
base is accessible to major users through terminals in their offices. The system 
considerably helped in minimizing the amount of duplication in reporting.
One of the main objectives of the project is to set up a workable system of 
performance evaluation which is based on criteria agreed in advance by each corporation 
and the government. Each enterprise under a corporation submits its MIS report to the 
Corporation. A monthly co-ordination meeting is held between the representatives of the 
enterprises and the Corporation. In the meeting performance of each individual unit is 
reviewed and discussion regarding all difficulties, shortcomings and bottle-necks are held 
and remedial actions are suggested. Results of actions taken again is reviewed in the next 
co-ordination meeting.58
System of performance evaluation is directly linked with the system of 
accountability. Since public enterprises have been established by the state involving public 
funds it is necessary that government should constantly monitor their performance in order 
to ensure judicious, efficient and economic use of public money. Government is also 
expected to ensure that such public enterprises, by operating at their attainable capacity 
and achieving their respective objectives discharge their social responsibilities and thus 
help achievement o f overall socio-economic goal of the nation.
The performance of public enterprises can only be judged by a set of criteria for 
evaluation o f performance and in Bangladesh the criteria of evaluation have nowhere been 
laid down. Traditional profit and loss account was kept and used as the determinants o f the 
performance of the public enterprises. The assumption behind commercial audit is that 
since public enterprises in the field of industries operate like the private enterprises 
therefore they should keep accounts in the same way as the private enterprises. An 
enterprise earns revenues and it incurs costs in earning revenues. The difference is either
58. For detail of the system see M.Moniruzzamin. 'Accountability of Public Enterprises in Bangladesh’, Management and 
Development, vol.17, No.3. 1983. pp.107-127.
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net profit or loss. Moreover, profit and loss account is well understood document whose 
variables can be easily quantified in terms of money. But it gives rise to confusion 
between the government and the corporations because traditional profit and loss account 
does not take into account the loss suffered while performing extra enterprise duties or the 
loss due to the fixation of lower prices by the government. Moreover, why should public 
enterprises use the same tools and criteria since they are set up for different purposes from 
private enterprise?
There are certain limitations in the use of profitability solely to measure the 
performance of public enterprises. The limitations are i) public enterprises have non­
commercial objectives and it is very difficult to quantify them in terms of money, ii) 
profitability o f an enterprise as shown by the profit and loss account is often different from 
its true economic profitability, iii) multi-period effects of action are not same in every 
year, iv) accounts are kept in terms of Taka, and the Taka is losing value as inflation 
continues year by year, hence can give a very misleading picture, for instance an 
enterprise which appears to have made a profit may have made a real loss and v) there are 
also factors beyond the control of the corporation.
In 1986 the government promulgated the Public Corporations (Management Co­
ordination) Ordinance 198659. Section 9 of the above ordinance speaks about performance 
evaluation in the following words:-
9. Performance evaluation.-(l) Every public corporation shall prepare 
an annual performance report in respect of itself and its enterprises and 
submit it to the Ministry or Division which has administrative control 
over it within such time as may be specified by the Council.
(2) The Ministry or Division to which the report has been 
submitted shall forward it to the Ministry or Division dealing with 
finance, together with its comments thereon, within one month of its 
receipt and that Ministry or Division, in its turn, shall forward the 
report to the Council, together with its comments thereon, within 
similar time.
S9. Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of Law and Justice, The Public Corporations (Management Co-ordination) Ordinance, 
1986, Ordinance No. XLV11 o f1986.
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(3) An annual performance report to be submitted under sub­
section (1) shall be accompanied by an audited statement of the 
accounts of the public corporation and its enterprises.
(4) The Council shall determine the method for its evaluation of 
performance of public corporations and their enterprises and shall use 
the annual performance reports submitted under sub-section (1) as the 
basic document for such evaluation.
(5) The Council shall complete the evaluation of performance of 
a public corporation and its enterprises within three months from the 
date of receipt by it of the annual performance report of the 
corporation under subsection (1) and shall submit a report, containing 
the results of such evaluation, to the President and send a copy thereof, 
together with its recommendations, if any, to the Ministry or Division 
which has administrative control over the corporation.
(6) The Ministry or Division receiving the copy of a report under 
sub-section (5) shall take, as expeditiously as possible, all measures 
necessary for implementation of the recommendations, if any, of the 
Council.
Thus, from the section it is evident that the Government realised the need to switch 
over from the traditional profit and loss accounting system to an alternative system. The 
section does not talk about any criteria to evaluate the performance instead it allows the 
corporation to work out its own system of evaluation and report to the administrative 
Ministry. The section merely determines the procedure to deal with the performance 
evaluation report sent by public corporations.
The above mentioned Ordinance says, "A corporation shall prepare management
objectives for itself and its enterprises...... and shall submit the same to the Ministry or
Division which has administrative control over it..."60 on the basis of "general guide-lines 
for preparation of management objectives"61 prepared by the Council for Public 
Corporations. The guide-lines are prepared "at least six months prior to the 
commencement of every financial year."62
During the planning/budgeting process, each enterprise management meets with 
the corporation Head Office, and agrees what its objectives should be in the next year,
60 Section 7 (2). The Public Corporation (Management Co-ordination) Ordinance, 1986, op. cit.
6I. Section H 1). ibid.
62 Ibid.
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how each objective should be measured, what percentage weight should be given to it, and 
what should rate as poor, fair, good, very good and excellent performance with regard to 
each objective. Any number of objectives can be listed, provided their measurement, 
weightage and scaling can be agreed. It does not matter that some objectives may be 
associated, e.g. profit and production, since this can be allowed for in choosing weights. 
Weight must add to 100%. The scaling is negotiated having regard to past performance, 
and expected future conditions and constraints. The Corporation then consolidates all its 
enterprises and submits the consolidated report to the administrative Ministry. Every 
public corporation, at least three months prior to the commencement of a financial year, 
prepares a statement indicating the production target, profit and performance criteria to its 
administrative Ministry.63 Once the corporation submits its management objectives to the 
administrative Ministry the Ministry examines them. It has a right to make 
modifications.64 The Ministry in its turn forwards it with its comments to the Council for 
Public Corporations for approval. After the approval with or without modifications it is 
sent back to the Ministry and Corporations. The Council after co-ordinating the 
management objectives of the different public corporations and making necessary 
modifications, gives its approval to them and informs the respective public corporations 
and their administrative Ministries or Divisions as the case may be, at least one month 
before the commencement of the financial year.65
The corporations agreed in principle to use Performance Index Method to evaluate 
their performance. The essence of the system is that the corporation should prepare a list 
of all objectives for a year itself. Once the list of objectives is prepared then the 
corporations weight the importance of each objectives and put an index value to each of 
the objectives to determine the grading of performance. The performance criteria are
63 Section 8(1). iW .
64 Section 7( J). ibid.
65 Section 7(4), ibid.
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finally set out on a Performance Evaluation Grid as will be illustrated in the example 
provided later.
The main features of the performance index method are agreement by the 
enterprise and its evaluating authorities before the start of the period. During the year 
actual performance is measured and combined into an index in the same way, and reported 
to both enterprise management and the supervisory authorities. If corrective action appears 
to be necessary, such action is then taken. However, theoretically the benefit of the 
method is that clear objectives will make day to day interference in the enterprise 
management unnecessary. Any unwise interference can be used to escape responsibility. 
The management is offered an additional incentive to improve performance by giving 
them a bonus based upon the actual achievement.
Although the performance index system has been accepted in principle but due to 
practical problems like deciding the precise weight an enterprise wants to put on a specific 
item and then get it agreed both by the corporation and the government. Moreover, 
different enterprises of the same corporation put different weight on the same item which 
would not allow the corporation to judge the comparative performance of different 
enterprises if each of them are judged by different parameters. But from the theoretical 
point of view it is definitely a right step considering the fact that the government realised 
the need to change the present defective system of performance evaluation based on profit 
and loss accounts.66 Moreover, performance index system represents an attempt, even if 
incomplete, at treating evaluation as a system.
In absence of practical details I am using a hypothetical example cited by Bennet 
to illustrate the working of the system.67 Bennet takes the example of BTMC because the
66 This approach has recently been applied in Pakistan, in enterprises under the Ministry of Production. However, the tangible 
results of the workings in real life are not known. For a detail of Pakistani system see S.A-Nawab, Evaluation of Public 
Enterprises: The Pakistan Signalling System'. Publ.c Enterprise, vol.5. 1985. pp.155-163.
67 See Bennet, op. cit.
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corporation produces only cotton yam and cloths while BSEC enterprises produce 
varieties of products and hence is easy to illustrate.
TABLES
BD. Textile Mills Corporation: Performance Evaluation Grid
Criteria
(Perf. indicator)
Weight Poor
0
Fair
10
Good
20
V.Good
30
Excell.
40
1. Net profit before 50% less 1550 1850 2050 2150
tax (lac taka) than
1550
-1850 -2050 -2150 or
more
2. Production of yam 20% less 1100 1200 1250 1350
(lac lb.; 32 count) than
1100
-1200 -1250 -1350 or
more
3. Production of cloth 10% less 590 635 675 720
(lac yards; 54 pick) than
590
-635 -675 -720 or
more
4. Inventory of stores, 10% 10% 3-10% 3% 3-10% 10%
spares and finished 
goods (% change 
during a year)
incr or 
more
incr. deer.
3%
incr.
deer. deer, 
or more
5. Employment (increase 10% less 100 170 230 300
in authorised posts 
filled during year
than
100
-170 -230 -300 or
more.
100
Performance is monitored regularly during the year on each of the chosen criteria, 
and review meetings are held to correct shortfalls and improve performance. At the end of 
the year, the over all performance index is evaluated as follows:
1 8 0
TABLE-9
BTMC: Performance evaluation 
result achieved
1984/85
score
(Hypothetical 
X weight
figures) 
= index
1. Net profit Tk. 1822 lac 10 50% 5
2. Prod'n of yam 1264 lac lb 30 20% 6
3. Prod'n of cloth 681 lac yd. 30 10% 3
4. Inventory 11% increase 0 10% 0
5. Employment 168 more 10 0% 1
Performance Index 15
In this example the scores have been set so that the highest possible performance 
index is 40. This could be linked with an incentive system under which all senior 
management get a bonus of up to 40% of their basic salaries. In our example they would 
get 15% bonus.
4.5 . Parliam en ta ry  C on tro l over Public E nterprises.
Theoretically Parliament, as the direct representative forum of the people, is the main 
body to which the government including the public enterprises are accountable. But in 
Bangladesh, Parliament did not function for more than 10 years out of 18 years of its 
existence. All governments, but the present one, have been changed through military 
coups. Governmental activities centre round the Military President and the very existence 
o f the Parliament depends upon the President. Moreover the ruling parties in Bangladesh 
have always managed to capture more than two thirds of the total seats in Parliament 
which effectively reduced the position of the Parliament to a somewhat ornamental and 
formal one. In such circumstances the discussion on parliamentary control over public 
enterprises will be more a theoretical exercise than of any practical value.
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Parliamentary control over public enterprises in theory are to be exercised mainly 
through questions and answers, debates68 and by the two important Parliamentary 
committees namely Public Accounts Committee and Committee for Public Undertakings. 
There are number of instances when the committee recommended actions against 
corruption and irregularities of some politicians and bureaucrats, but instead, they were 
rewarded by the government.69
The four Parliaments (1973-75, 1979-82, 1985-86, 1988-90) spanning a period of 8 
years, have failed to make any impact on the activities of public enterprises. The lack of 
interest of legislators in the public enterprises is manifested by the fact that the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) meet at irregular intervals. Even when PAC does meet, only 
few members choose to show up. It does not mean that all MPs belonging to the ruling 
party always turned a deaf ear to the affairs of the public enterprises or the country. The 
disaffection of party members were/are handled 'differently and outside the Parliament'.70 
The effectiveness of the parliamentary control over the government as a whole and public 
enterprises in particular also depend upon factors like qualities of the members, nature of 
the questions asked, knowledge of the members on technical issues involved. From the 
proceedings of the Jatiyo Sangsad71 it is evident that most questions asked not well 
articulated and the answers are also kept vague. In the debates in most cases there is 
apparent lack of proper home work. M.Huq aptly describes the situation in the following 
words :-
The Parliaments, when in operation, have been found to have 
accentuated the centralizing tendency of the executive governments 
instead of restraining it.... The almost total and precarious dependency
68 Evea in country like Britain with long parliamentary hiatory, questions and answers did not prove to be very effective control 
because a minister may avoid to give an answer that contains useful information. There is a large degree of discretion in the 
hands of the minister in deciding whether a question is to be accepted or whether a question should be answered. (See Report o f 
the Select Committee on Nationalised Industry, HC 371, 1967 68) In other words the government can manipulate many things 
including the parliamentary time. Therefore Parliamentary question does not provide any structural form of accountability.
69. Learnt from discussions with 2 members of the Public Accounts Committee and from the minutes of the meeting of PAC. In fact, 
narrating the workings of the committee, in despair, one member of the Public Accounts committee (Mr. Nurul Islam Moni, 
M.P.) told me, "the Committee is simply another jewel in the costly ornament called Jatiyo Sangsad worn by one of the poorest 
countries in the world."
70 M.M.Khan. 'Public Enterprises in Bangladesh: Context. Motivation and Leadership1. Public Enterprise, vol.9. Nos.3-4. 1989.
p.320.
71. See the proceedings of Jatiyo Sangshad. Jatiyo Shangshader Bitarka ( in Bengali) (Debates of National Assembly)
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of the members of the Parliament on the executive governments for 
their own enrichment or even survival may be regarded as the basic 
factor behind such a behavior.72
In short there is no meaningful parliamentary control over public enterprises.
The discussions in the previous sections would help us to sketch the structure of 
control over public enterprises in Bangladesh to provide some idea of the control 
hierarchy.
4.6. S tru c tu re  o f C ontrol.
Control structures have several tiers. At the bottom is the individual unit which may be an 
enterprise or a branch of a multi-branch enterprise. These units have very little policy 
making options. Even within the framework of their budget and programme, they do not 
enjoy any meaningful operational autonomy. For most decisions, in matters of personnel, 
procurement beyond a limit, finance, purchase, prices, investments etc they have to turn to 
the next tier i.e. the corporation.
It was clear that BSEC itself do not have adequate operational or managerial 
autonomy and hence cannot delegate what they do not have. But whatever autonomy it 
enjoyed, it did not appear that BSEC wanted to delegate it to the enterprises under its 
control.73
Above the individual enterprises stand the corporations which deal directly with 
the government. The individual enterprises are fully controlled by their respective 
corporations and the corporations are strongly controlled by the government. In practice 
government emerges as a multiplicity of public agencies and departments with divergent
72. M.M.Huq. 'Towards Understanding Relationship between the Government and Public Enterprises in Bangladesh: with emphasis 
on Public Corporations', paper presented at the seminar on Public Enterprises in Bangladesh [unpublished], organised by 
BPATC. 16-17 March. 1986, pp.7-8.
73 Almost all officers from BSEC interviewed by me made the point. Although they made it dear that whatever autonomy they 
enjoy they try to delegate maximum to the enterprises. But the enterprises officials did not think in the same way. From empirical 
review it seems the enterprises officials are more nearer to truth.
183
goals and perspectives. Thus government control often is not integrated resulting in 
confusions which in turn hampers efficiency.
The third tier is the administrative ministry. This tier includes such ministries as 
Finance, Commerce, Planning, Establishment, Labour and Law. These ministries exercise 
independent control functions over the public enterprises. The administrative Ministry, 
Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission are the most important supervisory 
bodies which among other things, oversee, regulate, advise, persuade and maintain almost 
a continuous liaison with public enterprises. Their role in controlling the operation of 
public enterprises is extensive and covers almost all conceivable areas of management.
The fourth tier is the Minister himself. His authority is co-extensive with that of 
the Ministry and beyond. The Minister is approached by the public corporations under his 
ministry on all policy issues as well as for protection from the proposed and actual 
interference or control of other ministries. His authority is particularly invoked against 
political pressures for patronage or for resolving labour disputes. The minister also 
conducts some of the review meetings and enterprise meetings.
The fifth tier of control is the Council for Public Corporations and the National 
Economic Council (NEC). The Council is the co-ordinating body with wide range of 
functions and controlling instruments at its disposal. The NEC approves all investment 
proposals and clear all economic policies.
The sixth tier is the President. His powers and authority are coextensive with the 
government, the people and the country itself. Obviously he has little time to devote to 
enterprises personally, hence formal control is through policy decisions sought on specific 
issues and appointment of the Board of Directors of the public corporations. But the 
intervention could go beyond this to removal of Chairmen/Directors and ordering an 
enquiry into the affairs of any enterprise. Theoretically, Jatiyo Sangsad is the final tier of 
control.
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In addition to the regular government structure, frequent use has been made of 
special, ad hoc enquiries. These have been established at various levels by different 
authorities. They have been established either to investigate the conduct of particular 
enterprises or to examine the general structure of organisations and relationships with a 
view to reform.
In this complex structure of control there is no real co-ordination. There is a need 
for co-ordination of the various controls exercised by different public agencies and 
departments, from the point of view of enterprises this adds a new dimension to the 
problem of relationships with the state and creates the problem of a variety of signals. 
Unless the government co-ordinates various controls, there is the danger of conflicting 
directives or signals being given to enterprises. Co-ordination is also necessary to produce 
some coherence out of the multiple objectives and purposes of the enterprises and the 
interests which seek to promote themselves through the enterprises. Co-ordination is also 
required to introduce intra- and inter-sectoral balances in harmony.
4.7. C o-ord ination  o f  Public C orpora tions in B ang ladesh .
The Nationalisation Order 1972 did not create any single agency to co-ordinate the 
activities o f different corporations. The government in 1986 promulgated an Ordinance to 
"provide for the co-ordination of management o f the affairs and business of public 
corporations."74 In order to achieve these objectives it created the Council for Public 
Corporations (CPC). The CPC consists of the following members:-
a. Minister for Finance,
b. Minister for Planning,
c. Minister for Industries,
d. Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources,
74 Sec Ike Public Corporations (Management Co-ordination) Ordinance 1986, op. cU.
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e. Minister for Commerce and
f. Ministers who have administrative control over any public corporation are 
also members in meetings which considers any matters concerning those 
corporations.75
The President nominates a member of the Council to act as its Chairman. Currently 
the Vice President, who is also Minister in charge of Industries, is the Chairman of the 
Council. The main functions76 of the Council are to formulate guide-lines for preparation 
of management objectives and guide-lines for preparation of budgets by public 
corporations. The Council also approves production targets, profit and performance 
criteria, declaration of dividend, contribution of profit to government. The Council also 
periodically evaluates and monitors performance of public corporations. It has the 
prerogative to appoint various committees of experts to advise it in matters of 
management, technical matters, evaluation of performance etc.
From the composition of the Council it is evident that the government is aware of 
the problem of co-ordination among public corporations and thus a very high powered 
council has been created with relevant Ministers.
The Ordinance does not clearly speak about secretarial back up. It also does not 
mention which particular Ministry shall provide the secretarial assistance. The co­
ordination process is going to be a continuous process and hence it is important that it has 
a location in a Ministry which has an overview of the total economy of the country. The 
Autonomous Bodies Wing (ABW) in the Ministry of Finance was working as the 
Secretariat for CPC. It was soon found that the ABW was unable to perform all the 
difficult tasks of the CPC except problems directly linked with finance. Thus, in a meeting 
held between the President and the representatives of CONCOPE, held on 25.8.1988 at the 
latter's secretariat, it was decided that a separate wing would be created at the Prime
Minister's secretariat which would work as permanent secretariat for CPC and also be 
concerned with matters connected with public enterprises.77 It is interesting to note that 
although it was decided that the Prime Minister's secretariat will be the location of the 
CPC secretariat but the Prime Minister is not a member of the CPC. In fact it seems more 
logical for the Prime Minister to be the Chairman of the CPC. Many countries have a 
permanent secretariat which makes the work of co-ordination much easier.78 Instead of 
having a body meeting on occasions of necessity a permanent co-ordinating body could be 
established which would improve and simplify channels of communications, help to unify 
and built up expertise in the government. This permanent body should represent the 
ministries, trade union and consumers- whose task would be to make policy guide-lines. 
But under the politico-economic realities of Bangladesh with the pre-dominance of 
military-civil bureaucracy one cannot expect such a wide representative body.
The Council seems too high powered with little day to day technical knowledge of 
the management problems. Perhaps a council with permanent secretaries and relevant 
experts instead of Ministers would have been more effective, with the proceedings being 
overseen by the cabinet. Perhaps the government created such high powered body in order 
to avoid another layer in the administration of public corporations. Since the Council 
started functioning only a year ago little is yet known.
Until 1980, there was no formal forum for the public enterprises to co-operate and 
co-ordinate amongst themselves and to mutually exchange view on matters of common 
interest. CONCOPE (Consultative Committee of Public Enterprises is now such an 
organisation.
The decisions of Ihe meeting of 25.8.88 was reported in the CONCOPE Jou
For example in India BPE (Bureau of Public Enterprises) is a |
i/. post-Hood issue. 1988. pp.45-49.
187
4.8. CONCOPE and its Role
The notion that corporate public enterprises might benefit from the establishment of 
certain "common services" is not particularly new. In the early 1950's Herbert Morrison, 
urged the chairmen of the British Boards to create a common efficiency unit for their own 
use. As it was conceived by him, it would have been "a collective creation" of the boards, 
composed of able people, and available to any of the boards "for the investigation of 
'headaches'."79 But the boards then resisted the proposal, which they considered a 
reflection on their ability to administer their own undertakings.80 Over the years, however 
the notion of common services gained some momentum in different countries like 
Yugoslavia, India, Ireland, UK etc.81 The ICPE report on focal points noted that the array 
of interlinkages in which public enterprises are involved includes linkages arising within 
the family of public enterprises and strongly made out a case for the establishment of an 
organisation of the various public enterprises of a country.
Public enterprises in Bangladesh have been criticised even made scapegoats and 
sacrificed often without a proper and objective analysis of the causes of their inadequate 
performance. In the wake of some of the unfounded criticisms the public enterprises 
management found itself defenceless.
It was therefore necessary to have a separate organisation of the public enterprises, 
which would be able, not only to present their viewpoints and try to safeguard their 
legitimate interests but also be able to develop better cooperation and co-ordination among 
themselves. As a result Consultative Committee of Chairmen and Managing Directors of 
Autonomous and Semi-autonomous Bodies was established in October, 1980. Later in 
1982 the name has been changed to CONCOPE (Consultative Committee of Public 
Enterprises). In March 1984 CONCOPE was formally registered under the Societies
79. II.Morrison, Government and Parliament, 1954, pp.274-75.
80 W.A. Robson. Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership. 1962 (2nd edition), pp.204-3.
81. For a detail, see R.Wettenhall and C.O.Nuallain (ed.). Getting Together in Public Enterprise, 1987.
Registration Act 1860 (Act XXI o f  1860). It was expected by the organisers that it will help 
improve operational efficiency in public enterprises through adoption of better 
management techniques and to improve managerial skills in public enterprises.
The government, in November 1985, formally recognised it as the representative 
body of the public enterprises. The importance that government attaches to CONCOPE 
and the nature of functions it is expected to perform are underlined in a letter from the 
Cabinet Division, which quoted its specified objectives of helping in the growth of the 
economy, promotion of better co-ordination, of the functions and operations of public 
sector corporations and autonomous/semi-autonomous bodies, developing better 
management relationships and improving the overall level of efficiency of public sector 
organisations for ensuring adequate return on Government investments. It would be 
consulted from time to time (at least quarterly) on issues concerning the public sector 
enterprises and particularly in its close collaboration with all public sector corporations, 
autonomous or semi-autonomous bodies to develop sound practices for implementing 
Government decisions as well as for suggesting co-ordinated thoughts and ideas.82
Since 1984, CONCOPE has been holding regularly annual conferences and annual 
general meetings. Apart from holding its own Executive Committee meetings, it meets 
with the government, especially the President. The government has consulted CONCOPE 
on number of policy decisions and its members now serve in interministerial committees 
relating to income tax, sales tax, customs duty, excise duty, turn over tax, shop tax etc. It 
publishes a quarterly journal which focuses on trade, industry, economics and other 
aspects of public enterprises. Through the journal and other public relations exercises like 
bringing out special supplements in the National Dailies or Weeklies, CONCOPE tries to 
focus the activities of various public enterprises in Bangladesh to the public.
Thus, it has provided a forum for public enterprises to get together and discuss 
issues of common interests. In addition to its main function of providing a forum in which
82 See Cabinet Divisions letter No. CD/CS/3/83/224 dated ¡3.1 IMS.
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government leaders and managers of public enterprises can discuss issues of common 
interest, CONCOPE arranges training programmes and workshops for officers working at 
various levels in public enterprises.
It has provided a much needed lobby for the public enterprises to put their case, 
supported by facts and figures, to the rest of the society, and to protect the public 
enterprises against both uninformed and unfounded criticisms about their performance and 
succeeded in making the government realise and also to take measures to check undue 
political and administrative interference in their day to day work.
There is every reason to be apprehensive about the role it might take. It is getting 
to be too powerful a lobby that escapes meaningful accountability and oversteps its 
functions, thus creating a psychological contradiction with the bureaucracy and the private 
sector.
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C H A P TE R S
Privatisation in Bangladesh
5.1. In troduc tion
A review of the annual reports of various public corporations in Bangladesh reveals that 
public enterprises in most cases are not performing well as expected. This bad economic 
performance of the public enterprises is not unique to Bangladesh. The World Bank, in its 
1983 World Development Report, concluded that the problem with public enterprises is 
economic inefficiency, leading to a financial burden which echoes throughout the 
economy. Privatisation offers one of the main solutions to the problems of inefficiency 
and bad economic performance of public enterprises which adversely affect economic 
development of a country. Hence, increasingly, the call is for "privatisation" because it is 
presumed that subjecting the public enterprises to the discipline of the market will per se, 
make them more efficient.1
Now, privatisation has become a universally popular phenomenon. Even in Eastern 
European countries it has become both an end and means to improve the efficiency of the 
public enterprises. The World Bank (IBRD) and other international financial agencies are 
not only emphasising the policy of privatisation but effectively providing technical 
support and financial assistance to accelerate the process o f privatisation in the developing 
countries. This phenomenon has so much engulfed the world that now the question 
increasingly has become not whether to privatise but how to privatise fast. The recent 
changes in the Eastern European countries provide evidence to the above statement.
IBRD. World Development Report 1983. 1983.
There are variety of other reasons put forward for privatisation, sec sectioa 5.2 below.
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The term "privatisation" has been used in the literature to refer to a number of 
developments,2 such as the break up of the monopoly of a public enterprise, the 
liberalisation of licensing requirements and procedures (e.g. bus deregulation in Britain), 
contracting out specific activities to the private sector by public agencies (e.g. cleaning 
and laundry services in British hospitals, rubbish collection in municipalities) and 
contracting out the management of a public enterprise to a private company (quite 
common in some developing countries).
Privatisation is a socio-economic and legal process through which private 
entrepreneurs are induced to participate in the public enterprises. As a process, it denotes, 
reducing the roles of government, while increasing those of the private sector, in activities 
or asset ownership.3 In its narrow sense, however privatisation means partial and full 
transfer of public sector enterprises from the state ownership to total, majority or minority 
private ownership or to private control. It goes beyond the simple transfer of ownership to 
cover, as well, leases and management contracts. At the broadest level, privatisation refers 
to the introduction of market forces into an economy, usually with respect to public 
enterprises.4 Thus, privatisation encompasses the general reassignment of property rights 
from the state to the individual, contracting out the delivery of public enterprises to the 
private sector or cut backs in state activities to allow greater room for private initiatives. It 
is important to note that privatisation is often only an element of a broader economic 
policy (or reform) that may include deregulation and liberalisation with the emphasis 
generally as much on improving the efficiency of retained public enterprises as an effort to 
divest. Thus privatisation is to be understood not only in the structural sense of who owns 
an enterprise but in the substantive sense of how far the operations of an enterprise are 
brought within the discipline of market forces. However, in Bangladesh privatisation
'Privatisation: The UK Experience and Developing Countries' in Ranunadham^ed!), Privatisation in Developing Countries.
1989. p.62.
3 ES Savas. Privatisation: The Key to Better Government. 1987, p.l.
4 V.V. Ramanadham. The Economics o f Public Enterprise. 1991. p.397.
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seems to be applied in its narrow sense covering the transfer of commercially oriented 
public enterprises to private sector.
The aim of the chapter is to discuss the process of privatisation in Bangladesh, thus 
echoing my earlier concern with institutional design. The chapter also discusses the 
introduction of the holding company in Bangladesh as one of the techniques of 
privatisation. It will also throw some light into the performance of privatised industries. 
The central hypothesis of the chapter is that privatisation in Bangladesh was carried out 
not so much to improve the efficiency o f public enterprises by bringing them within the 
discipline of market forces, but on ideological bias. As such like nationalisation, 
privatisation programme remains a superimposed policy of the executives without any 
public debate or the participation o f the parliament. It was mentioned in previous chapters 
that nationalisation had been undertaken without adequate analysis of issues of 
institutional design and of institutional arrangements for relations with government. The 
techniques adopted for privatisation show a depressingly similar poverty of institutional 
and constitutional analysis.
This chapter will not deal with the theoretical and general broad debate, as to what 
privatisation can accomplish or is privatisation desirable, because of two simple reasons. 
The first, the thesis deals specifically with the public enterprises in Bangladesh and not 
about privatisation, which itself by its own importance should be the subject matter of 
more in depth research. Moreover, it is impossible to properly address the complex sets of 
problem connected with privatisation within the limit of this chapter. Secondly, the 
general and theoretical issues are well covered in the existing literature on privatisation.5
for example. E. Berg and M. Shirley. Divestiture o f State-Owned Enterprise in LDC's. 1985; J. Vickers and G. Yarrow, 
Miration and the Natural Monopolies, 1985; M.Shirlcy. Managing Stale-Owned Enterprises. 1985; J. Kay. C. Mayer and D. 
mpson (eds.), Privatisation and Regulation - the UK Experience. 1986; P. Cook and C. Kirkpatrick (eds.), Privatisation inTzrszk
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5.2. R ationale fo r P riv a tisa tio n  in B angladesh
The rationale for privatisation differs from country to country, enterprise to enterprise.6 In 
Bangladesh, the rationale for privatisation were not officially spelled out. However, the 
speeches of government leaders and the Industrial Policies announced after 1975 give 
some insight. Conceptually the reasons seem to be two, namely government policy bias 
towards market economy and the government's economic policy to assign greater role to 
the private sector in the industrialisation o f the country.
Privatisation also reflected the realisation that public enterprises in Bangladesh 
were over-extended for the state to manage efficiently. It was too big and state was doing 
far too many things that could be done more efficiently by the private sector. These 
activities were diverting public money and managers away from more priority activities of 
government. Thus, the Zia government's main objective was to reduce the size of the state 
in an attempt to create a leaner and more efficient state apparatus. Therefore, logically, 
"over extended' public sector required 'rolling back’. This over-extension of public 
enterprises was blamed for poor production performance and low profits or even losses. 
This general proposition is empirically unproven. There is insufficient evidence as to the 
inverse relationship between economic performance and the size of the public sector.7
Almost all publications of the Ministry of Industries regarding industrial sector 
made it clear that public enterprises in most cases are not performing financially well, 
hence they should be transferred to private sector which is more profit making.
While factually one cannot deny that there are many cases of financial losses in the 
public sector but as discussed in the previous chapter the losses may have been the result 
of wrong investment choices. Restructuring might have transformed the financial situation
For rationale of the British privatisation, se* D. Heald and D. Steel. 'Privatising Public Enterprise: An Analysis of thi
Government's case'. Political Quarterly, voi. 53. 1982. pp.333-347. Sometimes the reasons for privatisatic-------- —
official documents, see for example. White Paper on Water privatisation in the U.K.. Cmnd 9734, 1986.
An extensive review of public records along with research in this area conducted by BIDS shows thi 
evidence in support o f this policy assumption in Bangladesh. See R. Sobhan and A. Ahsan. P :~—
Profile and Performance, (mimeo). Research Report New Series no. 38. BIDS. July 1984. V
also did not find sufficient evidence to the above as--- ■*— “  ^  ‘° -----° —*~
in Ramanadham (ed):1989, pp.94-95.
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itself into one of profits.8 Moreover, the losses may be in the nature of "planned losses" in 
the sense that the enterprises may have been induced by the government to undertake 
investments and operations in the interest of achieving certain goals like regional 
development, workers' welfare, benefiting the consumers with prices lower than the 
production cost, etc. Therefore, performance of public enterprises should not only be 
judged by financial losses, performance in fulfilling 'non-commercial' objectives should 
have been taken into consideration. Thus the losses argument has to be judged with care; 
and symptoms have to be distinguished from root causes. Above all, there are many 
private enterprises whose performance are not at all satisfactory financially. Therefore, it 
is difficult to agree that the change of ownership will automatically bring profits.
It is often mentioned by government Ministers9 the losses of the public enterprises 
are mostly caused by the government's bureaucratic and unproductive control systems and 
it is difficult to bring reforms. Therefore, it is claimed, privatisation will cure the roots of 
losses like slow decision making due to political-bureaucratic requirements, a 
preoccupation with procedures rather than results, a neglect of markets and clients and a 
management environment in which reward is only remotely related to performances.
Apart from the above reasons, conceptually, privatisation in Bangladesh shares 
many of the ideological underpinnings of the programme adopted elsewhere, for example, 
the assumption that privatisation will democratize capital by increasing the number of 
individuals and concerns responsible for the conduct and management of the production 
apparatus within the state. In industrialised developed countries, privatisation is seen as a 
way to bring stock ownership to the grass roots.
Another major argument in favour of privatisation in Bangladesh is to reduce fiscal 
and credit pressures. Governments since 1975 coup, are increasingly considering
There are several instances of capital restructuring undertaken in Britain, which helped produce improved financial results in the 
subsequent years e.g. British Steel Corporation. National Freight Corporation etc., before privatisation, were making profits.
See for example the interview of Mr. Moudud Ahmed, then Minister for Industries, with the Weekly Buh.tra. See The Bichitre.
22.9.86. pp .if
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privatisation as a means of getting rid of unprofitable public enterprises which require 
budget subsidies and continued infusion of credit aggravating the problem of budget 
balancing and contributing to inflation. The problem centres around the absence of an 
effective budget constraints. If the public enterprises are allowed to function on 
commercial principles and to borrow money from the financial market instead of 
government subsidising losses and more market discipline is introduced the problem could 
have been tackled.
Another reason behind privatisation is the desire of the government to respond to 
the expectations of its natural constituency by providing enhanced profit opportunities for 
the private sector. Privatisation help to ease the problem of public sector pay. The trade 
unions in the private sector are aware that excessive pay award may lead to bankruptcy but 
no such constraint exists in the public enterprises since public enterprises funds are 
connected with national exchequer and the government is unlikely to close the enterprises 
because o f bankruptcy. However, privatisation is not the only solution to the problem of 
excessive pay demands, the problem can be solved by removing access to exchequer 
funds.
It would seem however, that the government's privatisation programme was 
undertaken more to please the donor agencies especially the World Bank and the IMF. 
Indeed, the need for privatisation was not felt by the government of Bangladesh but was 
super imposed by the World Bank, IMF and Western donor countries. The very Articles of 
Agreement o f the World Bank required it "to promote private foreign investment by 
means of guarantees for participation loans and investments made by private investors."10 
It is well known that the policy of privatisation as one of the ways of implementing 
structural changes towards a market economy is a precondition of obtaining World Bank 
and IMF loans.11 Thus the goals of privatisation, it seems, are political and ideological.
10 Quoted from A.I. MacHean and B.N. Snowden. International Institutions in Trade and Finance. 1981. p.213.
11. Common features of economic structural adjustment programme generally includes a) to eliminate controls on finance and 
private enterprise, b) reduce the role of the public sector in the economy, c) adapt a wage-price policy that redistributes income 
from labourers to property owners, d) devaluate the currency and remove foreign exchange restrictions etc. For details of the 
conditions attached to IMF loans see J.Williams (ed.), IMF Conditionality. 1983. Referring to IMF loan conditions . Melvin 
Burke points out that the conditionalities have as their real objective for privatisation making third world economies more
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Efficiency, development and other economic aims of privatisation are for the most part 
implied.
5.3. B a ck g ro u n d  o f  Privatisation  in B angladesh
As discussed in chapter 1, although the Awami League government followed a policy of 
nationalisation, various measures were taken to strengthen the private sector side by side 
with it. The government, as early as 26th March 1972, in its industrial policy 
announcement, declared its decision to divest itself of enterprises with less than Tk.1.5 
million in fixed assets.
In 1972 the government had to take over 786 abandoned industrial enterprises. Of 
these, 221 enterprises were placed under different sector corporations set up under P.O. 27 
o f 1972. Subsequently, after proper verification 77 units were deleted from the list of the 
abandoned enterprises, 163 were returned to their owners and 14 more considered to be 
commercial concerns. The remaining 311 enterprises were relatively small (less than Tk. 
1.5 million) were placed under the management boards in various regions of the country. 
Thus they were kept outside the Nationalisation Order 1972. Divestment of these 
enterprises started in May 1972 under the Awami League Government and by September 
1978, 211 units of this category were divested.
Since 1973, there has been always a policy of encouraging more private sector 
investment for the industrialisation of the country.12 The only difference is that the Awami 
League government seemed to encourage private capital while at the same time keeping 
the public sector unaffected; the subsequent governments wanted to limit the size of the 
public sector to a minimum. The upward trend in the private sector investment since 1973 
is shown in the table below:-
de pendent on outride capital. IM. Burlte. Private versus Public Construction in Honduras: Issues in Economics and Ideology' in 
DJ. Gayle and J.N. Goodrich (eds.), Privatisation and Deregulation in Global Perspective. 1990. pp. 213-233.
12 Sec chapter 1.
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Table - 10
Sanction for Private Industrial Sector Investment Since 1973.
Year No. of units 
sanctioned
Amount sanctioned 
(in million taka)
Actual investment
1973-74 295 87 82
1974-75 276 150 133
1975-76 265 702 198
1976-77 439 810 620
1977-78 552 2092 975
1978-79 749 2179 1050
1979-80 928 3034 1200
1980-81 1740 6680 1530
1981-82 607 2280 1060
1982-83 636 3740 1370
1983-84 2503 11180 1350
1884-85 •5505 9380 1140
Total 14495 42914 11708
* Includes 2280 cottage industries. 
Sources: FFYP, TYP, SFYP, TFYP.
Privatisation as a conscious policy o f the government came into effect after the 
overthrow of the Awami League government by a military coup. Zia's military regime, in 
December 1975 decided to disinvest some of the abandoned enterprises placed under the 
corporations.13 According to the criteria laid down by the Government of Zia, only those 
units which were comparatively small in size, uneconomical for the sector corporations to 
run, unprofitable and located in remote areas were to be privatised.14
The sector corporations under Zia regime prepared a list of enterprises to be 
privatised. The following table will show the sector wise number of enterprises listed for 
privatisation in 1977.
13. See Revised Investment Policy 1975, op. cit.
14 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Industries, Papers on Objectives and Procedures for Disinvestment, September 1978.
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Table ■ 11
Sector No of enterprises listed 
privatisation in 1977-78.
for
Jute 6
Textile 3
Chemicals 38
Sugar and Food 17
Steel and Engineering 15
Wood Products 4
Total 83
Source: Ministry of Industries.
Thus the objective of privatisation was to streamline and improve the operative 
efficiency o f management of the remaining public enterprises and to reactivate and 
invigorate the private sector.13
Side by side with it, a decision to return the specialised textile units to their former 
Bangladeshi owners was also taken. Later the government decided to return the jute twine 
mills to their former Bangladeshi owners from whom they were nationalised and to divest 
the abandoned jute twine mills. In order to implement the decisions of the government the 
P.O. 27 o f  1972 was amended by a Martial Law Order.* 16 These decisions have special 
significance because jute and textile mills were considered by the Awami League 
government as the hard core public sector.17 18Furthermore, the return of the nationalised 
jute and textile mills to their former Bangladeshi owners was considered by the 
government as a measure to create confidence in the minds of the future investors about 
the security o f their investment. Apart from it, by September 1978, a total of 211 
abandoned enterprises had also been privatised through public sale.
In June 1982 a New Industrial Policy (NIP)1* was announced. The NIP sought to 
expand further the private sector while reducing the size of the public sector. It sought to
13 IkU.
16. See (he Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) (Amendment) Order 1976.
17. Govt of Bangladesh. Ministry of Industries, Industrial Investment Schedule for Two Years 1976-78) for Private Sector, 1976,
p.22.
18. Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of Industries, The New Industrial policy,, June 1982.
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"limit role o f  the public sector to the establishment of strategic and heavy industries."19 It 
confined the activities of public sector industries only to seven categories of industries and 
sought to reduce the size of the sector corporations. Thus the government changed the 
method of initiating new projects and allowed the private sector to invest in areas that 
were formerly the exclusive domain of the state. By a process of attrition, over time, the 
state is expected to control fewer and fewer transactions.
The success of the privatisation programme is connected with the private savings 
and their mobilisation. As mentioned in earlier chapters, private capital accumulation in 
Bangladesh was mostly the product of state sponsorship, proximity to administration etc. 
There was a huge amount of money illegally earned in the private hands which remained 
unutilised. Therefore, in order to invigorate the private sector by bringing unutilised 
("black-money") funds into productive stream, the government promulgated Martial Law 
Ordinances exonerating those who would disclose such funds from criminal liabilities, 
provided such funds were used for new investments or purchase of disinvested units.20
Within one year time, i.e. by 1983, the military government of Ershad almost 
completed the privatisation of remaining abandoned enterprises. It further widened the 
scope of privatisation in the following directions21:
(a) Reduction in the size of the public sector corporation by disinvestment of 
abandoned/nationalised industries in a phased manner irrespective of the question of profit 
or loss o f those enterprises;
(b) Privatisation o f those enterprises which are established by the corporations with 
their own resources/ADP funds where such units are found to be unable to compete with 
private sector or are incurring continuous losses.
«* ./ * *
20 How much of the legalised 'black money* has been invested in the industrial sector is unknown. But from discussions with 
various persons it transpired that very little amount has been invested in the manufacturing sector. (Chapter 1 discusses at some 
length about black-money and the Martial Law Ordinances exonerating persons who disclosed them and invested the money in 
Bangladesh.)
21. For details see RIP ¡986.
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(c) Off loading of up to 49% shares of enterprises managed by sector corporations 
for public subscription or operation by the ICB in order to reactivate the share market; and
(d) Return of nationalised Jute and Textile mills to their former Bangladeshi 
owners/share holders in order to create investment climate and confidence in the minds of 
the prospective entrepreneurs.
(e) Provision was also made to appoint management contractors to run some of the 
bigger industrial enterprises in the public sector.
The following table will show the total number of enterprises privatised (only 
those which were placed under the sector corporations) and the corporation wise break 
down.
Table -12
Corporation Units before 
privatisation
Units privatised 
before 1982 after 1982
Total
BCIC 88 51 12 63
BSFIC 68 31 15 46
BSEC 64 22 13 35
BJMC 79 5 32 37
BTMC 60 4 28 32
BFIDC 22 3 1 4
TOTAL 381 116 101 217
Source: derived from data collected from the 
Ministry of Industries and Sector Corporations.
Between 1976 and 1989 a total of 217 enterprises were privatised. These 
constituted 56.9% of the total of 381 enterprises originally placed under the 6 sector 
corporations. Of the total 217 privatised enterprises, 116 were privatised during December 
1975-May 1982 i.e. by the government of Gen. Zia. The remaining 101 were privatised 
within 16 months since July 1982 i.e. after Gen. Ershad came to power.
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5.4. T echniques used in B angladesh  Tor P rivatisa tion .
Privatisation encompasses many different techniques and does not follow any single 
model.22 It has taken different forms in different countries. Some states have resorted 
predominantly to the sale of shares to the general public, while others have sold shares or 
assets of public enterprises mainly to single buyers, and many have resorted to both. A 
number of governments also have used "non-sale" privatisation or what might be called 
"privatisation of management" such as management contracts and leases. There are first 
time privatisations of public enterprises originally established by the government, and 
there are many reprivatisation.
The most commonly used methods of privatisation are: public offering of shares, 
private sale o f shares, new private investment in a existing public enterprise, sale of 
government or public enterprise assets, fragmentation (or break up into component parts), 
management or employee buyout, and lease and management contract.23
The legal form of organisation of public enterprises heavily influences the 
necessary mechanical step» for the transfer of their ownership and, therefore, also to a 
large extent the ease with which the process of privatisation can be implemented. For 
instance, a public limited company whose shares are already being traded requires a 
relatively simple privatisation process, consisting only of offering additional blocks of 
shares currently held by the state to the general public through the stock exchange. At the 
other end of the sptectrum would be a public enterprise set up as a statutory corporation or 
a government department. Neither could be privatised in its current form but needs to be 
transformed into a stock corporation subject to ordinary company law of the country so 
that shares can be offered to the private sector. Legislation is necessary in such cases and 
personnel may need to be transferred from state to private employment regimes.
22. For deuils of different techniques of privatisation see World Bank, 
(Draft Report), Industry Department lxgal Department. July 1987.
» .  IM .
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In case of Bangladesh, the following methods were used for privatisation, namely, 
sale of enterprises (mostly abandoned ones), return of jute and textile mills to their former 
Bangladeshi owners, partial public offering of shares and management contract to a 
private party.
This section will deal elaborately with the sale procedure, return procedure and 
partial offerings of shares but management contracts will be avoided because privatisation 
is used in its narrow sense i.e transfer of ownership from the state to the private sector.
A) Sale o f  Public E n terp rises
A list of industries offered for sale was first prepared by the Ministry of Industries and a 
floor price called the "National Reserve Price" (NRP) was fixed by the government.24 
How the NRP was calculated nor the details of the pricing was made public. Only a 
consolidated figure was quoted.
Tenders were then invited for the sale of enterprises. The NRP was taken as a basis 
for considering the acceptance of price quoted by the bidders. An enterprise was sold at a 
price either at NRP or at the quoted price of the highest bidder, whichever is higher.
The successful bidder had to pay the quoted price in instalments. He was required 
to pay 25% down payment of the sale price for an enterprise situated in developed areas 
and 20% for an enterprise located in less developed areas. The balance was to be paid in 
three equal annual instalments for developed areas and four equal annual Instalments for 
less developed areas. The payment of instalments began after the expiry of 24 months 
from the date of execution of the Deed of Agreement for sale.
The sale procedure did not attempt to curb the growth of cartelisation. Two 
adverse consequences on the distribution of wealth follow from this. First, the buyers
24. For detail of sale/disinvestment of abandoned induatrial enterprises see S.H. Chisty. ' Privatisation in Developing Countries: The 
experience of Bangladesh'. Conference an Privatisation, Asian Development Bank. Manila. January 31-February I. 198S.
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came from the wealthy section of the community. Second, if buyer is an enterprise in the 
same line, the degree of concentration on the supply of outputs increases. Since 
Bangladesh is dominated by a handful of big private groups the disadvantages of such 
concentration is likely affect the consumers. Indeed, 70% buyers were already incumbant 
in the sector. In retrospect, it now seems that the sale procedure was promotive of 
cartelisation hampering competition and fair play of market forces. Such sale of public 
enterprises thus, helped in the concentration of capital in a few hands.
Since no floatation took place, instead private bidding was the method of sale, 
therefore public disclosure of information through a full prospectus was not issued. The 
process was, indeed, shrouded in secrecy. This illustrates how privatisation took place 
away from the public gaze and with no national debate and minimum of information, even 
for the workforce involved. To treat such constitutional change as purely private matter is 
to outrage even the most attenuated conception of democratic accountability.
It is thus evident that the bidder paid only between one fifth and one fourth of the 
NRP. Moreover 90% out of 73 interviewed including officials of different corporations, 
trade union leaders and businessmen told that the NRP was fixed far below the actual 
market price. Above all enterprises were sold at easy terms, e.g., the terms of repayment 
etc.
B) R e tu rn  o f Public E n terp rises to th e ir F o rm e r B angladeshi O w ners
The government through Ministry of Industries and Commerce notification no. 
JDIICITJM-1182 dated 27.9.82 decided to transfer all the shares in industrial enterprises to 
their former Bangladeshi shareholders and published a list of industrial enterprises. In 
pursuance of the Second proviso to clause(2) of Article 4 of the P.O. 27 o f  1972 the 
government made offers to the persons entitled to receive payment of compensation under
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Article 9 of the said Order to sell on the terms and conditions to the respective 
shareholdings in such industrial enterprises as on the date of nationalisation.
It is necessary to mention here that all these enterprises were incorporated under 
the Companies Act 1913 as joint stock companies before nationalisation. Therefore in 
transferring the shares to their former owners, the above mentioned government 
notification simply made provision for the transfer of shares in the following manner:
The above mentioned government notification laid down the terms and conditions 
for the transfer. The price fixed for each such share remained same as worked out at the 
time of payment of compensation.23 In cases where the Bangladeshi shareholders held less 
than 51% of the shares, they were required to buy additional shares to enable them to 
acquire controlling shares of 51% or more, before the actual transfer of management.* 26 
But the additional shares were to be sold on the basis of revaluation.27 As to the payment 
of the original shares held the purchasers were required to pay 51% of the total value 
immediately and the remaining 49% within a period of 1 year.28 For the additional shares 
the purchaser was allowed to pay 10% of the full value immediately and the rest within a 
period of 5 years in 10 half yearly instalments. In this case also it is evident that the 
government disposed of public property giving benefits to a few individuals whereas 
depriving the whole nation.
If the former owners refused to purchase the shares offered the shares were to be 
offered to other private investors. In absence o f sufficient response from the private buyers 
the government reserved the right to sell them to financial institutions like BSB, BSRS, 
ICB, insurance companies etc. which held shares in the mills prior to nationalisation.29
23. Government of Bangladesh. Clause 2, Notification no. JD/ICfTJM-I/82. dated 27.9.82 issued by Ike Ministry of Industries end
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Clause J.
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The new shareholders were not allowed to sell their shares within the period of 
encumbrancy without prior approval of the government.30
In case of failure to pay in due time the purchaser was liable to pay on the 
defaulted instalment a penal interest @2% above the contracted rate.31
The new shareholders were to accept the full liabilities of the company on the 
same terms and conditions as existed on the day of transfer.32 They were also required to 
take over all staff and workers in employment on the day of transfer along with liabilities 
for service benefits.33 In addition they were required to take over an agreed number of 
officers and staff, employed by the corporation, likely to be declared surplus after transfer 
of the mills to the previous shareholders from the Corporation.34 Termination and 
retrenchment within a period of 1 year was forbidden.35
Thus it is evident that, although many of the enterprises privatised do not strictly, 
call for regulation after privatisation because of their size, the mantle of former public 
enterprise status persists, and a regulation against termination and retrenchment of labour 
was forced on them while there was no regulation against closure. The legislation 
involved is very much a skeleton structure and little provision is made as regards the 
design of the privatised company.
For uninterrupted operation of the enterprise the government reserved the right to 
form the first Board of Directors. This Board was to be a temporary one functioning for a 
period not exceeding one year or till a new Board of Directors is elected in accordance 
with the Articles and Memorandum of the company, whichever is earlier.36
Clause 6. 
Clause 7. 
Clauses 9-12. 
Clause 17. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Clause 13.
2 0 6
In case of the violation of any of the terms the government reserved the right to 
intervene in the affairs of the company.37 But the government notification does not spell 
out the measures the government is likely to take in the event of violation of any of the 
terms, which means the government intended to leave a wide discretion with it.
By transferring ownership to the former Bangladeshi owners, the government 
denationalised 33 jute mills with a total national production capacity o f about 38% and 27 
textile mills with a spinning capacity of 45% and weaving capacity o f 57%.
The following table will illustrate the number of disinvestments, (both category a 
and b), in Bangladesh as on September 1989:-
Table -13
Categories Number
1. Industries soldout/disinvested by 
DG Industries (small units 
not placed under any corporation 269
2. Industries disinvested from the corporations 
a. Fully abandoned enterprises 125
b. Partly abandoned 38
Total 432
Source: personal collection from the MOI.
C) P a rtia l O fferings o f  shares
The government in its NIP 1982 and RIP 1986 decided to convert the sector corporations 
into holding corporations and the enterprises under them into subsidiaries and then to off 
load 49% shares i.e the holding corporations to keep 51% shares in the subsidiaries. The 
proposal for the introduction of holding companies is thus seen as a preparatory step 
towards privatisation.
37 Clause 17.
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5.5. T he In tro d u c tio n  o f  H olding C om pany in B angladesh
The previous chapter concluded that although P.O 27 o f 1972 created sector corporations 
and placed different enterprises under them, these were no more than an administrative 
device of the government and were subject to extensive control and direction denying their 
legal or organisational form. It was mentioned that the problems of corporations were 
more or less connected with bureaucratisation of business, over - centralisation and 
interference by government in the day to day operations of the enterprises, lack of 
adequate and meaningful control by the government and its failure to ensure the 
accountability of the public enterprises. The bureaucratic structures of management and 
control resulted in the absence of effective market discipline and control in the operations 
of these enterprises. The prevailing system was eroding autonomy, inhibited management 
development, caused delays in decision making and reduced the public enterprises' 
capability to respond to changes in the market.38 All these adversely affected the 
performance of public enterprises resulting in the necessity for more financial injection 
from the government. The financial problems of public enterprises in turn invited more 
government intervention seriously constraining their autonomy and entrepreneurial 
innovation and development. Thus a vicious circle is established.
Reforms to rectify the situation was felt necessary in all quarters (government, 
corporation and public in general). All reforms were directed towards enhancement of 
autonomy of public enterprises, introduction of market orientation, promotion of 
entrepreneurship and commercial behaviour.39
To alleviate the situation, the introduction of the holding corporation has been first 
suggested by CONCOPE. It was hoped, that the holding company would provide an 
organisational structure conducive to the efficient functioning of the public enterprise. The
38. See Enam Committee Report, op. cil.
39. See the Cabinet Divisions Guide lines, NIP 1986, Enam Committee Report, op. ci».
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assumption behind such change of organisational form is that legal form of organisation is 
important to the efficient functioning of public enterprises. Thus CONCOPE attached 
considerable importance to devising a proper organisational structure for public 
enterprises in the belief that certain forms of organisations, rather than others, can be more 
conducive to the efficient functioning of the public enterprises through a proper division 
of authority and responsibility between the Government and the public enterprise 
management.
The holding company by serving as a buffer between the government and 
subsidiary companies can provide a high degree of autonomy to the subsidiaries. It would 
also be able to protect the operating subsidiary companies from undue political 
interference.
By standing between policy makers (the government) and implementers 
(management o f the subsidiary companies) it is in a position to allow a sharper distinction 
to be made between policy and operations.
It would be able to utilise more efficiently the scarce managerial skills, because of 
their centralisation in the holding corporation. This concentration of experts would allow 
for an expert scrutiny of the affairs of the subsidiaries than would be the case if these 
experts had to be spread through the entire public sector. And given the quality of its staff, 
it should be able to translate policy into operative goals and strategies for the guidance of 
the subsidiary units.40
Moreover, in several other developing countries like Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana, 
Lesotho and Malawi, state holding companies have played a key role in the public sector 
for many years. A few more had expressed their interest in reforming their public 
enterprises by introducing this model. The Sengupta committee in India41 also
40 For the other theoretical advantages of the holding company form in public lector see Y.P. Ghai, The Management of Public 
Enterprises Through Holding Corporations', Public Enterprise, vol.10, No.l, 1990. pp.19-24.
41. See Government of India. Ministry of Industries. Report of the Committee to Review Policy for Public Enterprises (popularly 
known as Arjun Sengupta Committee after the name of its Chairman)
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recommended the adoption of this form of organisation in India, although India first 
introduced this structure in 1973 in some sectors. The holding company model is also 
widely used in Western European countries, but there are differences in models prevailing 
in different countries. This might have induced Bangladesh to reform her public 
enterprises in this direction.
Above all, the holding corporation form at least theoretically provides solutions to 
the basic organizational dilemma of public enterprises i.e. how to reconcile autonomy with 
public accountability. It is more useful both an effective evaluation and monitoring of the 
performance of the enterprises for a greater decentralisation of operation, while it keeps 
the operations of an enterprise at 'arms length' from the government and promotes 
decentralised decision making within the enterprise.
In Bangladesh, the arguments in favour of, or against, the adoption of the state 
holding form of organization and its usefulness in the public sector are at present largely 
theoretical because holding corporations in Bangladesh have not fully started functioning 
yet. It is therefore too early to comment on any practical aspects of their functioning. The 
following sections will only give some insights for the future researchers to undertake an 
in depth research on the functioning of holding companies in Bangladesh which is 
increasingly becoming due now.
5.5.1. H olding C om pany  - Defined
The concept of the holding corporation came from corporate organisation in the private 
sector towards the end of nineteenth century. With the diversification and extension of 
production and expansion into overseas operations, the holding corporation form became 
dominant in large private firms in this century.42 "It was a response in large part to the 
problem of the span of coordination and control over production and marketing which
210
restricted expansion or diversification in a unitary form."43 Public enterprises were 
restructured on this model only after 1930s. Moreover, some of the advantages of the 
holding form derive from its role in the private sector. Its adoption in the public sector was 
in part for similar reasons, and in part for others.44 In this chapter the emergence of 
holding company within large private enterprises is not discussed45 because of the 
limitation of size and contents of the present thesis which is a study of public enterprises 
in Bangladesh.
Most of the managerial problems which private enterprises experience are more or 
less similar to that of the public enterprises, but there are problems which are specific to 
public enterprises. For instance, in the private sector, the management of the holding 
company is for all effective purposes autonomous of its shareholders and a centre of 
policy making, and the company is in a good position to rationalise, co-ordinate and 
respond to a rapidly changing environment and exploit economies of scale. The 
management of the public holding corporation is not in a similar position since the 
government always remains as active share holder. Some of the advantages of the holding 
form in the larger private enterprises may not be "attainable" or even "desirable" in the 
public sector.
The essence of this structure in public sector is basically; government's interface 
with the public enterprises takes place at the level of the Board of the Holding Company 
which is responsible for the operation of a number of subsidiary companies. The 
government in turn set the goals and targets for the Holding Company and receives 
periodical performance reports regarding the overall efficiency of the holding company, it 
introduces an intermediate level of management i.e. the Board of the Holding Company 
between the Ministry and the Companies, reconstituted as subsidiary companies. As a
43 O.E. Williamson. Corporate Control and Business Behavior, 197a p.27
44 Y.P. Ghii and A. Bohm, Editorial Introduction'. Public Enterprise. vot.10, no.1, p.12.
45. For the historical emergence of holding company form see AD. Chandler. Strategy and Structure..... op. d t, 'The Development 
of Modem Management Structure in the US and the UK’ in L. Hannah (ed.). Management and Business Development. An 
Historical and Comparative Study and D.F. Channon, The Strategy and Structure of British Business, 1973.
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result, the interface between the government and the subsidiary companies is minimised 
without sacrificing the essential need for co-ordination of the operation of the companies.
Two broad (formal and functional) approaches can be applied to define a state 
holding company.46 According to the formal and legal approach, a holding company is a 
company which either holds a majority of the equity in the subsidiaries or has control over 
their operations through other legal means. However, the holding company and the 
subsidiaries are separate legal entities and have their own boards of directors.
According to the functional approach, which takes into consideration the de facto 
relationship between the headquarters (or board) of a company and its operating units, if 
the operating units have substantial operating autonomy and are run as separate profit 
centres, then the company can be described as a holding company, irrespective of whether 
the operating units are separate legal entities or merely division within one company.47
Large private diversified business in the US and UK to some extent prefers multi­
divisional form rather than the holding form.48 In the multi-divisional form, semi- 
autonomous operating divisions are set up and organised along product, brand, 
geographical lines. The divisions are separately managed. A general office, manned by 
senior executives, is responsible for the destiny of the entire enterprise, formulating 
general and long-term strategies and allocating resources. The routine day to day 
operational activities are left to the management of the divisions. In the holding company 
form the operational activities are delegated to different companies, each a legal entity in 
its own right (with concomitant structures), and in general can exercise a greater degree of 
autonomy than divisions in the multidivisional form.
Multidivisional form and holding form overlaps in many large firms. The choice 
between the two forms was often determined by history or law rather than by rational
Y.P. Ghii and A. Bohm.' Editorial Introduction', op. cit., p.ll.
Ibid.
For the reasons for the preference of Multi-Divisional form over the holding form see Channon. op. cil.
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considerations.49 50The Multi-divisional form and holding form even may achieve similar 
results.30 In the strict legal sense this consequence does not follow automatically, since the 
parent company has the potential of complete control over the policy and activities of its 
subsidiaries. It is a flexible instrument to design various forms of relationships. Indeed 
Hadden has shown that some British firms have been able to achieve a high degree of 
control over the operations of their subsidiaries.51
The holding company structure for public enterprises involves a tripartite 
relationship between government, holding company and subsidiaries. The main thrust of 
this tripartite relationship revolves round the organisational problem of balancing 
centralisation and autonomy on the one side and coordination and accountability on the 
other. There has been little research on the actual operation of the holding company 
involving a tripartite relationship.
5.5.2. T h e  T rip a rt ite  R elationship : Some P roblem s o f C en tra lisa tion  and  A utonom y
The organisation of the holding company structure in public enterprises is complicated by 
the fact that the holding company itself is not the final unit of control. While in the private 
sector there is a dual relationship between the parent company and subsidiary, in the 
public enterprise there is a tripartite relationship between government, holding company 
and the subsidiaries.
The holding company is seen as a unit o f control vis-a-vis the subsidiary but in its 
relation to the government, the unit of control is ultimately the ministry or government 
agency. This complicates the issues of control, centralisation and autonomy.
Arguments about efficient and productive organisational structures usually revolve 
around the conflict between centralisation and autonomy. The concepts 'centralisation'
49. Y.P.Ghsi, "The Management of Public Enterprises Through Holding Corporations', Public Enterprise, vol.10, No.l, 1990, p.21.
50 Ibid., p.22.
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and 'autonomy' themselves have multifaceted meanings depending on the way they are 
viewed.51 2
Lack of clear directives and plurality of goals in the public sector further 
complicate the question of centralisation and autonomy. Public enterprises are hybrid 
organisations pursuing both commercial and non-commercial goals. As discussed in 
chapter 4 the real problem occurs when various government agencies have different 
preferences, for instance, the Ministry of Labour may be interested primarily in 
employment, the Ministry of Finance in profit, the politicians in low prices. The 
underlying problem is thus one of plural principles with different objective functions.
Under the above circumstances, the question of how much autonomy should be 
given to the operating units becomes very important. A holding company can be used as a 
vehicle in the control system of a public enterprise, it can also act as an intermediary 
between minimising the political element in public control. This clearly illustrates the 
problems of centralisation and autonomy in the tripartite relationship.
One task is to translate public control goals into meaningful directives to the 
operating management better than the government department. This, however, is based on 
the assumption that the holding company has some autonomy from the government when 
it translates broad public goals set by the government into meaningful directives and 
communicating these directives to the subsidiaries. This autonomy may arise because of 
the closer operating relationship between the parent and the subsidiary and because the 
holding company is manned by professional management experts rather than the 
bureaucrats. On the other hand, the holding company does not have complete autonomy 
because the public goals are set by the government and may conflict with the business
51. T. Hadden. The Control o f Corporate Groups, 1983.
52. Brooke points out that 'myths' and 'legends' have grown around the concepts of 'decentralisation' and 'centralisation*. The 
concept of centralisation can be associated with many other concepts, like 'authority' or 'power'; or in the context of 
'geographical space*. According to Brooke, 'the concept [centralisation] stems from questions about power to questions of 
decision making, from questions on participation and influence to questions on communication.* [Brook, op. cit., pp. ]. The 
concept is not only relative but of a second order dependent upon otheia for its meaning. What aspect of decision-making 
functions for example, is centralised - decision-making, the power to make decisions, the influences on decisions....?
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goals which the parent and subsidiaries may consider more important. How much 
autonomy then would the holding company have in translating public goals, which it may 
disagree with, into meaningful directives for its subsidiaries?
A further complication might arise when any government agency as a unit of 
control tries to step in and take part in operations of subsidiaries. In such a situation over 
centralisation, instead, could take place. Even if decentralisation is desired, subsidiaries 
might actually refer decision-making to the Ministry, thereby by passing the holding 
company, which would result in centralisation. This might arise when subsidiary managers 
see the holding company as ineffective in decision-making and instead view the Ministry 
as providing a more active and clear leadership. Where the Ministry takes a more active 
role, managers of operating units may tend to see the Ministry as a better partner than the 
holding company. The role of holding company as a unit of control, in such 
circumstances, would be considerably reduced.
The holding company form instead of increasing might actually decrease the 
autonomy of the operating units. The constitutional theory expects that the holding 
corporation would exercise its power of control for rational economic reasons, and 
represent sensible allocation of responsibilities between the holding and subsidiary 
companies. But in practice, as will be seen later, this might not happen, and control might 
instead stifle initiative and demoralise the management of operating units. The civil 
servants and politicians are unlikely to give up whatever privileges or patronages the 
enterprise finds in them. The usefulness and purposes o f such corporate control depend to 
a large extent on the nature of the board and management of the holding corporation. For 
example, if the board is merely an extension of government arm as opposed to expected 
independent group of management and business experts then the holding company form 
may in fact increase political control over the operating units.53
S3 Ayub and Hegstad, op. cil.
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Moreover, the holding corporation might cause delays, confusions in relationships 
and responsibilities by itself being another additional layer in the system of control and 
regulation in the management of public sector. It might also reduce the efficiency and 
proper accountability of the subsidiary companies because decisions are likely to be made 
about the subsidiaries by persons remote from actual operation. They have a tendency 
towards cross subsidisation and the aggregation of accounts which might adversely affect 
the accountability and performance of individual enterprise otherwise would been 
regulated by the discipline of the market.
Above all, the government is unlikely to be a passive share holder like most share 
holders of the private holding company. In fact, the governments in different countries 
have devised many mechanisms like ministries of public enterprises, secretariat of public 
enterprises, central audit bureaux to discharge some of the functions of the holding 
corporation and in practice for many purposes the government remains the holding 
corporation which reduces the flexibility of the holding company to rationalise, co­
ordinate and respond to a rapidly changing environment and exploit economies of scale.54
5.5-3. Function ing  o f  H olding C om pany in Bangladesh
In 1987 the government amended the P.O. 27 o f 1972 making provisions for the 
corporations to off-load 49% of their shares in the enterprises under them. The amendment 
envisaged the transformation of the corporations into holding companies with the 
individual enterprises as subsidiaries.55 The RIP 1986 also emphasised it.56 In order to 
revitalise the share market and to allow small investors to invest, the RIP 1986 announced
54 Y.P.Ghai. The Management of Public Enterprises ihrough Holding Corporations'. Public Enterprise, op. d t
55 II may be mentioned here that during pre-liberation period EPIDC used to hold shares in its enterprises on behalf of the
amendment is seen as a means to keep the bureaucracy and the nch happy. The bureaucracy wants to keep a tight p ip  on the
economy and complete privatisation would mean they would loose the direct control and in some cases loss of authority. The 
government can alto from lime to time absorb tome of their bureaucrats and military officers for different reasons. The rich also
have the possibility of investing tin the on going enterprises rather than taking trouble of establishing new enterprises themselves.
KIP 1986. op. cit. part-4.
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the off loading of 49% shares in some of the enterprises. It was decided by MOI to off 
load 49% of the shares of 52 public enterprises controlled by it gradually.57 So far 49% 
shares of 11 enterprises of 3 corporations under MOI have been disposed off. The 
enterprises converted into subsidiary companies of the corporations by amending the 
Memorandum and Articles of Association of these companies are58:-
BCIC
1. Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Ltd.
2. Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd.
3. Eagle Box and Cartoon Mfg. Co. Ltd.
4. Chittagong Cement Clinker Grinding Co. Ltd.
BSEC
1. Eastern Cables Ltd.
2. Atlas Bangladesh Ltd.
3. Metalex Corporation.
4. National Tubes Ltd.
BSFIC
1. Dhaka Vegetable Oil Industries Ltd.
2. Renwic-Jagnefcwer & Co. Ltd.
3. Kushtia Sugar Mills Ltd.
Only 11 of the intended 52 industrial enterprises 49% shares were off loaded 
because the government realised that the financial market in Bangladesh is not in a 
position to acquire all the shares of the 52 public enterprises.59 The private individual 
business houses earlier were offered the sale of some public enterprises. So it was 
expected that there would not be enough private response if more enterprises are sold out 
in the manner described earlier. Moreover, the vast majority of population live in rural
57 Information given by officials of the MOI.
58. Personal collection from MOI.
59. Discussion with the officials of the MOI.
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areas, agricultural in occupation, illiterate, therefore unlikely to have investing interest, 
even knowledge of share availability.
It may be recalled that industrial enterprises placed under the sector corporations
were set up as limited companies.60 On nationalisation or taking over of management of
abandoned industries certain provisions of the Articles of Association of those companies
were kept in abeyance.61 These companies were exempted from some of the mandatory
requirements of the Companies Act 1913 for example the holding of (annual general
meeting) AGM, submission of statements etc. Therefore, in order that these can continue
as joint stock companies, the Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation)
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1987 inserted the following after clause (4) of Article 462:-
(4A) Where the Government sells or otherwise transfers under clause (2) 
any industrial enterprise or any share or proprietary or other interest 
therein, the provisions of the Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913), relating 
to holding meetings, balance sheet, minimum subscription, prospectus, 
statement in lieu of prospectus, filing of returns in respect of such industrial 
enterprise or transfer o f such share or interest for the period preceding the 
sale or transfer shall be deemed not to have been applicable thereto.
The judiciary in Bangladesh while considering all these and the fact that the 
companies were effectively run by the government through the sector corporations still 
concluded that these companies are separate legal entities.63 Thus, although officially the 
legal form of organisation for public industrial enterprises was the public corporation, but 
legally speaking, as confirmed by the judicial decisions, they were subsidiaries of the 
respective corporations which were nothing but holding companies. From this, one can 
also easily argue that the corporations used multi-divisional form model i.e. the individual 
enterprises functioned as divisions of the sector corporations rather than as subsidiaries.
The formal introduction of holding company form by the RIP 1986 is viewed by 
the government as a convenient way to help gradual privatisation. But CONCOPE
60 The Companies Act 1913 has the provision of incorporating a limited company either as private limited company or as public
61. See P .0 .27 o f1972 and its subsequent amendments, op. cil.
62 Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary. The Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1987,
Ordinance No. VI! o f1987. 7.5.87.
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recommended the introduction of holding company in order to increase the autonomy of 
the individual enterprises. Thus the adoption of holding company form by RIP 1986 is 
associated more with privatisation rather than a search to delegate more autonomy to the 
individual enterprises or to introduce market mechanism.64 Here, once again, we see that 
the same form is capable of being used for accomplishing different purposes.
There were few legal formalities which were required to be taken for the 
conversion of the existing units into subsidiaries as they were already incorporated as 
limited companies (mostly public limited companies). Only the Articles of Association 
were required to be changed in order to accommodate a number of things set by the 
government. Necessary amendments were done in the Articles of Association of those 
companies whose 49% shares were proposed to be off loaded. The changes were similar in 
all cases and the language used were also more or less identical. The shareholders of the 
company are divided into two following groups:-
(A) Minimum 51% of the shares to be retained by Group 'A ' i.e. the 
govemment/corporation.
(B) Up to 49% of the shares to be offered for sale to the general public 
including financial institutions like ICB etc. as follows:-
(i) Up to 34% of the total shares to be offered to and held by the general public.
(ii) Up to 15% of the shares to be offered and held by the existing staff, and 
workers and officers working in the company. If the staff, and workers and 
officers do not subscribe the entire shares or any part thereof the unsold portion 
of such shares shall be retained with the govemment/corporation which may be 
offered to the existing staff and workers of the company subsequently. In case,
63
64
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any part of group 'B'(i) shares remain unsold, the balance is to be treated as 
group 'A ' shares.
By keeping 51% of the shares the state (civil and military bureaucrats), it seems is 
assured of direct management and control of the enterprises. The 34% offered to the 
general public effectively would satisfy the former bureaucrats because they lack capital 
to set up their own enterprises or for many reasons cannot buy a disinvested enterprise. 
People serving in different organisations have also the opportunity to invest their small 
investments. The 15% offerings to the workers and staff of the enterprise, seems to aimed 
at defusing labour opposition to privatisation.65 It is to be mentioned that the government 
knew it very well that the employees financially and psychologically would not be able to 
take advantage of the 15% offerings to them. Precisely that has happened. In 62% of the 
enterprises the workers and staff was not able to purchase 15% offered to them because of 
shortage o f cash.66
After issue of shares the Board of Directors is to be composed of 9 people and they 
are to be nominated/appointed/ elected as follows:-
a) 5 Directors (including the Chairman and the Chief Executive) are to be 
appointed by the holding company i.e. the corporation - the possessor of 51% shares.
b) 3 Directors to be elected by group 'B ' (i) shareholders i.e. the possessors o f 34%
shares.
c) 1 Director elected by group B' (ii) shareholders i.e. shareholders from the staffs, 
workers and officers of the company. If the staffs, workers and officers do not own at least 
12% of the total shares they are not entitled to nominate a Director.
This vie» 
Learnt fn
I by moat trade union leaden and tone corporation ofTtciala interviewed,
ew with a Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Industry.
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However, the group 'B ' shareholders are entitled to elect one Director for each 
12% or at least equal to or more than half thereof of their shareholding subject to 
maximum 4 Directors as noted above. But in case of any undersubscription of group 'B' 
(i) and (ii) shares, the number of such Directors as may fall short of the total number of 
Directors due to proportionate shareholding shall be nominated by the group 'A ' 
shareholders so as to constitute the full Board as required by the Articles of Association.
The chairman o f the Board of Directors is nominated by the group 'A ' shareholders 
and the enterprise chief executive (generally a Managing Director) is appointed by the 
holding company. It is to be mentioned here that in all articles of the subsidiary companies 
these provisions are the same. Thus it is clear that the shareholders have no say in the 
affairs o f the company and the government through the holding company makes all 
decisions. While this is the case then it is doubtful what benefit is going to be accrued 
from the much publicised change of form. It is thus clear that company law techniques 
have been used to effectuate partial privatisation in Bangladesh. But how this off loading 
of 49% shares will affect the operation of enterprises are as yet unclear. What is certain, 
however, is that the idea that these joint ventures will operate just like any other private 
company, and subject only to market constraints has not proved feasible.
The government through the Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) 
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1987 simply inserted a new clause after clause (4) of Article 17
of P.O. 27 of 1972. The new inserted clause says that, "(5) The Corporation may ......
manage the affairs of any enterprise or company in which it holds shares or interest if the 
enterprise or company so requests."67 In compliance with the above, the Articles of 
Association o f all 11 companies whose 49% share was offered for sale kept provisions for 
the Board of Directors to enter into a management contract with the corporation (holding
67 See Ordinance No. VII o f1987. op. cit.
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company). In the Articles of Association it is clearly mentioned that, "the final amount 
shall be such as may be determined by the corporation".68
The subsidiaries have in fact entered into Management Contract with their 
respective corporation. The Management Contract is also identical for all the subsidiaries. 
The Management Contract between a subsidiary enterprise and the Corporation is 
reproduced as appendix-4 as an example.
By Management Contracts the subsidiaries have entrusted all operational 
responsibilities to the holding company. The holding company undertook the 
responsibilities of all major management activities such as investment, procurement, 
production, marketing, financing, staffing, fixation of prices of the products. Thus the 
institutional advantages of the holding form connected with decentralisation and 
autonomy is denied, of course the holding company form envisages that certain functions 
are to be handled centrally to ensure economies of scale and maximum utilisation of 
scarce management resources (both human and material). The subsequent administrative 
practice in Bangladesh, however, indicates that there is a definite trend towards over 
centralisation and attendant reduction in the operational autonomy of the subsidiaries.69 
Thus the potential of the form in ensuring autonomy have been short circuited if not 
negated by the use o f other means.
The concentration of almost all conceivable powers in the hands of the holding 
company by the management contract would definitely demoralise and stifle the 
management initiatives of the subsidiaries. Under the circumstances, it is doubtful, how 
far the holding company would be able to help induce commercial outlook and culture 
which in turn would expose the subsidiaries to the market forces.
68. For example see section 5(b) of the Articles of Association of Atlas Bangladesh Ltd.
69 Brooke also has shown that it is fallacious to assume that the holding company subsidiary relationship is necessarily 
decentralised. See M. Brooke, Centralisation and Autonomy: A study in Organisational Behavior, 1984.
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Two years only have passed since Bangladesh officially introduced the holding 
form. Thus it is too early to comment on any operational aspect. But the indications of 
past two years are that the holding company form, requiring a clearer division of 
responsibilities between the government, the holding company board, management of 
subsidiaries; and a greater restriction of government power than the other legal forms, is 
not operating as it should have been, as evidenced from the repeated notifications of the 
President's secretariat reminding the concerned authorities to respect the operational 
autonomy of the public enterprises as is envisaged in the Cabinet Division's Guide-lines o f 
1976. From the repeated reminders from the President's Secretariat to the Ministries, it is 
evident that until now the problems of centralisation, autonomy, coordination and control 
by the government as owner remain to be solved in Bangladesh. Thus by itself form means 
very little, it really matters how and for what a form is used. As has been mentioned 
earlier, the corporations in Bangladesh were really functioning as holding companies even 
before the amendment of the P.O. 27 o f 1972 in 1987. The off loading of 49% of the 
shares simply converted the individual subsidiaries into joint ventures where the 
government through the corporations are not only holding the majority shares but 
controlling the enterprises in all possible ways. It is thus questionable how far the 
efficiency o f the enterprises are going to be influenced by these changes. The objective of 
privatisation to improve operational efficiencies o f the enterprises are definitely not going 
to be achieved. Only 3 out of the 11 subsidiaries who off-loaded their 49% shares could 
declare a small dividend while the rest although made some profit but could not declare 
any dividend on the share. It is to be kept in mind that all these 11 enterprises were profit 
making enterprises even before the disposal of 49% shares. Though 3 enterprises declared 
dividend but it was learnt that they had to declare dividend because of the pressure of the 
Ministry which was eager to show success of the policy. Because of little profit and non 
declaration of dividend on the share the value of the shares fell. This will have definite 
negative consequence on the future sale of shares of other public enterprises. It seems the 
government realised the situation, therefore in spite of the lip service is not off-loading 
49% shares of other public enterprises. Because of decline of share values the small
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investors are not only suffering but are discouraged to buy new shares. Many sold their 
shares even at low price in anticipation o f further decline while those who have money are 
accumulating shares at low price in anticipation of future rise or to increase social prestige 
by becoming a director of any enterprise or to have sufficient share to influence the board 
decisions.
Let us now see how far the government has achieved its objectives behind 
privatisation.
5.6. P riv a tisa tio n  in Bangladesh - E valuated.
It has now almost become the universal belief that private enterprises are more efficient 
than the public enterprises. This has led to the assumption in Bangladesh that a transfer of 
public enterprises to private ownership would lead to an improvement in the operational 
performance and profitability. The assumption is derived from the historical performance 
of private enterprises and empirical evidence from other countries. It is "certainly not 
derived from any empirical evidence on the performance of private enterprises in post 
liberation Bangladesh."70
No proper research on privatisation in Bangladesh exists. There is no substantive 
published official materials either. The only research undertaken on the performance of 
denationalised industries is by Sobhan and Ahsan in 1984.71 Subsequently two papers 
were written in part fulfilment of the requirement of successful completion of the course 
in BPATC72 and one published in a local Weekly.73 But all of them are based on the work
70 R. Sobhan and A. Ahsan. op. cil.. p.4. A aludy of enterprises in other countries, also, found that there is no clear evidence of the 
superiority of private enterprise. See R.Millward. 'The Comparative Performance of Public and Private Ownership’ in Lord Roll 
fed.) The Mixed Economy. 1982. pp.58-93.
7*. Sobhan and Ahsan. op. cil.
72 For example sec A.H.M. Nooruddin. Some Basic Issues on Privatisation of Industries in Bangladesh’, (unpublished). BPATC 
Second Senior Staff Course on Administration and Development. February 1986 and H. Rahman. Review of the Performance of 
Industrialisation under Privatisation’, (unpublished). BPATC 9th Senior StafT Course on Administration and Development. 
November 1989.
73 C. Mutshuddy. Nationalisation-Denationalisation Debate’. The Weekly Bichitra, (in Bengali), 25.11.85.
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of Sobhan and Ahsan. The conclusions reached by them, although not conclusive because 
based on only a few enterprises and out of date, will no doubt help to understand the 
situation. One of the reasons for the absence of research on the field is the nonavailability 
of data on private enterprises. Data on public enterprises are reasonably comprehensive. 
Thus it is impossible to compare performances of the enterprises both before privatisation 
and after privatisation. The conclusions, summarised below, reached by them are very 
discouraging.
As discussed earlier, the NRP was fixed far below the market price of the 
enterprises.74 Even then a huge amount of consideration money remained unpaid by the 
purchasers.75 Often the new owner took a loan from financial institutions against the 
purchased enterprise in addition to the amount of bank loan to the enterprise since its 
birth. It may be mentioned here that in Bangladesh an unduly large part of the capital 
comes from public financial institutions as loan capital.76 Thus the real stake of the new 
investor is a minor fraction of its total capital outlay, yet he is in control of its use. Since 
the NRP was fixed far below the actual market value of the enterprise sold, several 
entrepreneurs got back their investment with profit, soon after taking possession of the 
enterprise by selling machineries, already produced finished goods, spares and 
accessories, raw materials etc. While he had the scope to profit from the situation, his risk 
of loss is relatively small. Once he got his investment back with profit, some even made 
the enterprise 'sick'. The losers are the creditors, mainly public financial institutions 
(public enterprises) and the workers lose employment.77 There is also a decline in the 
levels of employment in these enterprises. Above all, many privatised enterprises were
74 The weekly Bichitra dies the examples of Nabisco Biscuits and Bread Factory. Albert David, Pubali Bank etc. ibid, p.20.
75 The amount with interest is more than Taka two billions (Tk. 243,00,61,821.00), ibid.
76. The ratio at present is upto 80:20.
77'. From 1974-85 the BSB. BSRS and other DFl's gave investment loan totalling Taka 9124,000,000.00. The private sector received
about 96% of the toul loan. Since then the government has written off about 5 billion taka As a result BSB and BSRS have 
baldly any funds left to Finance future investments. Nooruddin, op. cit., p.23.
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closed by the new management. The MOI knew about the situation but did not disclose 
the exact number o f enterprises closed after privatisation.
Referring to the privatisation of 22 textile mills in 1982-83 Ramanadham notes 
that privatisation was carried out "at the cost of the long term interest of the economy".78 
He further quotes Lorch, who undertook a study of privatisation of textile mills in 
Bangladesh sponsored by UNDP, that "the objectives of a privatisation policy are 
sacrificed for the effectiveness of its implementation; the means prevail over the ends."79
The Weekly Bichitra in its leading article concluded that selling public enterprises 
by tender or other means created only new owners of industries without establishing new 
industries.80 Instead of privatising the public enterprises the government would have 
encouraged the private sector to invest in new enterprises thus helping the industrialisation 
and elevate the employment situation in the country. Since the private sector was busy in 
buying the already established enterprises there was less incentive to take the trouble of 
establishing a new one and to take the risk of efficient operation. Privatisation, thus in a 
way, hampered further industrialisation of the country. The government even admits of 
decline in production in different privatised enterprises.81
After privatisation the contribution towards the national exchequer by way of 
different taxes from these enterprises drastically reduced because of tax evasion. Even if a 
public enterprise suffered from loss still it contributed more to the national exchequer by 
way of tax than a profitable private enterprise because the private sector in Bangladesh in 
collaboration with bureaucrats manipulates the taxes and even do not pay it at all.82 The 
private sector has more opportunity and incentive to feedling with accounts where as
78 V.V. Ramanadham. The Economics of Public Enterprise. 1991. p.419.
™.lbiJ.
80 C. Mulahuddy. op. cit.. p.19.
81. Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of Finance. JaUyo Orthonoitik Jeriip (National Economic Survey) 198445. (in Bengali). 
1986. p.56.
82. This ia derived from interviews with officials of the MOI, corporations and general public. Almost every one expressed the same 
view although government officials try to qualify their assertions in different ways.
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public sector management has little chance and has no incentive of feedling with the 
accounts. Indeed, tax evasion has become almost synonymous with private enterprise in 
Bangladesh.83 Even there are many allegations of manipulations of electric and telephone 
bills in conjunction with corrupt officials of Power Development Board and the Telephone 
and Telegraph Board.84
Moreover, because of privatisation there was a transfer of a large quantum of 
public assets to the ownership and control of what at most amount to 217 families, if one 
indeed assume one family as controlling one enterprise. These concentration of wealth in a 
few hands, in a country where some are rich while the vast majority are not only poor but 
live below the poverty line will surely give rise to tension and violence if not now but in 
future.
In spite of the present apparent failure of the privatisation programme, it is 
expected by the government that the policy of privatisation will take some time to show its 
positive results. Most of the government officials interviewed tried to defend the 
privatisation policy on theoretical grounds85 and cited the examples of other countries, 
mostly industrialised ones. The government could not provide empirical evidence behind 
the success o f privatisation in Bangladesh. How far the experience of developed countries 
with different level of socio-economic and political development will benefit Bangladesh 
is very questionable.
Although, so far, privatisation programme of the government failed to show any 
spectacular economic results but undoubtedly there is a sense of competition between the 
public and private sector mills after privatisation. Before privatisation, it was difficult for 
the government to correctly evaluate the performance of public enterprises since the
83. In spile of (he present government's commitment towards more privatisation, the Finance Minister while talking to the newsmen 
on the performance of national economy made the above remarks.
84. I personally found 4 cases of gross manipulation of bills.
85. These include proposiling about the beneficial effects of the introduction of the profit motive, the removal of government from 
commercial decision making, the discipline imposed by the stock-market and the enhanced strategic position of management.
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government was unable to compare it with private sector. The privatisation policy 
substantially reduced government's burden on account o f the otherwise recurring payment 
of subsidy to the ailing public enterprises.
However, optimistic the government officials are, judging from the present facts 
one has to agree with a remark of a trade union leader in BSEC while talking to me, that 
"privatisation in Bangladesh is nothing but a loot of public property." Privatisation was 
possible because of the government policy of generous financial assistance from public 
financial institutions to its selected and chosen persons.
It would thus appear that change of policy towards privatisation by Zia 
governments has been an act of faith rather than result of pragmatism in public policy. The 
extension of privatisation policy by the military government of Ershad also was not 
derived from a careful review of the available evidence. It may be mentioned that while 
the government in 1972 nationalised it also did not consider its actual ability to manage 
the over stressed public sector. Incidentally, it is not a coincidence that the changes in 
public policies in Bangladesh always occurred through executive orders rather than by 
Acts of Parliament well debated in its floor. Policies were always thrust from above. The 
people of the country virtually had no say or control over the policies. The nationalisation 
and consequent policies are no exceptions.
It must be kept in mind that enterprises vested in the private sector either through 
disinvestment of public assets or through investment funds provided by public financial 
institutions should, from the social point of view, be regarded as part of the public domain. 
Thus the efficient and socially optimal use of their assets must remain as much a concern 
of the public as is the case with public sector assets.
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Conclusions
As has been discussed, contradictions conditioned the birth of public enterprises and the 
actual constraints of the workings of the nationalisation policy of the Awami League 
government soon after the independence of Bangladesh, in December 1971. While the 
direction of state policy was theoretically towards establishing a socialist state but the 
character of the state remained anti-socialist. As such the interests and activities of its 
dominant elements were expected to be directed towards surplus extraction. In this task 
the dominant class expected state policy to legitimise the appropriation of the surplus and 
to give it extended control over public resources thereby enabling it to maintain its 
material interests.
The contradictions within the system have, however, been sharpened by 
legitimisation of the ethic of private accumulation with its concomitant channelling of 
state resources and policy towards the private sector. In such a situation the tendency of 
public enterprise personnel to participate directly in the process of surplus extraction from 
their own enterprise has become much more apparent. In this situation, public enterprises 
became a composite part of the state. The principal contradiction between the private and 
state components o f the bourgeoisie became one of the division o f the spoils.
As discussed in chapter 1, the private sector in Bangladesh has been spoonfed both 
before and after liberation. Its growth was not the result of personal initiative, drive, 
inventiveness and imagination.1 It was rather the outcome of a political decision to create 
an artificially wealthy Bengali class so as to form a significant bastion of support for the 
prevailing rulers. After liberation, under the protective wings of the Awami League, BNP 
and Jatiyo Party a small selected group of people amassed huge wealth through the 
patronage of the state like permits, import-export licences, dealership and smuggling 
across the borders2 resulting in private accumulation beyond limits. The present system of
*. R.Sobhan and M. Ahmad, Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime: A Study in the Political Economy o f Bangladesh. 1980,
p.5.
2 F.RYutuf. Nationalisation o f Industries in Bangladesh. 1985, p.96.
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licensing and other fiscal measures tend to favour those who are already active in a field 
where permission of some sort is needed to continue or to expand. Those who are already 
in business are also better informed and are able to establish relations with the key 
officials. Thus a tie between the government and the existing firms develops. Also, it is 
easier for an overburdened bureaucracy to deal with a few large business house than with 
a number of small firms or new ones. This tends to restrict competition, favour monopoly 
and oligopoly, and pamper vested interest.
The distribution of the surplus extracted from the public enterprises to the trading 
bourgeoisie weakened the public enterprises and strengthened the dominant group viz, 
bureaucracy within the bourgeoisie. Once the petty-bourgeoisie became strong the state 
gradually abrogated the democratic principles enshrined in the constitution and started to 
use law to suppress opposition. The procedural and substantive values associated with law 
were ignored at the convenience of those in power3.
In post colonial Bangladesh in the absence of strong local bourgeoisie 
(manufacturers), the petty- bourgeoisie (traders i.e shop-owners, commercial houses,
professionals, farmers with surplus) always look for its development and sustenance to the
by -mai»!!«!, la«?,
state. More over, the country was ruled for more than 15 years out of its 20 years of 
existence. As a result, bureaucracy (both civil and military), as the organised and educated 
force tends to get upper hand over the popular representative institutions like Parliament. 
The wielders of political and economic power are moving in and arrogating unto 
themselves the task of making the major decisions for society. Although, mass 
participation in the running of the country is not only a means to achieve proper 
accountability thereby ensuring social justice, it is, in itself, a human right. After all, do 
not all people have the right to participate in decision-making processes that affect their 
lives and fortunes? The participation of the mass in the political processes (save
3. See chapter 1.
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occasionally to vote for the legitimization of their rulers) has little bearing on the 
functioning of the government.
The near absence of non-bureaucratic power-base due to weak economic and 
social process gave rise to a highly centralised, bureaucratic and authoritarian system of 
administration. The system of administration concentrates decision making power in the 
central bureaucracy, centres of responsibility are squeezed correspondingly and the social 
processes do not generate enough of countervailing forces. The bureaucracy thus goes on 
to device a system of negative control over the public enterprises in its own fashion. 
Controls in most cases thus become bureaucratic in nature- too detailed, extensive, 
inflexible and procedure bound. The bureaucracy not only dictates policies which are 
however, often conflicting and vague due to reflections of divergent socio-economic 
interests upon the administrative apparatus but also extensively intervenes into the day to 
day management of public enterprises. This thus leads to the removal of the boundary 
between policy and management on which rests the whole rationale behind the 
introduction o f public corporation or holding company model.
Operationally, the public corporation form of management was introduced as the 
institutional device to manage the public enterprises in the industrial field. The provisions 
of the President's Order 27 o f 1972, however, appear to have equipped the government, at 
that time led by petty-bourgeoisie and since 1975 dominated by military bureaucracy, with 
dominant role in respect of running the enterprises. Owing to the preponderance of civil 
service practices the corporations soon began to be run like government departments. The 
vast complex of industries compressed into a few corporations made the organisation 
extensive, unwieldy and overcentralised. The corporations attained a monolithic character 
although subservient to ministries for virtually everything.
In spite of adopting public corporation model, autonomy in public enterprises, as 
has been seen, is virtually absent. Government control extends over the personnel, 
financial, production and marketing functions of public enterprises. Government control
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symbolizes control of the public enterprises by bureaucrats working in the concerned 
Ministries. Under this situation, it can be concluded that the government is playing the 
role of massive holding corporation.
In such circumstances, the administrative accountability so envisaged by laws 
became obviously ineffective as it compromised efficiency, flexibility and operational 
freedom of the enterprises. Instead of evaluating performance and emphasising on goals it 
stressed more enforcing detailed procedures and regulations as in the case of departmental 
undertakings run by the bureaucrats. As was discussed in chapter 4, series of returns and 
reports were asked for, streams of instructions, directives and circulars were regularly 
issued on every conceivable aspect of management and compliance was ensured by almost 
reducing the public enterprises a subsidiary part of the bureaucracy. This system of 
administrative accountability lost its main context and direction. It ultimately proved to be 
self defeating, more because the controls used over public enterprises made bureaucratic 
perspectives prevail not the commercial or social perspectives. In such circumstances legal 
reform became a product of the pursuit of common interest of the ruling class rather than a 
set of changes imposed by the executive government seeking to achieve uniformity and 
conformity to principles, or imposed by politicians seeking cost reductions or greater 
political responsiveness.
The system of parliamentary accountability as implicit in the theory of public 
corporations or holding companies presupposes a mature democracy, political stability and 
acceptance o f the politico-economic institutions and purposes. In Bangladesh, this 
assumption seems to be pre-mature and thus political accountability has at best worked as 
means of political control and at worst as a promoter of political patronage. The 
replication of public corporation or holding company as legal forms in Bangladesh, 
without meaningful democracy, primarily means an introduction of a foreign or a new tier 
in the system o f existing bureaucracy.
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It is evident from chapter 4, that public corporation model has been clearly 
unsuccessful as a means of public ownership. On the other hand, no general framework of 
policy has yet been devised within which the industries could be permitted autonomy, and 
the result has been increasing detailed intervention in a strategic vacuum.
One of the great issues emerging within the public enterprise arena is the general 
lack of systematic approaches to or criteria for the creation, management, accountability 
and supervision of public enterprises. In retrospect, it is astonishing that, over a period of 
two decades, the nationalized industries have been left to operate with virtually undefined 
objectives. As a result, managements have continually had to look over their shoulders at 
the priorities of the government of the day - priorities that have been largely determined 
by macro-economic policy.
Thus, the balance between control and autonomy which constitutes the very 
essence of the relationship between government and public corporations is difficult to 
attain in Bangladesh because the forces that shape the nature of state administration and 
the role played by public enterprises in the development o f dominant economic groups do 
not normally allow such a balance. On the contrary, the tendency is always to create an 
imbalance in favour of the executive government. As such, law and legal form failed to 
achieve its potentials.
The failure of law to induce change in support of development objectives in 
developing countries is common. Reasons for the failure vary. Some scholars of law and 
development have ascribed the law's failure to the contradiction between what are 
perceived as "authoritarian legal orders and the participatory imperatives of 
development."4 Myrdal explained what he termed 'soft development' in terms of,
A general lack of social discipline in underdeveloped countries, 
signified by many weaknesses; deficiencies in their legislation and, in 
particular, in law observance and enforcement; lack of obedience to 
rules and directives handed down to public officials on various levels; 
frequent collusion of these officials with powerful persons or groups of 
persons whose conduct they should regulate; and, at bottom, a general
1978, p.468.
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inclination of people in all strata to resist public controls and their 
implementation. Also within the concept of the soft state is corruption, 
a phenomenon which seems to be generally on the increase in 
underdeveloped countries.5
It can be said that these factors have been at play in the situation of Bangladesh. 
However, it would be too simplistic to characterise all the shortcomings of the 
incorporation policy as due purely to the failure of law as such to bring about the changes 
legislated for. As was indicated in the thesis, the role of law was never an autonomous 
one. It was largely an attempt to legitimise policy choices based on economic, political 
and other concerned considerations. Economic factors, among others, therefore, played a 
significant role. Law has been used as part of the state's response to the economic 
imperatives o f development.
From the discussions in chapter 1 and 2, it was evident that nationalisation was 
viewed by the Awami League government as almost exclusively a matter of transferring 
property rights whereas the issues of control and accountability were treated as determined 
by ownership and therefore of little interest by their own right. This led to the assumption 
that a change of ownership would in itself cause the replacement o f the profit motive with 
'public interest’. There would therefore be little necessity for the conscious design of 
institutional arrangements for political and legal regulation of public enterprises or to 
ensure proper accountability.
With the change of Awami League government this attitude found its reflection in 
justification for privatisation. It is thus assumed that a transfer of ownership will itself free 
the public enterprises from government interference and will lead directly to discipline by 
impersonal market forces. As has been discussed in chapter 5 this follows neither in 
principle nor in practice. From this it can be concluded that a generalised advocacy of 
either nationalisation or privatisation as such will lead one to neglect the real important 
issue of the relationship between the government and industry. Unfortunately, following
5. G.Myrdal, The Soft Stale' in Underdeveloped Countries* in UCLA Law Review, IS. 1968, p.1120.
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the common law tradition, Bangladesh does not have an adequate public law to provide 
the means for the resolution of these problems.
It is inadequate to assert that the answer to the deficiencies in nationalisation 
revealed in this thesis is simply to expose the industries to the free play o f market forces. 
Implicit in most advocacy of liberalisation the assumption that free competition is a form 
of natural equilibrium created simply by the removal of state intervention. Yet an 
increasing body of literature has underlined that there cannot be any radical separation 
between public and private, 'the intermingling of functions, the relationships of financial 
interdependence on the government, and the interpretation of highly skilled man power 
cadres have obliterated many of the traditional "public-private" distinctions.'6
The first issue raised by privatisation is that of the openness of governmental 
pressure in relation to privatised concerns. We have seen that techniques are available 
drawing on company law and contract for the exertion of such pressure. Even if these are 
not used for such a purpose, many of the privatised enterprises will exist within a 
framework of government decision making through the retention of substantial role in 
determining development and depletion through the licensing and fiscal regimes and 
through a continuing role in export and import policy. There has been little discussion of 
the forms through which such governmental decision making will be exercised. If nothing 
else some degree of regulation will be needed to give an appearance of political 
respectability to enterprise sales. This raises key issues of institutional design which have 
so far been largely ignored.
The other major issue to be confronted in designing regulatory institutions is that 
of their procedures. Once it is realised that the decision-making of regulatory bodies is not 
a mechanical process of removing obvious blocks to competition but is a 'surrogate 
political process'7, the issue of procedural legitimacy becomes of central importance.
6 B.L.R. Smith (ed.). The New Political Economy. 1915. p.l.
7 R. Stewart. The reformation of American administrative law'. Herveri LewReview, vol. 88. 1975, p. 1670.
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However, as has been discussed, in Bangladesh, proper attention in the designing of 
appropriate regulatory arrangements after privatisation has not been given. There was no 
public debate or discussion on the subject, thus the question of paying any attention to 
procedural aspects never arose. So the institutions and practices are inadequate for public 
and private enterprises.
Under the present politico-economic situation of Bangladesh, despite the current 
emphasis on private sector development and the privatisation of many public industrial 
enterprises, 168 industrial enterprises remained under public domain8 partly because the 
government is not prepared to give up ownership and control, that goes with it, in certain 
categories of industries as mentioned in RIP 1986; and partly because the absorbing 
capacity of the private buyers is not large enough to permit total divestitures or they are 
not interested in taking over certain industries. The natural monopolies like gas, 
electricity, water, telecommunications, posts, railway will remain under public domain for 
a long time because private sector presently lacks sufficient resource and experience to run 
them. There is also no plan to privatise them. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 5, the 
privatised industries failed to show much positive results which slowed the pace of 
privatisation in Bangladesh. Thus for good or ill, public enterprises in one form or another 
will be around for a long time. In any case, at present public enterprises in Bangladesh are 
continuing to play a meaningful role in the economy. Because o f their preponderance, the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the public enterprises will largely determine the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the national economy and the success or failure of plans for 
development and the consequent elevation of the living standards of the people. It is 
therefore worthwhile to make efforts to improve the performance of public enterprises.
Thus, more important than the issue of what should be the size and arena o f public 
or private enterprises, is the need to assure that whatever enterprises remain in the public 
domain be accountable, responsible, responsive and well managed. This can be met by 
setting their goal and objectives. And this can be done by a new legislation well debated in
8 Sec (able
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the parliament and not by bringing amendment after amendment through executive orders, 
as is the case now. Of course law and legal forms are not totally irrelevant or empty shells 
as suggested by authors, like Renner.’ An essential precondition o f efficient performance 
of the public enterprises is the commitment of the ruling elites towards that end.
Therefore the problem of devising more satisfactory means of public ownership 
requires urgent attention of the lawyers. This is more so, because public ownership by 
itself is no guarantee of democratic control of an enterprise, which should get more 
priority than the question of ownership because neither public nor private ownership 
automatically brings efficiency. Above all increase in democratic participation is not 
opposed to increased efficiency, though not a pre requisite.
The central issue will thus remain the neglected legal task of conscious 
institutional design. But this should not be misunderstood as implying that there is no 
place for market competition. In fact competition amongst various enterprises under the 
same corporation should be promoted through policies of liberalisation or effective 
'yardstick competition' within the public enterprise concerned, or to formulate and 
effectively monitor their pricing and investment criteria in such a way that the consumers 
are protected from the evils of monopoly and a misallocation of resources does not take 
place. The natural monopolies like, gas, electricity, water supply, railways, etc., should be 
broken into smaller and competitive units, subjected to inside competition, and required to 
act as commercial undertakings.
A pragmatic public policy should recognize where private alternatives might work 
better and, by the same token, where new forms of public provision may ameliorate 
endemic shortcomings of the markets. Most of all it must recognize that markets are not 
natural creations, they are always legally and politically structured. Hence the choice is 
not public or private, but which of many possible mixed public or private structures works 
best. Indeed the real debate should be changed from public enterprises versus private *
K. Renner. The Institutions o f Private Law and their Social Functions. 1949, p.217.
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enterprises, to the issue of how is democracy to be combined with autonomy.10 
Liberalisation is a creation of the state itself thus requires state intervention to keep it in 
operation11. Once competitive conditions are seen as requiring deliberate creation and 
policing, this raises the question of the accountability of the regulators who undertake this 
task.
As has been seen, in Bangladesh in absence of democracy, there was no 
accountability of the government to the people. Constitutional provisions were violated 
time and again. In absence of ensuring proper accountability of the government to the 
people how there can be accountability of public enterprises which are in practical sense 
the extension of the government of the day? Thus without establishing democracy in the 
country (to which the present elected government is at least theoretically committed) the 
designing of any regulatory or institutional means will be o f less practical value.
It was clear from the discussion in chapter 4 that the public corporation as a legal 
form of operating public ownership was not successful in Bangladesh. Holding company 
form instead has been advocated by the government.12 But as it was seen, holding 
company was not introduced as an answer to the inadequacies of the public corporation 
form but as a way of privatisation. This ad hoc selection of the method of public 
ownership most convenient for government neglected broader issues o f accountability and 
participation. Other problems also remain unresolved, in particular, the pervasive 
difficulties of reconciling the positive role of government with the autonomy of public 
enterprises. Although successive governments felt the need for granting greater autonomy 
but when it came to implementation the problem has always been by-passed. It is quite 
legitimate for the government as the owner of public enterprises to use them as
id by G.Hodgson. The Democratic Economy. 1984. p.209.
ic Power. 1982, pp.13-14; G. Hodgson, op. a t., pp.77-8).
12 See the NIP o f1982.
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instruments of its economic and public policies, but government interventions must be 
open.
Enterprises listed for divestiture but not yet privatised call for a public sector 
model o f management. This implies that the management is given autonomy in taking 
input and output decisions, for example, in laying off unproductive and surplus labour. 
The emphasis of the operations should be on profit as if the enterprises are privately 
owned, and an attempt should be made to limit their extra-enterprise objectives ( and 
design the mechanics of any continuing obligations.) The government has to ensure that 
they operate in such a way that their appeal to potential buyers improves rather than 
deteriorate over time. Unfortunately, plans for changes in the institutional and legal 
framework were produced (introduction of holding company), without any debate and 
amounted not to any general design.
It will be unrealistic to think that the public enterprises could be and should be 
made completely autonomous and independent from government's supervision. The 
problem is not one of avoidance of government's supervision and guidance but the real 
problem is that the government intervention is often excessive and not based on well 
established rules and conventions. Often the interference is not related to efficient 
functioning or for achieving the objectives of the enterprises.
The task therefore is to establish the institutional means to ensure openness. The 
starting point for this should be the recognition that dialogue between public enterprises 
and government is inevitable and that mutual recognition of a division of responsibilities 
is only likely to occur through such dialogue. Other forms o f openness, for example 
through outside scrutiny of corporate planning and performance, would also be needed to 
prevent a convenient symbiosis between the interests involved. This indicates to a need to 
review the present mechanisms available for measurement and publicity, for example 
through more coherent arrangements for efficiency audit Improved relations can be 
brought about through a freer flow of information between public enterprises and 
government at the planning stage. The implication is that planning should be taken more
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seriously as a joint activity within which mutual commitments can be established. 
Incoherent and confused relations with government and absence of meaningful outside 
scrutiny is likely to adversely affect economic performance. In this sense the thesis is in 
total agreement with Freedman's view that 'institutional legitimacy is an indispensable 
condition for institutional effectiveness’.13 The central point here is that the means for 
accountability and other forms of democratic legitimacy should not be considered as mere 
optional extras but essential to the success of public ownership.
Reforms in investment decision, in the assignment of extra enterprise obligations, 
in the rules of operations, in monitoring, in evaluation and in the exercise of relationships 
with the government are needed. A number o f possible reforms are available which do not 
depend upon transfer of ownership. They include; establishing a more "arm's length" 
relationship between government and the public corporations; allowing direct access to the 
capital market; shortening time horizons for pricing decisions; introducing independent 
regulatory commissions to control tariffs, changing managerial incentive structures etc. In 
fact, the reforms suggested by the Committee on Reorganisation o f Public Statutory 
Corporations (Enam Committee) were focused on clarifying objectives of the enterprises; 
improving the relationship between enterprises and their sponsoring ministries; 
establishing elaborate schemes for measuring the cost of social objectives; establishing 
formal performance contracts between the enterprise and the government; and developing 
shadow pricing mechanisms allowing the enterprise's true economic performance to be 
measured.14 If these announced measures are put into practice then there is no reason why 
the public enterprises in Bangladesh should not improve their performance. But most 
measures still remain unimplemented. Before blaming the public enterprises for their 
alleged inefficiency they should be given a chance to operate as commercial enterprises.
13
14 The recommendation» of the committee ha» been accepted by the government in principle and the government announced certaii 
measure» in accordance with the recommendations The measures announced by the government were published in Bangladesh 
Gazette Extraordinary dated 24.07.1983.
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In Bangladesh inefficient plan strategies and inefficient government 
administrations have also to a large extent, resulted in the inefficiency of public 
enterprises. To deal with the inefficiency of public enterprises without improving 
efficiency o f public administration, would amount to dealing with symptoms rather than 
root causes.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1
Public Sector Institutions in Bangladesh at Liberation
A. National Institutions with Headquarters in Pakistan
Name in Pakistan year New name in BD.
1. State Bank of Pakistan 1948 Bangladesh Bank
2. National Bank of Pak 1949 Sonali Bank
3. Industrial Dev. Bank
o f Pakistan
4 Pak.Industrial and 
Investment Credit
1959 BD. Shilpa Bank
Corporation 1957
5. National Investment Trust 1962 BD. Shilpa Rin 
Sangstha
6. Investment Corporation of
Pakistan 1966
7. Equity Participation Fund 1966
8. Agricultural Dev. Bank 1961 BD. Krishi Bank
9. House Building Finance
Corporation 1952 No change in name.
10 Pak. Insurance Corporation 1959 Not replicated.
11. Security Printing Press 1962
12. Pak. International Airlines 1959 Bangladesh Biman
13. Radio Pakistan 1948 Radio Bangladesh
14. National Shipping
Corporation o f Pakistan 1963 BD. Shipping Corp.
15. Pak. TV Corporation 1965 TV Corp. of BD.
16. Trading Corp. of Pak. 1967 Trading Corp. of BD
17. Atomic Energy Commission 1965 Same
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B. Public Institutions under the Government o f  East Pakistan.
Old Name year New name in BD.
18. E.Pak. Industrial Dev. Corp. 1962 BD. Ind. Dev. Corp.
19. Agricultural Dev. Corp. 1961 same
20. Water and Power Dev. Board 1959 same
21. Small Industries Corp. 1957 same
22. Road Transport Corp. 1961 same
23. Pak. Eastern Railways 1962 Bangladesh Railway
24. Inland Water Transport 
Authority 1958 same
23. E.Pak. Shipping Corp. 1964 BD. Shipping Corp.
26. Forest Industries Dev. Corp. 1957 same
27. Film Dev. Corporation 1957 same
28. Fisheries Dev. Corp. 1961 same
29. Dhaka Improvement Trust 1956 same
30. Khulna Dev. Authority 1960 same
31. Chittagong Dev. Authority 1959 same
32. Water and Sewerage Authority 1959 same
33. Jute Marketing Corp. 1957 same
34. Jute Price Stabilisation 
Corporation 1968 same
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A PPE N D IX -2
P ublic  Sector C o rp o ra tio n s  in B angladesh  (1986)
A. In d u stria l Sector:
I. Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation
2 Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation
3. Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries Corporation
4. Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation
5. Bangladesh Steel and Engineering Corporation
6. Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation.
7. Bangladesh Jute Corporation
8. Bangladesh Handloom Board
9. Bangladesh sericulture Board
10. Telephone Shilpa Sangstha Ltd.
II. Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority
12. Bangladesh Film Development Corporation
13. Bangladesh Mukti Jodha Kalyan Trust
B. F inancial and  In su ran ce  Secto r
14. Sonali Bank
15. Janata Bank
16. Agrani Bank
17. Rupali Bank
18. Bangladesh Krishi Bank
19. Bangladesh Shilpa Bank
20. Bangladesh Shilpa Rin Shangstha
21. Investment Corporation of Bangladesh
22. Bangladesh House Building Finance Corporation
23. Shadharan Bima Corporation
24. Jiban Bima Corporation
C. Transport and Tourism Sector
25. Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Corporation
26. Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority
27. Bangladesh Shipping Corporation
28. Chittagong Port Authority
29. Port of Chalna Authority
30. Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation
31. Bangladesh Biman
32. Bangladesh Parjatan Corporation
33. Civil Aviation Authority
D. Agriculture and Water Resources Sector
34. Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation
35. Bangladesh Forest Industries Corporation
36. Bangladesh Fisheries Development Corporation
37. Bangladesh Tea Board
38. Bangladesh Water Development Board
39. Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority
40. Chittagong Water Supply and Sewerage Authority
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E. Energy Sector
41. Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral Corporation
42. Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation
43. Bangladesh Power Development Board
44. Rural Electrification Board
F. Area Development and Spatial Planning Sector
45. Dhaka Improvement Trust
46. Chittagong Improvement Trust
47. Khulna Development Authority
48. Rajshahi Town Development Authority
G. Trading Sector
49. Trading Corporation of Bangladesh
50. Bangladesh Consumers Supply Co. Ltd.
Source: The Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary, July 1986.
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APPENDIX-3
The
B angladesh G azette 
E x trao rd in ary
Sunday, March 26, 1972
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH 
MINISTRY OF LAW AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS
(Law Division)
NOTIFICATION
No. 287-Pub- 26 March 1972-The following Order made by the President on the advice of 
the Prime Minister, o f  the People's Republic of Bangladesh on the 26th March, 1972, is 
hereby published for general information:-
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH
MINISTRY OF LAW AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 
(Law Division)
President's Order No. 27 of 1972.
THE BANGLADESH INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES (NATIONALISATION) ORDER 
1972.
Whereas it is expedient to provide for the nationalisation of certain industrial 
enterprises in Bangladesh and for the establishment of Corporations for the purpose o f co­
ordination and supervision of the nationalised industrial enterprises and for matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto
Now, Therefore, in pursuance of the Proclamation of Independence of Bangladesh 
read with the Provisional Constitution of Bangladesh Order, 1972, and in exercise o f all 
powers enabling him in that behalf, the President is pleased to make the following Order:-
1. (1) This Order may be called the Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises 
(Nationalisation) Order, 1972,
(2) It extends to the whole of Bangladesh.
(3) It shall come into force at once.
2. In this Order, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context-
(a) "Board" means the Board of Directors of a Corporation;
(b) "Chairman" means the Chairman of a Corporation;
(c) "Corporation" means a corporation established by this Order;
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(d) "Director" means Director of a corporation;
(e) "Government" means the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh;
(f) "prescribed" means prescribed by rules or regulations made under this Order;
(g) "Scheduled industrial enterprises" means industrial enterprises enumerated in 
the Schedules to this Order.
3. The provisions of this Order and any rule or regulation made thereunder shall 
have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for 
the time being in force.
4. On the commencement of this Order, all the shares in each of the scheduled 
industrial enterprises or as the case may be the industrial enterprise placed under a 
Corporation by an order under clause (1) o f Article 10 which have not already vested in 
the Government by or under any other law for the time being in force, shall, by virtue of 
this Article and without further assurance, stand vested in, and allotted to, the Government 
free of any trust, mortgage, charge, lien, interest or other encumbrance whatsoever, and 
the Government shall, as from such commencement, be the sole share-holder of such 
industrial enterprises.
5. Notwithstanding anything contained in any memorandum or articles of 
association of any scheduled industrial enterprises or, as the case may be, the industrial 
enterprises placed under a Corporation by an order under clause (1) o f Article 10, or in 
any charter, agreement, contract or other instrument whatsoever, the Government may, in 
respect of any such industrial enterprise;
(a) the Government may, in respect of any scheduled industrial enterprise, take 
such measures and do such things as it deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of 
efficient running of such industrial enterprise;
(b) dissolve the Board of Directors of such industrial enterprise and appoint new 
Directors;
(c) terminate any managing agency agreement in respect of such industrial 
enterprise; and
(d) modify or amend the memorandum or articles of association or any charter, 
agreement, contract or instrument of such industrial enterprise.
6. Every provision in any law or in any memorandum or articles of association or 
any other charter or instrument of any scheduled industrial enterprise or, as the case may 
be, the industrial enterprises placed under a Corporation by an order under clause (1) of 
Article 10 providing for any consequence to follow, or requiring any act or thing to be 
done, or entitling any person to do any act or thing or to take any action whatsoever, as 
result of a reduction in the number, of the members of such industrial enterprises below a 
certain number, shall be o f no effect in relation to such industrial enterprise.
7. The Government may, by rules, modify in their application to any scheduled 
industrial enterprise or, as the case may be, the industrial enterprises placed under a 
Corporation by an order under clause (1) of Article 10 any of the provisions of the 
Companies Act, 1913 (act VII of 1913), or of any rules made thereunder.
8. Until the Government otherwise directs:-
(a) the Board of Directors o f a scheduled industrial enterprise, or, as the case may 
be, the industrial enterprises placed under a Corporation by an order under clause (1) of
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Article 10 which was in existence immediately before the commencement of this Order, 
shall continue to function, a Board appointed by the Government;
(b) the chief executive of a scheduled industrial enterprise or, as the case may be, 
the industrial enterprises placed under a Corporation by an order under clause (1) of 
Article 10 shall on behalf of the Government continue to exercise such powers of 
management in respect of the scheduled enterprise or, as the case may be, the industrial 
enterprises placed under a Corporation by an order under clause (1) of Article 10 as were 
vested in him immediately before the commencement of this Order; and
(c) all contracts and agreements, including the managing agency agreements, and 
all rules, regulations and bye-laws o f any scheduled industrial enterprise, or, as the case 
may be, the industrial enterprises placed under a Corporation by an order under clause(l) 
of Article 10 which were in force immediately before the commencement of this Order, 
shall continue to remain in force.
9. The Government shall pay in respect of the shares vested in the Government 
under Article 4 such compensation as may be determined by it:
Provided that such compensation shall not exceed the paid-up value o f such shares.
10. On the commencement o f this Order, there shall be established the following 
corporations:
(a) Bangladesh Jute Industries Corporation, which shall have and exercise all the 
powers of a corporation in respect of the industrial enterprises engaged in jute 
manufacturing enumerated in the First Schedule;
(b) Bangladesh Cotton Mills Corporation, which shall have and exercise all the 
powers of a corporation in respect of the industrial enterprises engaged in cotton 
manufacturing enumerated in the Second Schedule;
(c) Bangladesh Sugar Mills Corporation, which shall have and exercise all the 
powers of a corporation in respect of all the sugar mills enterprises enumerated in the 
Third Schedule;
(d) (i) Bangladesh Steel Mills Corporation;
(ii) Bangladesh Paper and Board Corporation;
(iii) Bangladesh Fertiliser, Chemical and
Pharmaceutical Corporation;
(iv) Bangladesh Engineering and Shipbuilding
Corporation;
(v) Bangladesh Minerals, Oil and Gas Corporation
to be called in short Petrobangla;
(vi) Bangladesh Forest Product Corporation;
(vii) Bangladesh Tanneries Corporation which shall respectively have and 
exercise the powers of a corporation in respect of such industrial enterprises, including 
industrial enterprises vested in Government under the Bangladesh Abandoned Property 
(control, Management and Disposal) Order, 1972 or owned and managed by a statutory 
corporation, which the Government may place under it by an order notified in the official 
Gazette.
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(1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, an industrial 
enterprise, placed under any Corporation by an order notified in the official Gazette under 
sub-clause (d) of clause (1) of Article 10, and all shares or other proprietary interest in 
such industrial enterprise shall be deemed to have always vested in the Government and 
no such order shall be challenged on the ground that the industrial enterprise or the shares 
or interest therein had not vested in the Government, or that the industrial enterprise, or 
any share or interest therein, was not liable to be vested in the Government.
(2) Each corporation shall be a body corporate, having perpetual succession 
and a common seal with power, subject to the provision of this Order, to acquire, hold and 
dispose of property, both movable and immovable, and shall by the said name sue and be 
sued.
(3) The head office o f each Corporation shall be at Dacca.
11. (1) The general direction and administration of the affairs and business of a 
corporation shall vest in a Board of Directors which may exercise all powers and do all 
acts and things which may be exercised or done by the Corporation.
(2) The Board shall be subject to the superintendence and control of the 
Government and shall be guided, in the discharge of its functions, by such general or 
special instruction as may, from time to time, be given to it by the Government.
12. (1) The Board shall consist of a Chairman and such number of other Directors 
not exceeding six as the Government may fix.
(2) The Chairman and other Directors shall be appointed by the 
Government for such period and on such terms and conditions as the Government may 
determine.
(3) The Chairman or any other Director may, at any time, resign:
Provided that his resignation shall not take effect until accepted by the
Government.
(4) No act or proceeding of the Board shall be invalid merely on the ground 
of existence of any vacancy in, or any defect in the constitution of the Board.
13. (1) The Chairman shall be the chief executive officer of a Corporation.
(2) The Chairman and any other Director shall exercise such powers, 
perform such functions and discharge such duties as may be prescribed.
14. (1) The meetings of the Board shall be held at such times and places and in 
such manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that a meeting may also be otherwise convened by the Chairman 
when he so thinks fit.
(2) If for any reason the Chairman is unable to be present in a meeting of 
the Board, a Director authorised in writing by the Chairman shall preside at the meeting.
(3) At a meeting of the Board each Director shall have one vote and in the 
event of equality o f votes the Chairman shall have a second or casting vote.
15. (1) the Board may appoint such committee or committees as it thinks fit to 
assist it in the efficient discharge of its functions.
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(2) The Board may delegate its power to the Chairman for the purpose of 
efficient functioning of Corporation.
(3) The Chairman may delegate his powers to the officers of a Corporation.
16. A Corporation may appoint such-officers, consultants, advisers, auditors and 
employees as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of its functions on such 
terms and conditions as it may determine.
17. (1) It shall be the function of Corporation to supervise and co-ordinate, subject 
to any regulation that may be made in this behalf, the activities, business and affairs o f the 
scheduled industrial enterprises placed under it by Article 10.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the 
Corporation shall have to exercise such powers as may be prescribed in respect of the 
scheduled industrial enterprises.
(3) The Corporation shall, in respect of any scheduled industrial enterprise, 
also exercise such of the powers of the Government as the Government may by 
notification in the official Gazette delegate to the Corporation.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Order, a Corporation shall 
exercise such other powers and functions as may be conferred on it by or under any law.
18. (1) the authorised share capital of each Corporation shall be one crore of takas 
each, to be subscribed by the Government, in the manner determined by the Government 
from time to time according to the requirements of the Corporation.
(2) The initial share capital shall be five lakhs of taka fully paid up and 
subscribed by the Government.
19. A Corporation shall by such date in each year as may be prescribed, by rules, 
submit to the Government for approval a statement, to be called the Annual Budget 
Statement, in the prescribed form for every financial year showing estimated receipts and 
expenditure and sums which are likely to be required from the Government during that 
financial year.
20. (1) A Corporation may spend such sums as it think fit on the basis of the 
Annual Budget Statement approved by the Government under Article 19.
(2) A Corporation may, with the prior approval of the Government, borrow 
such sums, with or without security, as may be required by it to discharge its functions 
under this Order.
21. (1) A Corporation shall maintain proper accounts and other relevant records 
and prepare annual statement of accounts, including a profit and loss account and balance- 
sheet.
(2) The accounts of Corporation shall be audited by not less than two 
accountants, being chartered accounts within the meaning of the Chartered Accounts 
Ordinance, 1961 (Ord. X of 1961), who shall be appointed by the Government.
22. (1) A Corporation shall furnish to the Government such returns, reports and 
statements as the Government may from time to time require.
(2) A Corporation shall, as soon as possible after the end of every financial 
year, furnish to the Government a statement of accounts audited by the auditors under 
Article 21 together with an annual report on the conduct of its affairs for that year.
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(3) The auditors shall in their report upon the annual balance-sheet and 
accounts state whether in their opinion the balance-sheet is a full and fair balance-sheet 
and contains all necessary particulars and is properly drawn up so as to exhibit and correct 
view of the state of affairs of a Corporation, and in case they have called for any 
explanation or information from the Board, whether it has been given and whether it is 
satisfactory.
(4) The Government may, at any time, issue directions to the auditors 
requiring them to report to it upon the adequacy of measures taken by the Corporation for 
protection of the interest of the Government and creditors or upon the sufficiency of their 
procedure in auditing the affairs of a Corporation and may, at any time, enlarge or extend 
the scope of the audit or direct that a different procedure in audit be adopted or that any 
other examination be made by the auditors if in its opinion the interest of the Government 
so requires.
(5) The copies of the audited accounts and annual report shall be published 
in the official Gazette and shall be laid before the Legislature.
23. No provision of law relating to the winding up of companies shall apply to a 
corporation and a Corporation shall not be wound up save by order of the Government and 
in such manner as it may direct.
24. The Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make rules for the 
purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Order.
25. (1) The Board may, with the previous approval of the Government, make 
regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Order and the rules, to provide for 
all matters for which provision is necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to 
the provisions o f this Order.
(2) All regulation made under this Article shall be published in the official 
Gazette and shall come into force on such publication.
26. (1) The Government may, by order transfer to a Corporation such portions of 
the property, assets and liabilities, and such officers and employees of the Bangladesh 
Industrial Development Corporation as the Government deem fit on terms and conditions 
to be determined by the Government.
(2) The Government may also, by an order, transfer to a Corporation such 
portion o f the property, assets and liabilities and such officers and employees belonging to 
the Government as it may deem fit on terms and conditions to be determined by the 
Government.
Dacca;
The 26 March, 1972
A.S. CHOWDHURY 
President
of the People's Republic o f Bangladesh.
AZIMUDDIN AHMED 
Deputy Secretary.
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APPENDIX-4
MANAGEMENT CONTRACT
This MANAGEMENT CONTRACT is made and entered into on this th e .....day
of 1988.
BETWEEN
.................... , a public company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1913
having its registered office at Bangladesh Steel House, Kawran Bazar, Dhaka hereinafter 
referred to as the "COMPANY" (which expression shall mean and include its successors- 
in-interest, legal representative and assign) of the ONE PART.
AND
....................................... , a corporation established by statute under the Bangladesh
Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) Order, 1972 by the Government of the Peoples 
Republic of Bangladesh (President's Order No. 27 of 1972) and having its office at 
Kawran Bazar, Dhaka, hereinafter referred to as the "BSEC" (which expression shall mean 
and include its successors-in-interest, legal representative and assign) of the OTHER 
PART.
WHEREAS the COMPANY in the course of its business requires management, 
administration and other allied services for efficient business operation of the country.
AND WHEREAS the COMPANY has requested the BSEC to perform such 
management and other services as required by them and the BSEC has accepted the said 
request.
AND WHEREAS in the Articles of Association of the COMPANY it is provided, 
inter alia, that the Board of Directors of the COMPANY may enter into management 
contract with any Corporation for management service of the Company on such terms and 
conditions as may be mutually agreed upon.
NOW, THEREFORE, IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PREMISES THE AFORESAID 
PARTIES ABOVE-NAMED HAVE MUTUALLY AGREED TO EXECUTE THE SAID 
MANAGEMENT CONTRACT AS FOLLOWS:
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A. APPOINTMENT OF BSEC
The COMPANY hereby appoints the BSEC for a period of 10 (ten) years with 
effect from 30th June, 1987 to manage and administer the Company in matters relating to 
operation and business o f the Company.
B. SERVICE OF BSEC
BSEC shall provide such managerial, administrative, advisory and other allied 
services for efficient and proper operation and function of the business of the COMPANY 
the scope of which is detailed hereunder:
01. BSEC shall advise and guide the COMPANY in all major activities such as 
investment, procurement, production, marketing, financing, staffing and other areas of 
operation.
02. BSEC shall extend the appropriate guide-lines for the COMPANY to enable it to 
operate on commercial consideration for achieving target of production and sales within 
the budget approved by the Board.
03. BSEC shall advise the COMPANY on measures to be taken for improving 
performance of the COMPANY to attain better result and to earn profit.
04. BSEC shall asses the performance o f the COMPANY on the basis of relevant 
information provided by the COMPANY and make appropriate recommendations to the 
COMPANY for improvement and better results.
05. BSEC shall prescribe and frame proper measures to ensure economic and efficient use 
o f all resources available at the disposal o f the COMPANY and prescribe means to keep 
the rate of wastage at minimum level.
06. BSEC shall assist the COMPANY by providing appropriate rules and regulations for 
day to day maintenance of the plant and equipment and to keep the same in good running 
condition for optimum utilisation of the production facility.
07. The COMPANY shall regularly provide the BSEC with MIS Report and all other 
reports, returns and accounts incidental to all its activities and the BSEC shall advise 
where required, the COMPANY in the light of the said information to ensure better results 
and optimum efficiency in operation.
08. BSEC shall assist the COMPANY continuously to improve its profitability by 
improving the standard of efficiency of manpower, method, machine and elimination of 
wastage of materials.
09. BSEC shall prescribe guide-lines and advise the COMPANY for initiating and 
undertaking research and development activities.
10. On the request o f the COMPANY, BSEC shall give advise, guidance, decisions and 
approval in the functional field of the COMPANY, including, making and framing of such 
guide-lines as and when required by the COMPANY in all matters.
11. BSEC shall perform any other function as BSEC and the COMPANY may find 
necessary and expedient.
C. FIXATION OF PRICE AND SALE OF THE PRODUCTS OF THE COMPANY
a) The cost and the proposed price of the products of the COMPANY shall be placed 
periodically before BSEC for examination and approval of the competent authority. The
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annual production target of the COMPANY with due recommendation shall br placed 
before the Corporation for fixation o f the target prior to taking any decision in the meeting 
of the Board o f Directors.
b) BSEC shall recommend appropriate measures for ensuring brisk sale of the products of 
the COMPANY and for the removal of bottlenecks, if any, in the marketing of the said 
products including the imposition of restriction in the import of wires manufactured by the 
company.
D. PROCUREMENT OF RAW MATERIALS
12. BSEC shall assist the COMPANY by providing proper procedural rules for efficient 
procurement policy for the instant and timely supply of raw materials and spare parts to 
ensure uninterrupted production line and to achieve production of optimum quantity and 
standard quality goods.
13. BSEC shall prescribe appropriate rules for material management keeping in view that 
the level of stocks are kept at the minimum.
E. APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE/MANAGING DIRECTOR.
o f f ic e r s  a n d  o t h e r  e m p l o y e e s  o f  t h é  Co m p a n y :
14. BSEC shall select/appoint the Chief Executive/Managing Director of the COMPANY 
and such other Officers, Consultants, Advisers and Employees as may be necessary for the 
efficient operation of the COMPANY on such terms and conditions as may be determined, 
and agreed upon.
15. BSEC may, if it considers expedient in the interest of better administration of the 
affairs and business of the COMPANY, transfer Officers and other Employees of BSEC to 
the COMPANY, including such workers from any enterprise placed under the BSEC, on 
such terms and conditions as may be determined and mutually agreed upon between the 
BSEC and the COMPANY.
16. The organogram of the COMPANY showing the total requirement of personnel with 
job specifications shall be placed with their due recommendation thereon before the BSEC 
for finalisation before taking decision in the meeting of the Directors.
17. BSEC shall provide the appropriate procedural guide-lines for the appointment, 
recruitment, training and promotion of officers/staff/workers within the approved 
organogram of the COMPANY.
18. BSEC shall provide and frame appropriate procedural guide-lines in matters of 
management relationship and disciplinary action in respect of officers/staff/workers of the 
COMPANY.
19. BSEC shall provide appropriate rules for giving of prizes, commendation certificate, 
cash awards, special increment and special promotion to the concerned personnels of the 
COMPANY.
20. BSEC shall provide proper and efficient guide-lines for the development of manpower 
and to arrange training programme for the workers/employees/officers of the COMPANY.
F. BUDGET AND ACCOUNTS OF THE COMPANY
21. The Revenue and Capital budget and BMRE Scheme, if any, shall be placed before the 
BSEC for finalisation prior to taking of any decision in the meeting of the Board of 
Directors.
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22. BSEC shall prescribe proper financial rule for capital/revenue expenditure within the 
approved budget, specifying the persons authorised to incur or approve the expenditure.
23. BSEC shall provide appropriate procedural guide-lines and measures for ensuring 
economic utilization o f the COMPANY'S funds.
23. BSEC shall be provided with all audit reports of the COMPANY from which they 
advise the COMPANY for better result and improvement in the financial management.
G. REMUNERATION OF BSEC
25. In consideration o f the services rendered by BSEC the COMPANY shall pay such 
remuneration to BSEC from time to time as may be fixed mutually during the tenure of 
this Management Contract.
H. TERMINATION
26. This Management Contract shall remain valid until it is mutually discontinued by both 
parties, i.e. by BSEC and the COMPANY.
27. Upon termination of the Management Contract for any reason whatsoever, all amount 
due and owing as between the COMPANY and BSEC shall become immediately due and
Gyable, without prejudice to any claim otherwise arising from any breach of this anagement Contract.
1. ARBITRATION
28. In case of any dispute or differences arising between the parties relating to this 
Management Contract, the same shall be referred to the arbitration of two arbitrators to be 
appointed one each by the parties and the decision of the arbitrators shall be final and 
binding upon the parties. The arbitration shall be in accordance with the Arbitration Act, 
1940 or any amendment made thereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF THE PARTIES ABOVE NAMED HAVE 
SEALED AND SIGNED THIS MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ON THIS THE -—  DAY 
O F --------1988
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APPEND IX - S
L is t o r persons in terview ed in B angladesh
(Number of persons in the bracket)
[In the interest of anonymity names and official positions are avoided. Since precise rank 
would identify individuals too readily, hence "officials" is used.]
Members o f Parliament
Mr. A.S.M. Abdur Rab.
Mr. Nurul Islam Moni.
Mr. Monzur Rahman Biswas.
Mr. Abdur Rahim.
Mr. Mr. Fazle Rabbi.
Additional Secretary ( 1 )
Joint Secretary (3)
Deputy Secretary (5)
Assistant Secretary (5)
Ministry of Finance
Joint Secretary (1)
Assistant Secretary (6)
Planning Commission
Member Planning Commission (1) 
Senior Assistant Secretary (3)
Ministry of Law and Justice
Joint Secretary (1)
Deputy Secretary (2)
Dhaka Chamber of Commerce
Mmembers of Executive Committee (5) 
Officials (3)
Bangladesh Shilpa Bank
Officials (3)
BJMC
Officials(7)
BCIC
Officials (]5)
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BSEC
Officials (12)
Labour leaders (3)
BSF1C
Officials (5)
Apart from the above persons, interviews with 57 officials, at various levels, and 38 labour 
leaders and workers o f different enterprises were held. The enterprises are:-
Atlas Bangladesh Ltd.,
Bangladesh Machine Tools Factory Ltd.,
Bangladesh Diesel Plant Ltd.,
Bangladesh Cycle Industries Ltd.,
Chittagong Steel Mills Ltd.,
Chittagong Cement Clinker & Grinding Co. Ltd.,
Dhaka Steel Works Ltd.,
Eastern Cables Ltd.,
Eagle Box & Carton Manufacturing Co. Ltd.,
Gazi Wires Ltd.,
Kamaphuli Paper Mills Ltd.,
Kamaphuli Rayon & Chemicals Ltd.,
Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd.,
Mehar Industries (Bangladesh) Ltd.,
Metalex Corporation Ltd.,
National Tubes Ltd.,
North Bengal Paper Mills Ltd.,
Pragoti Industries Ltd.,
Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Ltd.,
Zia Fertiliser Co. Ltd.
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